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  Summary 
The main objective of the thesis is to investigate the patterns, causes, and (labor market) consequences 
of structural change in developing countries especially those in Africa. The thesis begins from the 
premise that our understanding of structural change in Africa is limited by a great statistical problem. 
Building on the existing work, the thesis produces a new sectoral database for Africa. Using this 
database, which reflects current sectoral development in Africa, the thesis establishes many empirical 
regularities about the patterns, causes and consequences of structural change in Africa.  
Chapter 1 provides a general introduction and the thesis outline. The construction of new sectoral 
indicators in Africa is discussed in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 provides empirical evidence on the patterns of structural change and labor market 
consequences of structural change in Africa. The analysis in this chapter suggests that while structural 
change has played an important role in the productivity growth of Africa, the general direction of 
change of the structure of African economies may not bode well for sustainable growth and poverty 
reduction. Particularly, there has been a reallocation of workers to lower-paid jobs or into the informal 
sector, leading to increased uncertainty for workers. 
Chapter 4 examines technological change and the role of structural change in technological catch-up 
within Africa. The motivation for examining technological catch-up to a local frontier is based on the 
well-established evidence that suggests that the diffusion of technological knowledge from the global 
frontier decreases in intensity with geographical and institutional distance. The analysis highlights that 
successful convergence is driven more by technological catch-up and less by technological change. 
The chapter explores further the special role of technological catch-up by decomposing it into within-
sector convergence, between-sector convergence and initial specialization. The results emphasize the 
special role of structural change in catch-up within Africa.  
There is a general view that Africa is deindustrializing.  Chapter 5 examines the extent to which the 
existing results are sensitive to sample size and new sectoral indicators. The chapter shows that 
deindustrialization is not the typical experience of most countries in the region.  Instead, we observe 
a pattern where the manufacturing output share for a typical African country has not significantly 
changed since 1970. The chapter further examines the potential drivers of manufacturing performance 
in Africa.  
There is a growing literature that attributes cross-country differences in the speed of structural change 
and labor productivity growth to distortions. Structural reforms are often described as the magic wand 
that can be used to reduce rigidities that exist in markets. In developing countries where a series of 
structural reforms have been implemented over the last decades, there is little evidence on the impacts 
of these reforms on labor productivity growth. Most importantly, the few studies that exist focus on 
the effects of reforms on productivity growth but do not assess how these effects are distributed 
between the within and structural components. This masks the allocative efficiency channels through 
which reforms affect labor productivity growth. Chapter 6 of this thesis sheds light on the mechanisms 





overwhelmingly show that reforms affect growth in developing countries mostly by inducing an 
efficient reallocation of resources within sectors but not across sectors. 
Chapter 7 present the concluding remarks of thesis, policy recommendations, limitations and 
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It is now evident that economic development involves the successful transformation of the structure 
of the economy. This process involves multi-dimensional changes in the socio-economic system, 
including its demographic composition, production structure, institutional setting,  and social structure 
(Nissanke, 2019).  Structural change1 – i.e., changes in the productive structure or the shift of resources 
from low productivity sectors to high productivity sectors – is the central feature of this 
transformation and often precedes changes in the other dimensions of the socio-economic system. 
The postwar experience of developing countries has shown that structural change is at the heart of 
the divergent growth paths with different patterns of structural change explaining much of the 
variation in total labor productivity and income growth among developing countries. While the past 
decades have been marked as boom times for industrial transformation in many countries in Asia, the 
rate of productive transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth Africa) and Latin America was 
unsatisfactory, and at best, lackluster.  
After independence, many African countries with the advantage of backwardness2, sectoral 
productivity gaps, and the substantial endowment of manufacturing-relevant natural resources were 
expected to achieve rapid industrialization, sustained economic growth, and poverty reduction. In the 
1960s,  Africa’s growth potential was ranked ahead of East Asia’s by a leading development economics 
textbook and the then chief economist of the World Bank expected the growth rate of some African 
countries to reach or exceed 7 percent per annum (Enke, 1963 and Kamark, 1967 cf Easterly & Levine, 
1997). However, six decades after independence, industrialization is elusive, economic development 
has mostly eluded the continent in sharp contrast to this initial optimism and the immediate post-
independence nationalist aspirations for rapid growth. Similarly, Latin America, with the favorable 
initial condition – a higher per capita income than the rest of the developing world after the Second 
World War – was expected to catch-up to the then industrialized world. And yet, today, many 
countries in Latin America are still middle-income countries facing considerable challenges to moving 
out of the middle-income trap and reducing pervasive inequality. Conversely, some countries in Asia 
enjoyed a process of profound structural transformation, which altered the productive structure of 
their economy. 
At the core of this transformation are significant productivity increases within countries, productivity 
convergence within East Asia, and the closure of the productivity gap with the technology frontier, 
i.e., the US. What is often understated in the East Asian miracle story is the phenomenon of 
productivity catch-up within East Asia. For much of the 20th century, Japan was the economic leader 
of East Asia. By the turn of the 21st century, the productivity of Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Taiwan converged. The productivity gap of China, Malaysia, and the Philippines with 
Japan has also reduced significantly. By catching-up with the productivity of the regional economic 
leader, the productivity gap of East Asia with the US has also reduced considerably. But this is not the 
case for Africa and Latin America. For example, the aggregate labor productivity level of East Asia 
 
1 Here I am referring to structural change that has a positive impact on productivity. 
2 In the catch-up literature, the greater the backlog of technological knowledge with a developing country, the greater 
possibility of rapid industrialization because learning from existing technological knowledge or imitation is often faster 
and less expensive than new innovations. However, the ability of the country to benefit from the advantage of 





was 15% of the US level in 1963 but had reached 70% of the US level by 2010. The productivity of 
Latin American was 35% of the US level in 1963 but shrank to 25% by 2010 (Üngör, 2017). The labor 
productivity of Africa was less than 15% of the US productivity level in the 1960s and has widened 
over time (see chapter 4 figure A4.2). At the sectoral level, labor productivity in the manufacturing 
and services sectors of Africa has reduced from about 20% in the 1960s to 10% in 2010 (see figures 
3A & 3B in de Vries, Timmer, & de Vries, 2015) 
There is a voluminous literature trying to explain the sources of this divergence, notably; the causes 
of the East Asia miracle; Africa’s growth tragedy; Latin America’s failure; and the awry economic 
performance of Africa and Latin America relative to East Asia. These comparative studies focus on 
the differences in institutional and policy reforms in explaining the divergence, mostly based on 
empirical analysis of aggregate macroeconomic indicators. These explanations have often generated 
controversy and unproductive bickering among development economists. In recent periods, a less 
controversial approach – the structural approach – has evolved in the literature, which emphasizes the 
different patterns of structural change as an explanation for much of the variation in total labor 
productivity and income growth between Asia and the rest of the developing world (e.g. see McMillan 
et al., 2014; Timmer et al., 2015; Üngör, 2017; Lavopa & Szirmai, 2018).3 These explanations being 
offered take their theoretical inspiration from the two-sector model of Lewis (1954).  
The evolving literature has emphasized structural change as a missing ingredient in Africa’s recent 
growth turnaround. As a result, industrialization and structural change are now very much a part of 
the prevailing policy rhetoric. While the specific aspect of structural change, such as 
deindustrialization, has not been disputed in Asia and Latin America, the pattern of deindustrialization 
in Africa is inconclusive. Furthermore, much of the rapidly evolving literature on structural change in 
Africa is based on a database built before the recent statistical reforms which have significantly 
improved sectoral indicators in Africa. A further concern is that much of the literature on Africa 
focuses on the extent of labor reallocation and labor productivity, neglecting other consequences of 
structural change such as labor market volatility, which are among the root causes of (transitory or 
structural) unemployment. The purpose of this thesis is to bring up-to-date the empirical patterns of 
structural change in Africa, in the light of new sectoral indicators; and extend the empirical analysis 
from the mere examination of patterns of structural change to potential causes as well as consequences 
of structural change in Africa. In addition, we also consider structural reforms as a fundamental 
correlate of productivity growth either via intra or inter-reallocation mechanisms in all developing 
countries for which data is available. In doing so, this thesis provides empirical evidence to guide 
policymakers in Africa to move from rhetoric to the realization of absorbing the majority of the labor 
force in the modern sector.  
1.2 Africa’s Elusive Quest for Industrialization  
In the pursuit of economic development, the post-independence era in Africa saw nationalist 
aspirations being closely connected with the quest for rapid industrialization. For example, Kwame 
Nkrumah, the leader of Africa’s political renaissance, said, “industry… is the means by which rapid 
 
3 These studies renewed interest in the role that structural change plays in the economic development of countries. Earlier 
studies emphasizing the role of economic structure in development include Chenery (1955, 1960, 1982), Chenery & Taylor 





improvement in Africa’s living standards is possible…” (Nkrumah, 1965 cf Page, 2011). The passion 
for rapid industrialization is understandable since, both in theory and history, industrialization has 
been the well-known path to modernization. For example, manufacturing offers unique opportunities 
for capital accumulation, effective backward and forward linkages, economies of scale, and both 
embodied and disembodied technological progress (Szirmai, 2012:410). These special growth effects 
were first observed as a stylized fact of growth by Kuznets and later formalized into three laws by 
Kaldor (1966). This special role of manufacturing is known as the engine of growth hypothesis in the 
literature. Historically, the industrial revolution made possible the sustained productivity growth of 
Europe and the US in the 18th century, then Japan in the late 19th century (Rodrik, 2016). The East 
Asian miracle is a story of industrialization. Therefore, for post-independence African leaders, 
dreaming about industrialization was a step in the right direction. However, dreaming is one thing, 
realizing that dream is another thing. 
Many African countries were inspired by a vision of development set in motion by a ‘big push’, which 
primarily involves a significant investment effort by the state. In line with the proposition that industry 
is the means to increase per capita income, the state invested heavily in industry, emphasizing import-
substitution, structural change, and a less open economy (Killick, 2010). Industrialization, in a broad 
sense, was seen synonymously as development. This notion of development did not take place within 
an intellectual vacuum. The industrial policies of post-independence Africa were, in many ways, similar 
to or influenced by a set of leading ideas on economic development after the Second World War. The 
first prominent idea was that economic development involves the process of discontinuous structural 
transformation (e.g., Hirschman, 1958; Lewis, 1954; Rostow, 1960). Second, beyond a certain 
threshold of per capita income, economic growth is self-sustaining, and below this threshold, countries 
will remain in poverty traps (e.g., Leibenstein, 1957; Nurkse, 1953). Third, to escape poverty traps and 
achieve self-sustaining growth, ‘a critical minimum effort’ or ‘a big push’ is required (e.g., Leibenstein, 
1957; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). Fourth, the big push should be targeted at increasing the ratio of 
investment to national income (Domar, 1957; Harrod, 1948). Finally, to alter the inherited colonial 
structure of exporting primary products and importing manufactures, rapid (import-substitution) 
industrialization is needed to satisfy domestic demand for manufactures (see Killick, 2010, for further 
discussion). Making theory work in practice often involves a heuristic process of contextualization. 
As is well-known, import-substitution industrialization failed in Africa. The import-substituting 
industries created by the state were often uncompetitive and unsustainable (Page, 2011). The drive for 
manufacturing in Africa lost steam with the political and economic crisis of the 1970s. Following the 
economic collapse of the 1970s, there was a strong argument against excessive government 
intervention in Africa, with market-oriented development policy displacing state-led industrial 
development. The World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the 1980s are an 
embodiment of this new orientation in development policy. The SAPs emphasized the removal of 
price distortions, trade liberalization, and a strong focus on agriculture. This new development 
paradigm marginalized industrial development, leaving it to the mercy of the market. “Indeed, beyond 
a preoccupation with trade policy, there was no comprehensive industrial strategy within SAPs” 
(Fahnbulleh, 2005: 10).  
Industrial policy has re-emerged in Africa in the past two decades, with regional organizations leading 





means and end to productivity growth in Africa. The Africa Development Bank has also stressed 
industrialization as one of its pillars (high fives) for transforming Africa. With the incoming youth 
bulge, African countries need to create quality jobs to absorb the estimated 11 million youth who enter 
the labor market each year, according to the ILO (2018). However, Africa’s higher productivity sectors 
failed to generate sufficient employment for the rapidly growing labor force (Newman et al., 2016). In 
the absence of high productivity jobs in Africa, and to survive, the youth have been engaging in 
relatively unproductive economic activities – i.e., retail trade and distribution – in the informal sector. 
As a result, the share of informal services in employment and output is rising, a trend we describe as 
the informal tertiarization of African economies in this thesis. If the current slow pace of structural 
transformation continues with the high number of youth entering the labor force each year, the 
informal services sector will be the major employer of youth for many years to come (Fox, Senbet, & 
Simbanegavi, 2016).  
1.3 Contributions and Structure of Thesis 
Many attempts have been made to explain why Africa has failed to industrialize and structurally 
modernize (e.g., McMillan & Headey, 2014; McMillan & Harttgen, 2014; McMillan & Rodrik, 2011; 
Mcmillan & Verduzco-Gallo, 2014; Rodrik, 2014, 2015, 2016; de Vries, Timmer, & Vries, 2015). 
However, there is a huge statistical problem: data coverage is limited, and data reliability is often 
debatable. This has often led to contrasting conclusions about industrial development in Africa. For 
example, while Rodrik (2016) concludes that Africa is deindustrializing prematurely, Diao et al. (2017), 
using the same dataset, concludes that it is difficult to say that Africa is deindustrializing. The most 
comprehensive database used by researchers to analyze the long-run sectoral performance of Africa 
economies is the Africa Sector Database (ASD) developed by the Groningen Growth and 
Development Center (GGDC). The ASD, however, only covers 11 relatively rich countries in Africa 
with higher educational, health and nutritional outcomes than the majority of the countries in the 
region, raising important questions about the representativeness of the sample for research and policy 
conclusions ( Diao, Mcmillan, & Wangwe, 2018). A second concern relates to the fact that after the 
construction of the ASD most countries have revised their GDP estimates which has changed the 
structure of reported production resulting from structural undercounting in previous estimates. As a 
first step towards establishing empirical regularities about long-run industrial development in Africa, 
Chapter 2 of the thesis presents a new sectoral database on Africa economic performance: The 
Extended Africa Sector Database (EASD). The database covers about 80% of GDP in Africa, and it 
is used throughout the rest of thesis to answer essential questions about structural change in Africa.   
There is a growing literature focusing on the relationship between the extent of structural change and 
productivity growth in Africa (e.g. Barrett, Christiaensen, Sheahan, & Shimeles, 2017; Diao et al., 2017; 
Diao, Kweka, & McMillan, 2018; Diao & McMillan, 2018; M. McMillan & Verduzco-Gallo, 2014; de 
Vries et al., 2015). While these studies have revealed important insights into the patterns of structural 
change in Africa and have indicated that structural change has been an important phenomenon in the 
productivity growth of Africa, its impact on other outcomes – most notably labor market outcomes – 
are less well known. Indeed, these studies tend to ignore the impact of structural changes on other 
features of the economy, with its impact on labor markets, and labor market volatility in particular, 
being an important omission. While structural change may enhance aggregate productivity, there is 





workers to lower-paid jobs or into the informal sector, leading to increased uncertainty for workers. 
Using the data constructed in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 of the thesis provides a fuller picture of the role 
of structural change on economic performance by combining an analysis of structural change on 
productivity growth with an analysis of structural change on labor market outcomes. The chapter 
contributes to the literature in several ways by shedding light on atypical patterns of structural change, 
on labor market turbulence, and on the institutional arrangements in Africa responsible for these 
outcomes.  
The peculiar nature of African development presents unique technological challenges. This often 
requires African-induced innovation or a combination of frontier and local technologies to solve 
problems unique to Africa. Several innovations, such as mPedigree, MPesa, etc., illustrate this point. 
An important finding in the economics literature is that the slow diffusion of technology is responsible 
for the slow speed of productivity convergence (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 
1992).  However, most researchers study technological change in Africa in relation to some globally 
defined technology frontier (e.g., Harchaoui & Üngör, 2018). The diffusion of knowledge from this 
global frontier to other regions, however, decreases in intensity with geographic and relational 
distance.4 
Given that African countries are geographically and relationally close to each other, Chapter 4 of the 
thesis departs from this existing literature and studies technological change and technological catch-
up within Africa by considering catch-up with respect to an African technology leader. We do this by 
using structural (shift-share catch-up decompositions) and nonparametric (Data Envelopment 
Analysis) methods to estimate an African production frontier. A combination of both approaches 
offers more comprehensive insights than would otherwise be possible. For example, while the 
nonparametric approach provides an explanation of productivity convergence at the aggregate level, 
the structural approach traces the sources of this productivity convergence to its sectoral origins. We 
further measure productivity change in Africa and disentangle the change due to general technological 
progress and technological catch-up using the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI). Our results show 
that Botswana and Mauritius are the only two countries in Africa which have converged to the 
technology level of the frontier. This successful convergence was driven more by technological catch-
up and less by technological change. We explore further the special role of technological catch-up by 
decomposing it into within-sector convergence, between-sector convergence, and initial specialization. 
The results highlight the special role of structural change in catch-up. This chapter contributes to 
recent evidence suggesting that countries can climb up the income ladder at a faster rate through a 
two-pronged transformation – i.e., structural change and technological catch-up.  
In addition to the data gap, the labor market gap, and the technology-related gap in the literature, there 
is inconclusive evidence on the presence or otherwise of deindustrialization in Africa. While some 
researchers believe that Africa is deindustrializing (Page, 2012; Rodrik, 2016; Tregenna, 2015), others 
conclude that Africa is not deindustrializing (Diao et al., 2017; Naudé, 2019; Nguimkeu & Zuefact, 
2019). This debate relates to data coverage and the reliability of sectoral indicators in Africa. In 
addition to the data contribution in Chapter 2, Chapter 5 of the thesis collects sectoral data that covers 
46 countries in Africa to provide extensive evidence on deindustrialization in Africa. The results show 
 
4 Relational proximity is defined as “the similarities of two areas in terms of shared behavioral codes, common culture, 





that the manufacturing output share for a typical African country has not changed since 1970. We 
document, however, important regional differences with East Africa industrializing and Southern 
Africa deindustrializing. Based on this extensive evidence, we argue that the appropriate 
characterization of the evidence is industrial stagnation, not premature deindustrialization. While 
Africa has not deindustrialized, manufacturing performance is disappointing. Several factors account 
for these outcomes with import penetration and limited intra-African trade playing an important role 
in the industrial development of the continent. The new intra-African trade agreement could, 
therefore, open new opportunities for the future industrialization of Africa if implemented 
successfully.  
As mentioned above, while many Asian countries have successfully undergone a deep structural 
change that boosted labor productivity, other developing regions have struggled to implement an 
efficient reallocation of labor across sectors that could generate higher productivity growth. This is 
specifically the case for the majority of African and Latin American countries that recorded relatively 
low labor productivity growth, mostly driven by within-sector productivity growth (McMillan et al., 
2014). This raises the question of why some countries have higher productivity growth and a more 
dynamic shift of labor across sectors than others.  
There is a growing literature that attributes cross-country differences in the speed of structural change 
and labor productivity growth to distortions. Several studies have shown that market and institutional 
frictions lead to a suboptimal allocation of scarce resources across and within sectors penalizing overall 
productivity growth (e.g., Bartelsman et al., 2013; Hsieh & Klenow, 2009; Restuccia & Rogerson, 
2008). The logical corollary of this finding is that if countries can remove barriers and obstacles to an 
efficient reallocation of resources, such as labor and capital, aggregate productivity will grow at its 
optimum rate. Structural reforms are often described as the magic wand that can be used to reduce 
rigidities that exist in markets. In developing countries where a series of structural reforms have been 
implemented over the last decades, there is little evidence on the impacts of these reforms on labor 
productivity growth (Dabla-Norris, Ho, & Kyobe, 2016; Kouamé & Tapsoba, 2019). 
Most importantly, the few studies that exist focus on the effects of reforms on productivity growth as 
a whole but do not assess how these effects are distributed between the within and structural 
components. This masks the allocative efficiency channels through which reforms affect labor 
productivity growth. While some reforms induce a stronger inter-allocative efficiency, other sets of 
reforms generate stronger intra-allocative efficiency. Chapter 6 of this thesis sheds light on the 
mechanisms through which structural reforms affect productivity growth in developing countries. The 
results overwhelmingly show that reforms affect growth in developing countries mostly by inducing 
an efficient reallocation of resources within sectors but not across sectors, further providing empirical 
support for the argument that many developing countries had structural adjustments programs 
without structural change (Page, 2012).  
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the construction of the Extended 
Africa Sector Database. Evidence of structural change and labor market consequences in Africa is 
presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 discusses technological catch-up within Africa. Chapter 5 presents 





performance in Africa. Chapter 6 presents how reforms affect labor productivity growth either via the 
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There is a growing literature that portrays African National statistics as notoriously unreliable and 
potentially misleading. The negative characterization of African data has been referred to in the 
literature as: the African Statistical Tragedy (Devarajan, 2013), the Jerven Debate, and the Political 
Economy of Bad data (Sandefur and Glassman, 2015). One of the key concerns is that changes such 
as rebasing of time series or improvements in the estimates of the informal sector and subsistence and 
untaxed activities lead to substantial changes in GDP. Mentioning this in almost all of his papers, 
Jerven argues that the 60% overnight increase in Ghana’s GDP as a result of rebasing is a potential 
source of worry (Jerven, n.d., 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013a, 2013b, 2014; Jerven & Duncan, 2012; Jerven 
& Johnston, 2015).  
In response to these concerns, a UN high-level conference on post-MDGs development goals has 
called for a data revolution in Africa and called for African national governments to disseminate 
information under an open data protocol (Sandefur and Glassman, 2015). This culminated in a 
resolution (L4) at the African Union known as the African Data Consensus (ADC). The ADC seeks 
to “create an inclusive data ecosystem involving government, private sector, academia, civil society, 
local communities and development partners that tackles the informational aspects of development 
decision-making in a coordinated way” (UNECA, 2015). This generates the needed information to 
drive social, economic, and structural transformation and to track progress on nationally, regionally, 
and globally agreed goals such as the Ouagadougou Declaration on Employment Poverty Alleviation 
in Africa, the AU Agenda 2063, and the SDGs. 
While the concerns raised in the literature may have motivated the ADC, which is very important for 
creating the data ecosystem that Africa needs, we argue that some academics have exaggerated the 
data problems and made wrong calls on some points. There are more data available for Africa than 
many observers realize if one is willing to dig deep enough to unearth them. For instance, Jerven 
(2013) argues that all discrepancies and problems in international income databases concerning Africa 
necessarily derive all their problems from the weaknesses of African national statistics (Jerven, 2013). 
We disagree with Jerven on this point. The differences between Penn World Tables (PWT), Maddison 
Database, and World Development Indicators (WDI) are primarily due to differences in statistical 
methods and not necessarily to the underlying African statistics.  
Unlike some of these overly pessimistic scholars, we think it is worthwhile to make a genuine effort 
to study, on a country by country basis, the different data sources and link them in a way that produces 
a reliable sectoral dataset for African economies. We argue that a meticulous study of the statistical 
sources, methods, statistical reforms, and macroeconomic reforms, such as currency redenomination, 
can result in a statistical database that can be used to analyze economic developments in Africa.  
Our starting point is the Africa Sector Database (ASD), developed by the Groningen Growth and 
Development Center (GGDC), which provides long-run series on sectoral development in Africa for 
11 countries from 1960 to 2010. The ASD database is constructed based on an in-depth study of 
available statistical sources on a country by country basis (de Vries et al. 2013). It builds on earlier 





In this chapter, we expand the Africa Sector Database by adding sectoral data for seven additional 
countries from 1960 to 2015 (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, 
and Uganda). We also extend the existing data for the countries already in the ASD up to 2015, taking 
into account recent statistical and currency reforms in some of the countries.6 We strictly follow the 
ASD methodology to ensure data continuity, consistency, and comparability (see de Vries et al. 2013). 
As this chapter is meant to be read as a stand-alone chapter, some overlap and repetition of de Vries 
et al. (2013) in the description of methods and procedures is inevitable. We would at the outset, 
therefore, like to fully and explicitly acknowledge our intellectual debt to the earlier paper by de Vries 
et al. (2013). 
The result of the empirical exercise in this chapter is an Extended Africa Sector Database (EASD) 
with sectoral data on employment and value added for 18 economies in Africa from the 1960s to 
20157. The resulting dataset covers about 80% of the GDP of Africa. 
An examination of the trends in the data reveals that the service sector is increasingly the most 
important sector in Africa, both in terms of employment and value added. Agriculture is losing its 
position as the mainstay of African economies. This is consistent with the literature on structural 
change, which argues that over the course of development, inputs shift from primary sectors to more 
dynamic sectors such as manufacturing and services, and in response, these sectors contribute more 
to GDP. What is very striking is that industrial sectors and especially manufacturing sectors are rapidly 
losing steam as the engines of growth in most African countries at relatively low levels of GDP per 
capita, the. This immediately raises three essential questions: Why has manufacturing remained 
constant or declined in several countries in Africa (premature deindustrialization)? Is the growth in 
services strong and dynamic enough to avoid becoming a potential structural change burden in Africa? 
Is the recent growth in Africa due to within-sector growth, structural change, or changes in labor 
participation?  These are the kinds of questions that can be analyzed with the EASD and are discussed 
in later chapters of the thesis. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on African data and 
prepares the ground for a meticulous study of the statistical sources, methods, and reforms in the 
seven new countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, and 
Uganda. Section 3 describes the general content and layout of the database. It covers measures of 
output and labor input for the seven new African countries at the 10-sector level, usually from the 
1960s to 2015, and further describes the data on output and labor input used to update the existing 
countries in the database from 2010 to 2015. The sources and methodology used in constructing the 
value-added variables are described in Section 4. Section 5 describes the sources and methodology 
used in constructing the employment variables. Section 6 describes the process of updating the original 
ASD from 2010-2015, taking into account recent statistical and exchange rate reforms in some 
countries.  Section 7 summarizes and concludes. 
 
6 Rebasing in Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, and Currency Redenomination in Zambia. 





   
2.2 The Data Debate  
The study of structural transformation in Africa is limited by a lack of reliable long-run sectoral data. 
Data, in general, have been highlighted to be problematic in Africa (Devarajan, 2013: 9). Before 
Devarajan (2013) identified this problem, Young (2012) argued that measures of real consumption 
based on demographic health survey (DHS) data indicate that living standards in Africa are growing 
at a rate 3.5 to 4 times greater than the rate stated in national accounts datasets. Using the growth in 
household assets as a proxy for growth in incomes and consumption, he concludes that economic 
performance is better than suggested by national income data, putting the quality of national data in 
Africa into question. Harttgen et al. (2013) challenged this claim by showing that the trend in assets is 
a biased proxy for the trend in income or consumption since there is a weak relationship between the 
growth of assets and the growth of income or consumption, with asset growth exhibiting drift 
behavior.  
Jerven, in various papers,8 has further argued that African national statistics are highly unreliable and 
potentially misleading. Comparing the ranking of income per capita based on World Development 
Indicators (WDI), Penn World Tables (PWT), and the Maddison historical database, he shows striking 
discrepancies. Countries are ranked into different income categories according to these databases. He 
concludes that there is a black box of uncertainty surrounding African data, resulting in knowledge 
and governance problems.  
While this may have created the policy momentum for better measurement and the timely 
dissemination of data in Africa, we argue that some of Jerven’s arguments and generalizations are 
unfounded. Jerven (2013) argues that all discrepancies and problems in international income databases 
concerning Africa necessarily derive all their problems from the weaknesses of African national 
statistics (Jerven, 2013). We argue that Jerven is wrong on this point. The differences between PWT, 
the Maddison Database, and WDI are due to differences in statistical methods, not necessarily to the 
underlying African statistics. Garcia-verdu (2014) highlights the fundamental problems of definition 
and many other inaccuracies in Jerven’s book.  
What this debate shows is that there are still severe problems of statistical measurement in Africa. 
Unfortunately, much of our current understanding of the nature of structural change and productivity 
growth in Africa is based on imperfect data. The informal sector, subsistence, and untaxed activities 
are poorly measured (Young, 2012); measurement of manufacturing output is characterized by 
margins of errors (Ridell, 1990 cited in Jerven, 2009); and data quality, in general, is graded C or D in 
the PWT 6.2, reflecting an error margin of 30% or 40%. These problems of measurement produce a 
considerable amount of uncertainty in our continuous attempts to estimate the effect of structural 
change on productivity growth in Africa. 
 





In many cases, little can be done about these measurement problems by users of African statistics. But 
as a second-best solution, de Vries et al. (2013, 2015) developed a methodology to make the data 
‘‘intertemporally, internationally and internally consistent’’. The Africa Sector Database provides long-
run series on sectoral development in Africa based on national and international sources. Their 
approach covers only 11 countries in Africa. However, the same sources used to construct the series 
are available for seven other African countries from 1960-2015: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, and Uganda. 
 
2.3 Expanding the Africa Sector Database (ASD) 
The original ASD covers 11 countries from 1960 to 2010 (de Vries et al., 2013). We have added seven 
new countries and updated the original ASD that ended in 2010 to the year 2015. The resulting 
expanded and updated ASD covers data for 18 African countries, with four variables reported across 
10 sectors from 1960 to 2015. The industry classification is based upon the International Standard 
Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) Rev.3.1. To ensure that the labor 
productivity of the Business Services (J+K) sector is not overestimated, value added for Dwellings is 
presented separately9. The update includes revisions of the data for Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Zambia in recent periods (see details in the update section 4.3) because of the recent rebasing of GDP 
in the countries mentioned above and currency redenomination in Zambia. The table below presents 
the countries in the original database and the new additions. 
Table 2.1: List of Countries in the Africa Sector Database 
ASD Database Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa 
Tanzania, and Zambia 
Expansion Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, and Uganda 
 
 Variables and the 10 Sectors 
Table 2.2 lists the variables covered in the ASD. We include the same variables in the update to ensure 
continuity and consistency.  
Table 2.2: Variables Used in both the ASD and EASD 
Variable Code Description 
VA Value added in current prices in local currency 
VA_Q05 Value added in constant 2005 prices in local currency 
VA_P Value added price deflator (2005=100) 
EMP Persons engaged (usually ≥15 years) 
 
 





For these four variables, data were usually available from the 1960s until 2015, in particular for value 
added at current prices. The length of the time series for value added at constant prices and 
employment differ for some countries depending on data availability. For Uganda, employment data 
go back to 1952, and value added is available from 1955 onwards.  Value added at current and constant 
prices is measured in millions of local currency while employment is measured in thousands of 
persons. Because of currency redenomination in some countries at different points in time, all value-
added data are converted to new national currencies.10 Table 3 gives an overview of data availability 
in the EASD.  
 
Table 2.3:  Data Availability by Country 
Code Country Currency VA   VA_Q05 VA_P EMP 
BWA Botswana Pula (P) 1964-2015 1968-2015 1964-2015 1964-2015 
BFA Burkina Faso Franc (CFA) 1965-2015 1966-2015 1966-2015 1970-2015 
CMR Cameroon Franc (CFA) 1965-2015 1965-2015 1965-2015 1965-2015 
ETH Ethiopia Birr (Br) 1961-2015 1961-2015 1961-2015 1961-2015 
GHA Ghana Cedi (¢) 1960-2015 1960-2015 1960-2015 1960-2015 
KEN Kenya Shilling (KSh) 1960-2015 1964-2015 1964-2015 1969-2015 
LSO Lesotho Molati (LSL) 1964-2015 1965-2015 1965-2015 1970-2015 
MWI Malawi Kwacha (MK) 1960-2015 1966-2015 1966-2015 1966-2015 
MUS Mauritius Rupee (R) 1960-2015 1970-2015 1970-2015 1970-2015 
MOZ Mozambique Metical (MT) 1966-2015 1966-2015 1966-2015 1970-2015 
NAM Namibia Dollar (N$) 1965-2015 1965-2015 1965-2015 1960-2015 
NGA Nigeria Naira (₦) 1960-2015 1960-2015 1960-2015 1960-2015 
RWA Rwanda  Franc (RWF) 1966-2015 1966-2015 1966-2015 1970-2015 
SEN Senegal Franc (CFA) 1960-2015 1970-2015 1970-2015 1970-2015 
ZAF South Africa Rand (R) 1960-2015 1960-2015 1960-2015 1960-2015 
TZA Tanzania Shilling (SHS) 1960-2015 1960-2015 1960-2015 1960-2015 
UGA Uganda Shilling (Ush) 1955-2015 1955-2015 1955-2015 1952-2015 
ZMB Zambia Kwacha (ZK) 1960-2015 1965-2015 1965-2015 1965-2015 
                          
 Sectoral Classification and Treatment of Dwellings 
The ASD followed the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities 
(ISIC) Rev.3.1 to define the ten sectors. Table 4 reports the ISIC Rev 3.1 codes, the ASD sector name, 
and the corresponding sub-sectors. Owner-Occupied Dwellings (70) are given special treatment in the 
ASD. Ownership of dwellings is the imputed rent, which would typically be paid by the owner-
occupier if s/he were renting the property rather than owning it. In other words, it is an estimate for 
 
10 For example, one new Zambian Kwacha adopted in 2013 is equivalent to thousand old kwacha. We converted data 





the economy as a whole of what owner-occupiers would charge for the use of their housing. The 
estimate is usually based on the number of dwellings given in the population and housing census and 
an imputed rent per month. In the ASD, it is implicit in real estate activities, which is part of Business 
Services (J+K). It has no employment equivalent, therefore, in productivity analysis, and as such, tends 
to overestimate the productivity of the real estate sector if it is not deducted. As a result, it is treated 
separately in the ASD and EASD. This is particularly important for Africa, where many workers live 
in their own houses.  
In the case of the seven additional countries, the National Statistical Institutes of Lesotho and Uganda 
construct a separate series for owner-occupied Dwellings. For Burkina Faso and Cameroon, we used 
the share of Dwellings in Business Services (J+K) of Senegal to build a separate series for Dwellings 
(70). Since Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Senegal are AFRISTAT members, are in the same monetary 
zone and have a similar economic structure, we apply the share of Dwellings in Business Services 
(J+K) of Senegal to give a reasonable estimate of dwellings in the other two Francophone countries. 
As Namibia does not report separate series on dwellings, we applied the share of dwellings in Business 
Services (J+K) of Lesotho to arrive at an estimate for Namibia. Namibia and Lesotho are in the 
Common Monetary Area (CMA) and have a similar real estate structure. Rwanda and Mozambique 
also do not report separate series on Dwellings. For these two countries, we applied the share of 
Dwellings in Business Services (J+K) of Uganda and Tanzania, respectively, since the economic 
structure of these countries is similar to the two countries that do not report these data. 
 
Table 2.4: The 10 Sectors 
ISIC Rev3.1 code ASD sector name ISIC Rev3.1 description 
AtB  Agriculture  Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, and Fishing  
C Mining Mining and Quarrying 
D Manufacturing Manufacturing 
E Utilities Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 
F Construction Construction 
G+H Trade Services Wholesale and Retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods, Hotels and Restaurants. 
I Transport Transport, Storage and Communications. 
J+K Business Services Financial Intermediation, Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities. 
70 Dwellings  Owner occupied Dwellings (is part of Business services) 
L,M,N Government 
Services 
Public Administration and Defence, Education, Health and Social work 
O, P Personal Services Other Community, Social and Personal service activities, Activities of 
Private Households 







2.4 Value Added  
 Sources for new countries 
In expanding and updating the ASD, we followed carefully the approach used by de Vries et al. (2013, 
2015) in constructing the value added series to ensure comparability, consistency, and continuity. In 
the ASD, de Vries et al. (2013:12) apply the follow rules and methods: 
• They make a distinction between ‘official’ (NSI produced), and ‘non-official’ (estimates) sources. 
• Official NSI data are used as the primary source.  
• Non-official data are used to bridge gaps in official data using growth trends.  
• When detailed sectoral data are missing, growth trends of aggregate sectors are applied.  
• The most recent revision of the National Accounts data is used as the benchmark. Time series are constructed by 
extrapolating the benchmark value added levels forward and backward in time.  
• Historical series are linked using growth rates, which ensure consistency over time. 
• Current price series and price deflator series derive from the source data. Volume series (constant price series) are 
calculated implicitly by dividing current price series by a price deflator. 
Official data are usually obtained from national statistical institutes. The main sources are yearly 
publications such as the Statistical Bulletins, Statistical Yearbooks, and National Accounts reports. All 
countries in this study use the UN System of National Accounts in preparing value added data, 
ensuring that the data is highly comparable across countries. For some years, official sources are not 
available from National Statistical Institutes. In those years, in our expansion and updating exercise, 
we complement the available official sources with value added data from the UN Yearbook of 
National Accounts and the online database of UN Official Country Data. These two UN sources are 
based on information elicited from the UN National Accounts questionnaire sent to the National 
Statistical Institutes. UN national accounts data are usually available from 1970. However, for 
Mozambique and Namibia, the UN data starts from 1991 and 1980, respectively, which is the same 
period for which we had national accounts data from the National Statistical Institutes. For Lesotho, 
the Bureau of Statistics started computing volume and price series from 1980 onwards.  
If value added or price information is missing, we fill gaps in the data using information from the 
Africa Statistical Yearbook produced by UNECA (1970-1990)). Other (non-digital) official and Non-
official sources were mostly obtained from the SAOS, University of London Library, and the British 







Table 2.5: Official and Non-official sources 
Official Sources  Non-official Sources 
National Statistics Institute National Accounts 
publications (NSI)  
UN Economic Commission for Africa, African Statistical 
Yearbook UNECA (ASYB) 
UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics (UN YB) Online database of UN Estimates of National Accounts 
(UN E) 
Online database of UN Official Country Data UN OCD 
 
 
These sources are reported with different historical base years, methods, and different versions of the 
System of National Accounts. Also, some countries over the years changed or redenominated their 
currencies. For example, Lesotho changed its national accounts currency from the Rand to the Maloti, 
while Uganda also changed its national accounts currency from Pounds sterling to Ugandan Shillings 
and redenominated its old shillings to new shillings in 1989. As a result, we observed significant breaks 
in the levels of the series over time. The ASD back-casting technique is used to remove these breaks 
in series to ensure consistency over time.  
For the new countries added to the database, the National Statistical Institutes of Burkina Faso, 
Lesotho, and Namibia extrapolated value-added series backward in time to the 1980s. The other four 
countries have the latest revision of National Accounts starting in the 1990s. For the 1960s and 1970s 
we have value added series produced with different methods, standards, and SNA, resulting in breaks 
and inconsistent series.  
We remove major breaks in series by using the first year of the most recent revisions of national 
accounts (value added) as our benchmark level data. We link the benchmark level series to historical 
series using growth rates. This repairs the breaks by adjusting the level of historical series to reflect 
current information and methodologies while maintaining historical growth rates. Table 6 indicates 
years for which recently revised national accounts are available for benchmark levels and years for 
which growth trends have been used. 
For some years, Education; Health and Social Work; and Other Community, Social and Personal 
Services (M+N+O) are lumped together as a single sector in the UN database (UN OCD). We added 
Public Administration and Defence, and Compulsory Social Security (L) and Activities of Private 
Households with employed persons (P) to get an aggregate sector (L+M+N+O+P).11 We then applied 
the growth rate of this aggregate sector (L+M+N+O+P) to those years for which data were available 
for both Government Services (L+M+N) and Personal Services (O+P) as defined in the ASD. 
Whenever detailed sector information is missing in the NSI sources and the Africa Statistical 
Yearbooks, we followed a similar procedure.  
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Legend 
 Official Sources:  Latest Revision of National Accounts data 
 
Official Sources: Data used for trends                           (Note: For Uganda, this source goes back to 1955 but for convenience we shaded up to 1960) 
 









 Value Added Methodology 
Value added series in current and constant prices for each of the ten sectors are constructed by 
linking historical data to the value-added data from the latest revision of the national accounts. 
Using the same sources, we compute price deflator growth rates for each of the ten sectors. Using 
these price deflators, we deflate the value-added data in current prices to obtain value added in 
constant prices using 2005 as the reference year. Total economy figures are obtained by the 
summation of the values of the ten sectors for each year (see de Vries et al, 2013).   
The current value-added series is computed by linking historical data to benchmark level estimates 
as: 
2.1         𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 × �
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1𝑒𝑒
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒
�                                                                    
Where 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 represents the current value added in the benchmark year 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  is the value added 
from the external non-official source. This preserves the historical growth rates by adjusting the 
levels in the maintained period to reflect the latest revision in the national accounts. 
To obtain continuous data on current value added and price deflators, we calculate deflator growth 
rates using the current and constant valued added from the same source as: 






]}                                                       
Where ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉_𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  is the logarithmic growth rate of the price deflator in year 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒  and 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉_𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒are the nominal and volume valued added data respectively for year 𝑡𝑡.  Based on (2.1) and 
(2.2), we compute the sectoral volume data as: 
2.3                     𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉_𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉_𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡+1/𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 �𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡
� − ∆𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉_𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1�                                        
Where 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉_𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 is the sectoral volume index for the year 𝑡𝑡. The advantage of this approach is that 
when detailed sector data is missing, we can use aggregate growth trends to represent the detailed 
underlying sectors. “It is more reasonable to make this assumption for price developments than 
for volume growth rates” (de Vries et al, 2013:15). When primary sources are not available, this 
method allows us to use price developments from external sources (de Vries et al., 2013).  
 
 Update of Value Added for existing ASD countries 
The ASD has been used widely to analyze the long-run structural transformation of Africa. It 
contains data on six variables across ten sectors for 11 African countries. Since the construction 
of the ASD, many African countries in the database have undergone statistical reforms or 
macroeconomic reforms. “For instance, in 2014 alone, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia all 
completed rebasing exercises, which led to significant revaluations of their GDPs: Nigeria’s latest 
(2013) GDP nearly doubled, Tanzania’s grew by a third, and Kenya’s and Zambia’s increased by a 
quarter” (Sy, 2015). Nigeria revised its GDP estimates and recalculated historical data back to 1981 
while Zambia also redenominated its currency.  
GDDC acknowledged the significant break in the sectoral series of Nigeria following the rebasing 





had not re-estimated the historical GDP.12 NBS has now re-estimated old series backward to 1981, 
taking into account new sources and methods. The figure below compares the structure of 
production under the old national accounts and the new national accounts. The old estimates 
portray the Nigerian economy as industry-driven, but the latest estimates show that the Nigerian 
economy is service-driven. Therefore, we updated the original ASD to reflect these recent reforms 
and statistical revisions in Nigeria as well as other African countries. For each country, we take the 
first year of the revised estimates as a benchmark. We then change the reference year to 2005. The 
notes below provide information about the update process that was adopted for each country in 
the ASD. 
Figure 2.1: The structure of Nigerian economy before and after rebasing. 
         
Source: NBS (2016). The figure shows the percentage share of Agriculture, Industry and Services in GDP. It compares 
each sector before and after rebasing. It shows a significant re-evaluation of the structure of production after rebasing.  
 
2.4.3.1 Botswana 
Value added by type of economic activity in both current and 2006 constant prices were obtained 
from Statistics Botswana.13 The yearly data covers the period 2004-2015, thus containing seven 
years of overlapping data with the ASD. We compared the level data of the overlapping years 
(2004-2010) with the Botswana value added data in the ASD. For 2004-2005 data from both 
sources were the same since the ASD used the latest revision, at the time of construction, as the 
benchmark level data. However, from 2006-2010 the data obtained differ from the ASD 
benchmark level data following revisions undertaken by Statistics Botswana. Statistics Botswana 
usually revises the first estimate of yearly or quarterly data after receiving updated source data such 
 
12 https://set.odi.org/comments-page-3/ 
13 http://www.statsbots.org.bw/sites/default/files/publications/GDP%20Q3%20December%202016.pdf. The 
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as “finalized or audited data from companies in which differences and inconsistencies in the 
previously published data may be observed” (Statistics Botswana, 2016). As a result, we update 
ASD starting from 2006 to 2015 and joined it with the ASD data from 1960-2005. We chose 2005 
as our reference year to recalculate the value-added series in constant prices to obtain a volume 
series from 2006 to 2015 that is consistent with the ASD volume series from 1960 to 2005. 
 
2.4.3.2 Ethiopia  
For Ethiopia, current information on value added is not available on the website of the National 
Statistical Institute. We, therefore, used value added data from the 2016 Africa Statistical Yearbook 
(ASY).14 We used the growth trend from the value added in current prices to update the Ethiopian 
value added data in the original ASD from 2010 to 2015. In the ASY, value added in constant 
prices is not reported, but the annual growth rate of GDP by kind of economic activity in constant 
prices is reported. We used the annual growth rate to update the value added series from 2010 to 
2015.15 For Dwellings in current prices, we assume that the share of Dwellings (70) in Business 
Services (J+K) has been constant since 2010. Using this constant ratio, we derive the Dwellings 
series in current prices from 2011 to 2015. For Dwellings in constant prices, we used the growth 
rate of Business Services from 2010 to 2015 to update. This smoothly updates the original ASD 
without any inconsistency or significant breaks. 
 
2.4.3.3 Ghana 
The update period for Ghana is 2011-2015. GDP by type of economic activity in both current and 
2006 constant prices were obtained from the Ghana Statistical Service (Revised Annual GDP 2015, 
Ghana Statistical Service(GSS)).16 GSS reports the value added data in current and 2006 constant 
prices from 2006 to 2015. This overlaps with the Ghana data in the ASD. The data for overlapping 
years are the same as the data in the ASD since the recent revision was used as the benchmark 
level data in the ASD. As a result, we used the level data for the period 2011-2015 to update the 
ASD from 2010 to 2015. We then changed the reference year from 2006 to 2005 to obtain volume 
data consistent with the ASD. 
 
2.4.3.4 Kenya 
Kenya finished a rebasing exercise in September 2014 using some of the recommendations of the 
2008 System of National Accounts. This increased GDP by about 15%, with minor changes in the 
structure of production. The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics provides an estimate of Gross 
Domestic Product by kind of economic activity from 2006 to 2015.17 The last year of the rebased 
series was used as the benchmark year with the data then retropolated back to 1960 using the 




15 The update is done using the simple growth formula: 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(1 + 𝑔𝑔); where 𝑔𝑔 is the annual growth rate 
reported in the ASY. VA is sectoral value added in constant prices. 
16 http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/gdp_revised.html. The website leads you to the Revised Annual 2015 GDP, 
September 2016 Edition in Excel format, which covers the period 2006-2015.   





constructed from the rebased national accounts and the ASD. This updates the Kenya data to 
reflect the rebasing, the 2008 SNA, and minor changes in the structure of production. 
 
2.4.3.5 Malawi 
The update period for Malawi is 2009-2015, and thus includes two overlapping years with the 
ASD. Gross Domestic Product by economic activity in both current and constant prices was 
obtained from the National Statistical Institute of Malawi.18 The data for the overlapping years 
(2009-2010) differ from the data in the original ASD since the national accounts have been updated 
with recent information. As a result, we used the level data for the period 2009-2015 to update the 
ASD. We then changed the reference year from 2010 to 2005 to obtain volume data consistent 
with the ASD.   
 
2.4.3.6 Mauritius 
Gross Domestic Product by kind of economic activity in both current and constant prices from 
2006-2015 was obtained from Statistics Mauritius.19 The Mauritius data is based on the 2013 CEA, 
the 2008 SNA and the National Standard Industrial Classification (NSIC) Rev. 2. The update 
period for Mauritius is 2006-2015. We compare value added data for the overlapping years (2006-
2010) with value added data from the original ASD. We found a slight difference for the 
overlapping years. Since the new official source embodies recent updates and revisions, we used it 
in place of the ASD data.   
 
2.4.3.7 Nigeria 
The GGDC constructed value added series for Nigeria in the ASD utilizing information based on 
a severely outdated system of national accounts and base year. The entire data, including recent 
years, was based on the 1968 UN System of National Accounts and 1990 as a base year. In 2014, 
Nigeria rebased this old base year to 2010 following international standards and guidelines. The 
National Bureau of Statistics updated its survey frame, and “as a result, the size of the sample 
frame expanded from 83,733 to 851,628 establishments. In addition, the number of economic 
activities reported in the GDP computation framework increased to 46 compared to 33 in the 
previous series” (NBS, 2014). The new GDP data was compiled following the 2008 UN System 
of National Accounts (SNA 2008 version), the International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC Revision 4), the Central Product Classification (CPC version 2), and the ongoing 
development of a SUT for Nigeria (NBS, 2014). The rebasing also covered more economic 
activities including new sectors such as entertainment, research, and patents and copyrights, in 
addition to broader coverage of the services sector, particularly the informal sector. Following the 
update, nominal GDP in 2010 increased by 59.5 percent, and the structure of the Nigerian 
economy changed significantly, with the service sector being the fastest growing sector and 
contributing more to GDP than previously estimated under the old base year. Historical data were 









significantly different from the output used to construct the original ASD. As a result, we 
reconstruct the entire value-added data for Nigeria in ASD by: 
• Using the newly revised estimate for the period 1981-2015 as level data.  
• Using 1981 as a splicing point to backcast to 1960 using the growth trend from the ASD 
data. 
• Recalculating the volume data using 2005 as a reference year, and then deriving the price 
index. 
Value added series in current and constant prices (1981-2015) used as the level data was obtained 
from the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics.20 For the period 1960-1981, we used the growth trend from 
the original ASD.  
While the update has provided key updates of sectoral data, the reliability of some of the sectoral 
estimates deserve further scrutiny. For example, the nominal value added share of information and 
communication services in GDP is 11.45% in 2015 in Nigeria. This seems to be overstated when 
compared to highly digital African economies like Kenya and advanced countries like UK, which 
estimate the share information and communication services at 1.60% and 6.3%, respectively.    
 
2.4.3.8 Senegal 
GDP by kind of economic activity in both current and constant prices was obtained from UN 
Official Country Data. It covers the period 2009-2014, with two overlapping years. The data for 
the overlapping years are the same as the data in the original ASD since the original ASD was 
constructed using the same source. As a result, we used the level data for the period 2011-2014 to 
update the ASD from 2010 to 2014. We then changed the reference year to 2005 to obtain volume 
data consistent with the ASD. Since Government and Personal Services are put together in the 
UN OCD, we applied the growth trend of this aggregate sector to obtain separate series for both 
Government Services and Personal Services. 
 
2.4.3.9 South Africa 
Value added by kind of economic activity in both current and constant prices were obtained from 
Statistics South Africa.21 We used yearly data from 2005 to 2015, thus giving six years of 
overlapping data with the ASD. We compared the level data of the overlapping years (2004-2010) 
with value added data in the ASD, and observe slight differences following revisions undertaken 
by Statistics South Africa. Statistics South Africa continuously updates and revises the first 
estimates of yearly or quarterly data after receiving finalized primary source data. Hence, we used 
level data from 2005 to 2015 in this revision and joined it with the ASD data from 1960-2004. We 
chose 2005 as our reference year to recalculate the value-added series to obtain a volume series 
from 1960-2004 that is consistent with the new volume series from 2005 to 2015. 
 
2.4.3.10 Tanzania 
In 2014, Tanzania completed a rebasing exercise that changed its base year from 2001 to 2007. 
This rebasing takes into account the natural gas discovery and the mobile money revolution in 
 
20 http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary?queries[search]=GDP  





Tanzania. This increased Tanzanian GDP by about 33%. As a result of this rebasing exercise, we 
update the Tanzanian value-added series in the ASD using this revised data. Data on value added 
by kind of economic activity in both current and constant prices were obtained from the National 
Bureau of Statistics of Tanzania.22 Thus giving six years of overlapping data. For the overlapping 
years, we used this revised source in place of the ASD.  
 
2.4.3.11 Zambia 
Another important update in this database is the value-added series of Zambia. The primary source 
used to construct value added series for Zambia in the original ASD is based on the 1968 UN 
System of National Accounts. This version of the system of national accounts is quite outdated 
and hence a re-benchmarking of the national accounts of Zambia was long overdue. In 2014, 
Zambia completed a rebasing exercise that benchmarked the base year in 2010 using the 2008 UN 
System of National Accounts as a guideline. The input data used in the benchmarking exercise is 
based on the 2011/2012 Economic Census, the 2013 Non-agriculture Informal Sector Survey, the 
2009/2010 Post Harvest Survey, and the 2010 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey. “The main 
source of data for this benchmarking exercise was the Economic Census, which was specifically 
undertaken to address the challenges of compiling economic statistics, such as the old benchmark 
year (1994), the limited scope of coverage, and use of inappropriate price and volume indices. 
Overtime, the structure of the Zambian economy had significantly changed since 1994 largely on 
account of the development of new industries and technological innovation” (CSO, 2014:1). In 
addition to this statistical revision, Zambia redenominated the Kwacha in January 2013.23 The 
revised national accounts are reported in the new currency, but value-added data in the original 
ASD was published in the old currency.    
To account for these revisions, we update the original ASD by first converting the ASD data to 
the new Zambian Kwacha. We used value added series from the revised national accounts (2010-
2015) as our benchmark level data and then backcast to 1960 using the growth trend from the 
original ASD converted to the new currency. We used 2005 as our reference year, resulting in a 
consistent value-added series in both current and constant prices from 1960 to 2015. The 
benchmark level data was obtained from the Central Statistical Office (CSO), Zambia.24 
 
2.5 Employment 
 Sources of employment data for new countries                                                            
The primary sources for employment data are: Population and Housing Censuses, Labor Force 
Surveys, (Other) Household Surveys, Establishment Surveys, and Economically Active Population 
in Agriculture. The UN system of national accounts and the Africa Charter on Statistics govern 
the production of national accounts statistics in Africa, meaning that value added data are 
consistent over time and space. The national accounts do not cover employment, however. 
Historically, household surveys with a different focus, scope, and definitions have been used to 
measure sectoral employment, meaning that country-by-country comparisons of sectoral 
 
22 http://www.nbs.go.tz/nbs/takwimu/na/HIGHLIGHTS_FOR_THE_THIRD_QUARTER_GDP_2016.pdf  







employment estimates based solely on household surveys are, in principle, difficult. More recently, 
African countries have used labor force surveys based on international harmonization of concepts 
and definitions to measure sectoral employment, but sampling size and methods still vary across 
countries (McMillan et al., 2014; de Vries et al., 2013). For example,  whereas Rwanda, which has 
an estimated population of about 12 million, uses “a rotation sample scheme with a sample size of 
9,344 households per round, selected by means of a stratified two-stage probability design…” 
(Rwanda Labor Force Survey Report, 2016), Ghana, with an estimated population of 29 million, 
uses a sample size of 6,030 households constructed using two-stage random sampling (Ghana 
Labor Force Report, 2015). Though the methods, in this case, are similar, the sample size to 
population ratio varies significantly.  
Establishment surveys are another source of sectoral employment. These surveys tend to focus on 
formal establishments above a specific size. As a result, sectoral employment is underestimated in 
agriculture and retail trade, where self-employed, family workers, and informal workers are more 
widespread. Moreover, this source does not cover establishments that employ workers below the 
threshold number of employees considered in the survey. 
To overcome these shortcomings, de Vries et al. (2013) and Timmer & de Vries(2009) defined 
employment as all persons employed (15 years and above). This definition allows them to use 
population and housing census (PHC) data as the main source of employment because PHC 
covers not only employees but also self-employed, family workers, and all informal sector workers. 
To derive employment figures consistent with the coverage of the value-added series in the seven 
countries, we followed the ASD approach strictly by using PHC data as benchmarks. When the 
PHC sectoral employment estimates are not reliable or not available, we adjust it or replace it with 
data from labor force surveys. The problem with this approach is that population censuses are 
typically conducted every ten years. We, therefore, interpolate between benchmark years using data 
from Household Surveys and Establishment Surveys (ES). De Vries et al. (2013) distinguish 
between two interpolations based on data availability, in particular: “when ES data is available, 
interpolation is based on annual growth trends. When this data is unavailable, interpolation is based 
on average trends in labor productivity between the benchmark years”. We followed the same 
general approach. In the case of Agriculture, growth trends from the ILO economically active 
population in Agriculture are used to interpolate between benchmark years. The table below shows 







 Table 2.7: Sources of Employment 
Population and Housing Census 
Labor Force Surveys 
Household Surveys 
• Living Standard Measurement Surveys 
• Household Income and Expenditure Surveys 
• Demographic Health Surveys 
• Population surveys 
• Priority Surveys 
• Welfare Monitoring Surveys 
Informal Sector Surveys 
Establishment Surveys 
FAO data on the economically active in agriculture 
ILO Estimates of employment-to-population ratios 
 
 Using Population and Housing Censuses as Benchmarks 
The aim of a census is the complete counting of the population in a given country. This involves 
collating demographic and socioeconomic information on the population. For many African 
countries, the PHC is the main source of representative employment data. Although questions 
about employment in the PHC are not as detailed as the Labor Force Survey (LFS), the PHC 
covers the entire working population, including the self-employed, family workers, and informal 
sector workers. Also, PHC results are typically used to create the sampling frames for labor force 
surveys during the intercensal period. This enables cross-referencing and adjustment of sectoral 
employment figures from both sources within a defined period. We used the PHC as benchmarks 
for the construction of the employment data. The table below shows the years for which data are 







Table 2.8: Employment Benchmark Years 
Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
Burkina Faso       
Census   1985* 1996 2006  
Survey  1970 1980 1994  2014 
Cameroon       
Census  1976 1987  2005  
Survey 1965    2001 2010 
Lesotho       
Census  1976 1986 1996 2006  
Survey      2011 
Mozambique       
Census  1970 1980 1997 2007  
Survey    1990  2014/15 
Namibia       
Census    1991* 2001 2011 
Survey 1960 1970 1980  2000 2016 
Rwanda       
Census  1978 1991 2002## 2012##  
Survey    2000 2010 2016 
Uganda       
Census  1969# 1980 1991# 2002 2014* 
Survey 1952-59** 1960-61**   2003, 2009 2013 
*For these censuses, the sectoral distribution is taken from the surveys of the nearest year. # For these censuses, 
employment by occupation is available, the surveys in the nearest year are used to map occupations to sectors. 
**Agriculture and Trade Services is adjusted using information from the 1969 population census. ## Figures are 
adjusted using surveys in the years below.   
                                                                   
 Publication Sources  
The main publication sources of employment statistics are recent and historical publications from 
National Statistical Institutes. We obtained recent publications online and obtained historical 
publications from the reference sections of the SOAS University of London Library and the British 
Library. We also obtained data from international sources such as the ILO’s Key Indicators of 
Labor Markets, Africa Integrated Census Micro Data, and IPUMS International. 
Table 2.9: Main sources of employment information 
Sources                                                                                                           Acronym 
National Statistical Institutes Publications                                                          NSI 
1. Census and Survey Reports 
2. Statistical Bulletins and Yearbooks 
3. Research Publications 
Online database: Africa Integrated Census Microdata                                       AICM 
Online database: ILO Key Indicators of Labor Markets                                    KILM 
Online database: IPUMS International, Minnesota Population Center            IPUMS 
ILO Yearbooks of Labor Statistics                                                                   ILO YB 
Online FAO Database on Economically Active population                              FAO 
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Employment figures from population censuses are used as benchmarks. For the intervening years 
we interpolate using employment figures from establishment surveys or external sources (e.g. FAO 
data). Where establishment surveys are not available, we interpolate between years using average 
productivity growth rates. Interpolation based on survey or FAO data is given as:  
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Where 𝑏𝑏2 >  𝑡𝑡 >  𝑏𝑏1, 𝑏𝑏1 and 𝑏𝑏2 are the first and second benchmarks. The 𝑒𝑒 superscript 
represents data from external sources. Employment in each sector in year 𝑡𝑡 is denoted by 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 . The 
interpolation based on average trends in labor productivity is computed as: 
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Where 𝑏𝑏2 >  𝑡𝑡 >  𝑏𝑏1  and 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉_𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡/𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 is labor productivity. The advantage of this method 
is that it harmonizes movements in employment and value added since “linearly interpolated 
employment figure may be inconsistent with the growth trends of VA, resulting in irregular 
productivity patterns.” (de Vries et al., 2013).  
 
2.5.4.1 Extrapolation and Backcasting  
Depending on data availability, extrapolation and backcasting are necessary to complete the 
dataset. If data are available from external sources, we use sectoral trends to extrapolate and 
backcast from the nearest benchmark using (2.6) and (2.7): 
2.6   Extrapolation:  𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ �
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1𝑒𝑒
�                                                   
2.7    Backcasting:  𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1 ∗ �
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1𝑒𝑒
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒
�                                                                                               
Where 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 is sectoral employment in year t, and superscript 𝑒𝑒 indicates that data are from external 
sources. When establishment and external data are limited, we use average labor productivity to 
backcast and extrapolate between benchmark years using (2.8) and (2.9): 









�              Where 𝑡𝑡 > 𝑏𝑏2; 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉_𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡/𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡  
  









�            Where 𝑡𝑡 < 𝑏𝑏1  and 𝑏𝑏1 and 𝑏𝑏2 are benchmark years. 
Using (2.8) and (2.9) it is assumed that the average labor productivity between 𝑏𝑏1 and 𝑏𝑏2 can 
sufficiently represent the productivity of the extrapolated or backcasted years due to sectoral 
employment statistics not being available. To overcome this constraint, de Vries et al. (2013) use 
total economy employment estimates from the ILO-E database and normalize sectoral results 





2.10        Total-Employment:     𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 =  𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ∗ �
 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼
 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼
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Where  𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇  is total employment in year t,  𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 is the total employment level from the ILO-E 
database in year t, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗  is estimated employment based on labor productivity levels between the 
closest benchmark years for sector 𝑖𝑖, and 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 is the sectoral employment level normalized to the 
total employment level. This method aligns sectoral productivity with total economy productivity 
growth trends. 
 
 Sources for employment updates 
ASD is arguably the only database that provides reliable long-run sectoral employment data for 
Africa. It has been used to analyze long-run productivity trends. However, since the construction 
of the ASD, most countries in the database have conducted comprehensive new labor force 
surveys and PHC. Therefore, the ASD is updated from 2010 to 2015 using these recent surveys 
and censuses.  
 
2.5.5.1 Botswana 
We used employment information for the year 2011 from the 2011 Population and Housing 
Census published in the 2011 Labor Statistics Report and employment information for 2013 from 
the 2013 HIV/AIDS Impact Survey published in the 2013 Labor Statistics Report. The total 
employment figure for Agriculture in the original ASD estimate is 251,000, but the 2011 
Population Census report Agricultural employment as 98,000, a difference of 153,000. To ensure 
continuity and avoid an irregular productivity pattern, we used the ASD estimate as a benchmark 
in 2011. We then extrapolated using the growth trend estimated from 2011 to 2015, using the 
trends from data obtained from the 2011 Population and Housing Census and the HIV/AIDS 
Impact Survey.  The same procedure was followed to estimate employment values for 
Transportation Services, Government Services, and Personal Services. For the other sectors, we 
use the 2011 employment figure from the 2011 Population and Housing Census and 2013 data 
from the HIV/AIDS Impact Survey as benchmarks, and then interpolate for 2012 and extrapolate 
for 2014 and 2015. 
 
2.5.5.2 Ethiopia 
We used 2013 employment information from the 2013 National Labor Force Survey and the 2010 
ASD figure as benchmarks and then used labor productivity trends to interpolate for 2011-2012 
and extrapolate for 2014-2015. We observed a sharp increase in Personal Services, Trade, and 
Utilities. We adjusted the figures for these sectors to ensure smooth growth by using the 2010 







We used the employment component of the Ghana Living Standard Survey Round 6 (2013) and 
the Ghana Labor Force Survey 2015 as the benchmark data. We then interpolate for 2011, 2012, 
and 2014 using information from the Economically Active Population in Agriculture from FAO, 
the 2014 Integrated Business Establishment Survey, and Labor productivity trends. 
 
2.5.5.4 Kenya 
We used employment data from the Kenya Economic Survey from 2010-2015. We used the 2010 
value from ASD data as a benchmark and then extrapolated all sectors, except Trade Services. 
Comparing the values in the Kenya Economic Survey and the ASD estimates, we concluded that 
the ASD underestimates employment for Trade Services. We, therefore, used the 2010 figure from 
the Kenya Economic Survey as a benchmark and used the trends from ASD to backcast to 1969. 
 
2.5.5.5 Malawi 
We used the 2013 Labor Force Survey and the ASD estimate for 2010 as benchmarks, and then 




We used the employment data from the 2011 population census as a benchmark and then 




Detailed sectoral employment data is not reported in the Nigeria Quarterly Labor Force Statistics 
report. However, the total number of people employed is reported. We used trends in total 
employment and ASD estimates for 2010 as benchmarks to extrapolate total economy 
employment figures, and then used sectoral ratios based on labor productivity extrapolation to 
disaggregate the total economy figures. 
 
2.5.5.8 Senegal 
We used the 2010 ASD estimate as a benchmark and then used the 2013 PHC and 2015 National 
Labor Force Survey to extrapolate for 2011-2015. Note that the detailed sectoral level data are not 
reported in the 2013 PHC, but the total employment level is reported. We used the sectoral shares 
stated in the 2015 Labor Force Survey to disaggregate the 2015 data. We then interpolate between 
these years using trends from 2011-2015. We used the trends in sectoral employment and 2010 
ASD level data as a benchmark to extrapolate. 
 
2.5.5.9 South Africa 
We used data from the Quarterly Labor Force Survey (QLFS) for the years 2011-2016, except in 





extrapolate the 2010 ASD employment figures for 2011-2016. The agriculture figures reported in 
the QLFS are three times lower than the ASD estimate for 2010. Community and Other Social 
Services are lumped together in the QLFS. To get consistent figures for Agriculture, Government 
Services, and Personal Services, we used growth trends from the QLFS to extrapolate the 2010 
data to 2015. 
 
2.5.5.10 Tanzania 
We used employment information for the year 2012 from the Population and Housing Census 
and the 2014 Labor Force Survey as benchmarks. For some sectors, the data were checked for 
reliability and if necessary, were replaced by using ASD 2010 data as a benchmark instead. We then 
interpolate for 2011 and extrapolate data for 2013-2015 using the employment series from the 
Employment and Earnings Survey, 2010-2015. 
 
2.5.5.11 Zambia 
We used employment data from the 2012 and 2014 Labor Force Survey as benchmarks, then 
interpolated for 2011 and 2013 and extrapolated for 2015. Note that the labor force figures are 
twice as high as those in the 2010 benchmark used in the ASD, except in the case of Agriculture 
and the Mining, Manufacturing and Trade Sectors. To ensure continuity and to avoid sudden 
jumps in productivity we used the 2010 ASD estimate as a benchmark and then extrapolated for 
the other sectors using trends from the Labor Force Surveys. 
2.6 Treatment of the Informal Sector 
The AfDB (2013) estimates that the informal sector accounts for about 80% of total employment 
and about 50% of GDP in Africa. The importance of the informal sector in Africa implies that 
the reliability of the sectoral value-added and employment data depends on the reliability of the 
informal employment and GDP estimates, which in turn depends on three things. First, the 
sampling frame for the measurement of economic activities must include broader coverage of 
informal activities. Second, it requires that all countries in the sample similarly measure informal 
economic activities. Finally, the reliability of the data requires that informal sector employment 
and GDP be treated in similar ways to ensure reliable productivity estimates.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, when statistical capacity declined in Africa, estimates of GDP relied mostly 
on economic censuses, which did not cover many activities in the informal sector, resulting in 
structural undercounting of informal activities. However, in the recent wave of statistical reforms 
across Africa, many African countries have updated their sampling frame to cover more economic 
activities, which were previously not covered, including broader coverage of informal activities. 
To arrive implicitly at a reliable coverage of informal activities, we use recent estimates of GDP by 
sector as benchmarks and extrapolate backward. This adjusts the levels in years (the 1980s and 
1990s) that informal activities are undercounted to reflect current trends while maintaining 
historical growth rates. This ensures that the data is consistent over time. However, the reliability 
of this adjustment decreases as we go back in time.   
All countries in the sample use the SNA to compile the value added. The 1993 SNA, which was 
used by most countries in the sample, treats the informal sector under the household sector and 
its sub-sectors (S.14). It introduces the concept of the informal sector and refers to the guidelines 





For employment, we use population census (PC) complemented with labor force surveys (LFS), 
which covers both formal and informal sectors, as benchmarks. The key is that most countries in 
Africa measure employment in the informal sector in the PC and LFS using the ILO guidelines on 
the measurement of the informal sector. In principle, the use of employment estimates from PCs 
and SNA ensures that implicit estimates of informal employment and GDP are comparable across 
countries and variables.   
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
The basis of this chapter is the Africa Sector database. The ASD provides long-run sectoral data 
for the analysis of the structure of 11 African economies. Since the construction of the ASD, there 
has been a wave of statistical reforms in some of the countries in the ASD, leading to a significant 
revaluation of GDP. These reforms have provided a clearer picture of the size and structure of 
production of the countries involved. We update the ASD to reflect these statistical changes. Most 
importantly, we expand the ASD by constructing sectoral data for seven new African countries: 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, and Namibia. This has 
resulted in an expanded database (from the 1960s to 2015) covering about 80% of GDP in Africa. 
We strictly follow the ASD methodology to ensure data continuity, consistency, and comparability. 
The ASD methodology ensures the internal, international, and intertemporal consistency of the 
data.  
African National Statistics are evolving. In recent years, many African countries are revising 
national accounting frameworks and base years previously used to estimate GDP.  This has led to 
the re-evaluation of GDP estimates, providing timely and more reliable data on production, 
income, and expenditure with implications for both producers (national statistical authorities, 
central banks, etc.) and users of African statistics such as researchers, government and investors. 
For producers of statistics, the production of more reliable and timely data could increase their 
visibility, international collaboration, and funding. For researchers, timely and reliable data 
significantly equips researchers to diagnose the problems of African economies better and offer 
the right policy prescriptions. For governments, it enhances their ability to predict and better 
manage expenditure and revenues (consolidates fiscal positions), understand the key growth 
drivers, and take the policy initiatives necessary to spur growth. For investors, more accurate 
information enhances their investment decisions and returns. Therefore, the relevance of the 
recent statistical reforms across Africa cannot be overemphasized. One lesson that is clear from 
the construction of the EASD is that while African statistical institutes are improving the 
production of information on output, there is a long way to go on the production of data on inputs 
such as employment, hours worked and sectoral information on capital and Research and 
Development (R&D). The frequency of employment information is often ten years (mostly from 
PHC and LFS), which impairs government’s ability to plan and deliver on creating employment 
for the 11 million youth entering the labor force in Africa each year, according to ILO(2018). 
While this is the case for most African countries, there are also good practices on the continent. 
For example, South Africa conducts quarterly labor force surveys with detailed information on 
sectoral employment, occupation, and hours worked. In most parts of Africa however, data on 
hours worked is mostly missing, largely due to the high level of informality on the continent. 
Although the informal sector is significant in Africa, reliable and consistent time series data on 






2.8 Appendix  
 Statistical Notes on New Countries 
2.8.1.1 Burkina Faso  
2.8.1.1.1 Background of National Accounts Statistics 
In 2001, Burkina Faso adopted the 1993 UN System of National Accounts (SNA 1993) and 
changed the base year from 1985 to 1999. Prior to the adoption of the 1993 SNA, the Population 
Census of 1996, the Informal Sector Survey in 1997 and the Commercial and Industrial Census of 
1998 revealed that the 1968 SNA underestimated output and productivity. Therefore, the adoption 
of the 1993 SNA was long overdue. With technical support from the Observatoire economique et 
statistique d’afrique Subsaharienne (AFRISTAT), the Institut National de la Statistique et de la 
Demographie (INSD) upgraded to the 1993 SNA using the CRETES module. The CRETES 
software consolidates the use of SNA93 through the full integration of concepts, definitions, and 
methods. AFRISTAT member states have common nomenclatures for activities (NAEMA) and 
for products (NOPEMA). This constitutes an important tool for harmonization available to 
member states for their statistical work, in particular for the collection of statistical data and the 
preparation of national accounts. These nomenclatures are based on United Nations International 
Nomenclatures, including the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities (ISC Rev 3) and the Central Product Classification (CPC). This ensures international 
comparison with non-French speaking African Countries. 
The first publication that implemented the SNA93 is the National Economics Account, 2001 (Les 
comptes économiques de la nation 2001). The three years of accounts (1999, 2000 and 2001) were 
developed using the new system with 1999 as the base year. The old series of GDP (from 1985 to 
1998) was also retroactively extrapolated to match the concepts and definitions of the SNA93 and 
the new base year. This publication links the old GDP backcast series (1985-1998) and three new 
accounts (1999-2001). More recent publications such as the National Economic Account 1999-
2012, and the Burkina Faso Statistical Yearbook (Annuaire Statistique 2015) use the SNA93, 
though data for the period 1965-1984 uses the 1968 UN system of national accounts. To link this 
historical series with the new series we used data from recent series as the benchmark level data 
and backcast to 1965 using equation 1. See notes on data construction. 
 
Period Source Notes 
2013-2014 Annuaire Statistique 2015, pg 171-
172, INSD26 
Level used for nominal value added. SNA1993 
1999-2012 Les Comptes Economiques de la 
Nation 1999 à 2012: Comptes 
Définitifs27, pp. 27-32, INSD 
Levels data used for nominal value added SNA1993 
1994-1998 Les Comptes Economiques de la 
Nation 1994-1999, pp. 18-19 and 
96-98, INSD28 
Level used. Originally published in SNA1968 but 











1985-1993 Les Comptes Economiques de la 
Nation 2001, pp. 19-24 and 58-63, 
INSD29 
Level used for sectors A-I. Services (J-P) do not follow ISIC 
3 distinction. Growth rate of the aggregate sector was 
applied to each subsector. 
1970-1984 UN National Accounts Official 
Country Data30 
Trend used, difficult to disentangle personal and 
government services so aggregate growth rate was applied. 
Published in SNA1968 
1965-1969 Africa Statistical Yearbook31, Part 2 
of 1972 and 1975 
Trend used. Data on services (J-P) has not been                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
defined separately so aggregate growth rate is applied to 
each subsector.   
 
2.8.1.1.2 Construction Notes on Value Added Series 
• The recent series is published according to the 1993 UN System of National Accounts. 
We used the first year of the recent series as the benchmark level data and link it to the 
historical data using equation 1. This repairs major breaks by adjusting levels of historical 
series to reflect current information, methodologies and system of national accounts while 
maintaining historical growth rates.  
• For 1985-1998, the branches of economic activities are: Agriculture (AtB), Mining and 
Quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Utilities (E), Construction (F), Trade Services (G+H), 
Transport and Communication (I), Bank and Insurance, Other Services of Merchants, and 
Services of Non-Merchants (J-P). 
• Sectors A-I match perfectly with the ASD sector classification, but sectors J-P do not. The 
levels data were used for Sector A-I, while we matched Bank and Insurance, Other Services 
of Merchants, and Services of Non-Merchants to the ASD classification J-P by applying 
the growth rate of the sum of the aforementioned sectors to each detailed sector that 
corresponds to the ASD sectors. 
• There is no information on Dwellings (70). The Share of Dwellings in Business Services 
(J+K) for Senegal was applied. Both Senegal and Burkina Faso are AFRISTAT members, 
are in the same monetary zone and have similar economic structure. 
• For the period 1970-1984, UN OCD was used. Sectors A-K correspond to the ASD 
classification, while sectors L-P slightly differ with Community and Government services 
being combined. We applied the aggregate growth rate of sectors L-P to both Government 
and Personal Services. 
• For the period 1965-1969, data were obtained from the Africa Statistical Yearbook, 1972 
and 1975. UNECA provides estimates of value added for Burkina Faso, then known as 
Upper Volta. Sectors J-P do not match the ASD classification. The aggregate growth rate 
of the main sectors was applied to each sub-sector.  
• Price information is not available for 1965. 
 
2.8.1.1.3 Construction Notes on Employment 
Year Primary Sources Source of Publication 
1975 Total Employment from the General Population Census INSD32 
1980 Economically active population by Sector from AYB UNECA 










1994 Sectoral ratios from HIEC33 ILO KILM 
1996 Sectoral employment Levels from 1996 PHC IPUMS International 
2006 Sectoral employment levels from 2006 PHC ILO KILM 
2014 Sectoral employment levels from 2014 HIEC  ILO KILM 
2003, 2005, 
2007 
Distribution of workers by Industry from Household Surveys INSD34 
1980-2015 Trend from the Economically Active Population in Agriculture FAOSTAT 
 
• We used level data from 1975, 1985, 1996, 2006 and 2014 as benchmarks. 
• For the 1975 benchmark, total employment data was obtained from the report of the 
General Population Census. We applied the sectoral distributions of the economically 
active population from 1980, reported in the Africa Statistical Yearbook, to disaggregate 
the total employment figure into sectoral levels.  
• In 1985, employment by occupation is available but employment by sector is not available. 
We map employment by occupation to sectors using the 1980 sectoral distributions of the 
economically active population. 
• For Agriculture, we interpolate between benchmark years using growth trends from the 
economically active population in Agriculture from 1981 to 2015. From 1970 to 1980, 
retropolate and extrapolate using the average trend of labor productivity (see equation 7, 
10, 11). Average labor productivity trends are obtained by calculating labor productivity 
for benchmark years and linearly interpolating between these benchmark years. 
 
2.8.1.2 Cameroon 
2.8.1.2.1 Background of National Accounts Statistics 
The first national account of Cameroon was prepared in 1964 and covers 1959, 1962/63 and 
1963/64 for East Cameroon. These accounts were prepared to provide the empirical basis for the 
implementation of the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1966-1971). After the 
unification that led to the creation of the Federal Republic of Cameroon in October 1961, a virtual 
national account was prepared for the new federation that covered East Cameroon as well as other 
new regions with the help of French technical assistance. Oleg Arkhipoff was the French technical 
assistant who helped to build the first national account system that covers the entire federation. 
The Arkhipoff methodology was derived directly from the French Courcier System. Industrial 
censuses and administrative information from tax units were used as the primary source of 
information for the construction of national accounts. The methodology was used to prepare 
national accounts of Cameroon until the 1970/71 fiscal year when the National Statistic Institutes 
adopted the 1968 UN System of National Accounts (National Institute of Statistics, 2013). 
The 1968 System of National Accounts was used to produce the 1971 national accounts and to 
convert previous accounts in the Cameroonian Courcier System to the SNA. The adoption of the 
1968 SNA came with the introduction of the residence notion into the national accounting system. 
This emphasized the importance of national territory in the production of goods and services, 
unlike the Cameroonian Courcier System which included foreign administration and international 
organizations. National accounts were constructed by grouping institutional units according to 
functions: Non-Financial Companies and Quasi-Companies; Financial Institutions; Public 
administration; and Households and non-profit organizations at the service of households. The 
 
33 Household Income and Expenditure Survey 





Courcier System operated under five accounts: production accounts; exploitation accounts; 
appropriation accounts; capital account; and external accounts. With the adoption of the 1968 
SNA, the production and exploitation accounts were merged, and the appropriation accounts were 
divided into income, expenditure, and final consumption accounts (National Institute of Statistics, 
2013). 
In 1993, the Institut National de la Statistique benefited from EU, French government and Africa’s 
Economic and Statistical Observatory (AFRISTAT) joint support to reshape and upgrade the 
national accounts to the 1993 UN SNA. This project was integrated into the ERETES package of 
AFRISTAT, with Cameroon being the pilot country. The Institut National de la Statistique 
adopted the 1993 SNA, ISIC Rev 3, the Central Product Classification (CPC) and the ERETES 
package and changed the base year to 1989/90. This led to the production of a series of national 
accounts published in November 2004. The national account was published in both fiscal and 
calendar years. In the recent revision used as a benchmark, the base year was changed to 2000 and 
the national account was reconstructed backwards to 1993. The Institut National de la Statistique 
is planning to upgrade to the 2008 SNA using 2005 as the base year, further updating the data 
backwards to 1959 using 2005 as a reference year, as well as producing quarterly accounts with the 
assistance of AFRISTAT and Regional Accounts to help the decentralization process (National 
Institute of Statistics, 2013). 
Period Source Notes 
2012-2015 Les Comptes Nationaux de 2015, pg 5-11, 
Institut National de la Statistique35  
Levels data used and the 1993 SNA 
1993-2011 Les Comptex Nationaux, Optique 
production, Tables 6-22, Institut National de 
la Statistique36 
Level data used for both value-added in 
current and constant prices.  
1965-1992 Comptex Nationaux du Cameroun, 
1969/70-2008 publications, Institut 
National de la Statistique37 
Trend used for value added in current prices 
for the whole period. It was also used to 
construct price series from 1971-1992. Price 
information is not available for the 1965-1970 
period. 
1965-1969 Africa Statistical Yearbook38, Part 2 of 1970, 
1972 and 1975 
Trend used to construct price series from 
1965-1970.  
Data on Services (J-P) has not been                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
defined separately so the aggregate growth rate 
is applied to each subsector.   
2.8.1.2.2  Data Construction Notes 
• The recent series is published in the 1993 UN System of National Accounts. We used the 
first year of the recent series as the benchmark level data and linked it to the historical data 
using equation 2.1. 
• The NSI started estimating volume data after the adoption of the 1963 SNA in 1971, 
therefore price information is not available from 1965-1970 from our primary source. We 
complement our primary source by using information from the Africa statistical yearbook 
to construct price series from 1965 to1970. In the ASY, data on services (J-P) has not been 
defined separately so the aggregate growth is applied to each subsector. 
 
35 Available online at http://slmp-550-
104.slc.westdc.net/~stat54/downloads/2016/Comptes_Nationaux_2015_final.pdf 
36 Available online at http://nso.cameroon.opendataforafrica.org/xkrcbs/national-summary-data-page 
37 Available at the SOAS, University of London Library https://library.soas.ac.uk/Record/383822 






• There is no information on Dwellings (70). The share of Dwellings in Business Services 
(J+K) for Senegal was applied. Both Senegal and Cameroon are AFRISTAT members and 
have a similar economic structure. The price index of Business Services (J+K) was used to 
derive volume data on Dwellings (70). 
2.8.1.2.3 Construction Notes on Employment 
Year Primary Source Source of Publication 
1965-1968 Number of Employees by Industry from 1975 ASY UNECA 
1972-1974 Number of Employees by Industry from 1980 ASY UNECA 
1973-1981 Number of Employees by Industry from 1985 ASY UNECA 
1976 Employment by Occupation from the 1976 PHC IPUMS International 
1976 Economically Active Population by Industry from the Yearbook of 
Labor Statistics, 1945-1989 
ILO 
1986 Sectoral Employment Levels from 1986 NSI Estimate  KILM 
2001 Sectoral Employment Levels from 2001 Household Survey KILM 
2005 Sectoral Employment levels from the 2005 PHC IPUMS International 
2005 Sectoral Employment Levels from the 2005 ESSI 1 NSI of Cameroon 
2010 Sectoral Employment Levels from the 2010 ESSI 2 NSI of Cameroon 
1980-2015 Economically Active Population in Agriculture FAOSTAT 
 
• We use level data from 1976, 1986, 2001, 2005, and 2010 as benchmarks. There was no 
available information for benchmark in the 1990s, making the interpolation period 
between 1986 and 2001 quite long.  
• In 1976, employment by occupation is available but employment by sector is not available. 
We map employment by occupation to sectors using the 1976 sectoral distributions of the 
economically active population by industry reported by ILO. The figures reported by ILO 
and the figures we obtained after mapping turn out to be very similar. 
• Using the 1976 data from PHC as benchmark, we extrapolate to 1980 and retropolate to 
1965 using growth trends from the annual number of employees by sector reported in the 
1975, 1980 and 1985 Africa Statistical Yearbooks.  
• From 1980 onwards, for the agricultural sector, we interpolate between benchmark years 
using the growth trend of the economically active population in Agriculture. 
• For the other sectors, we retropolate and extrapolate using the average growth trend of 
labor productivity (see equations 7, 10, 11). Average labor productivity trends are obtained 
by calculating labor productivity for benchmark years and linearly interpolating between 
these benchmark years. 
 
2.8.1.3 Lesotho 
2.8.1.3.1 Background of National Accounts Statistics 
The first National Accounts report was issued by the Bureau of Statistics in July 1967. This covers 
the 1964/65-1965/66 fiscal years. The National Accounts estimate was initiated by Mr. Michael 
Ward of the School of Applied Economics, Cambridge University. Interim work was circulated to 
governments’ officials and agencies and based on their inputs and the additional information 
provided many corrections and some changes in concepts and treatment were made. The concepts 
and definitions used in this report are generally in accordance with the principles laid down by the 
UN 1953 System of National Accounts although the presentation of tables follows more closely 
the practices of the Central Statistical Office of the United Kingdom (Lesotho Bureau of Statistics 





The Bureau reports the potential margin of error associated with each statistical table, with ‘A’ 
representing errors in major aggregates probably less than 10%, ‘B’ representing errors in major 
aggregates probably between 10-25%, and Z representing errors not known, possibly in excess of 
25%. Value added data by industry at current and factor costs were classified under B reflecting 
possible error between 10%-25%.  One other important issue is that the 1964/65-1974/75 value 
added data is estimated in thousands of Rand. We converted it to Maloti. The Maloti was pegged 
at parity with the Rand. From 1964 to 1974, the data were estimated in the fiscal year, with the 
Bureau of Statistics starting to estimate value added in in the calendar year in 1975.  As a result, 
the growth trend from the fiscal years 1964/65 to 1974/75 was used to estimate levels data for the 
calendar years 1964 to 1974 in this update. 
Over the years as more information was gathered and the SNA was revised, the LBS also revised 
its series from 1975-1986 to reflect current information and methodologies. The period account 
was converted from the fiscal year to the calendar year in 1975 and value added in constant prices 
was computed beginning in 1980. Recently the 2008 UN SNA was adopted, with the base year 
changing to 2012 and the historical series recalculated back to 1982 to reflect the revision in 
method and system of National Accounts.   
 
Period Source  Notes 
2007-2015 National Accounts 2015 Publication Tables, Lesotho Bureau of 
Statistics (LBS), 2015.39 
Level used  
1982-2006 National Accounts Revised estimates from 1982-2014, LBS.40 Level data used 
1964-1981 • National Accounts 1964-5/1965-6, LBS, July 1967.  
• National Accounts 1973/74, LBS, Nov 1976. 
• National Accounts 1974/75, LBS, July 1977. 
• National Accounts 1976-1986, LBS, March 1988. 
• National Accounts 1980-1988 Analytical tables, LBS, 
Sept 1989. 
• National Accounts 1980-1988, LBS, Sept 1988. 
• Statistical Reports No 13: 1992 National Accounts 
1980-1991, LBS. 
• Statistical Reports No 10: 1994 National Accounts 
1980-1993, LBS. 
• Statistical Reports No11: 1997 National Accounts 1980-
1996, LBS. 
•  Statistical Report No 17: 2003 National Accounts 1982-
2002, LBS.  
• Statistical Report No 6: 1999 National Accounts 1980-
1998 
• Statistical report No. 16 2002 
• Statistical report No. 29 200841 
Trend used for nominal value 
added.  
We mostly used these reports 
to construct nominal value 
added and price series on 
dwellings. 
1970-1979 UN National Accounts Official Country Data42 Trend used to construct price 
series. 
1964-1969 Africa Statistical Yearbook, 1970, 1972 and 1974 Publications43 Trend used to construct price 
series. 
 
39 Available online at http://www.bos.gov.ls/ 
40Available online at http://www.bos.gov.ls/ 
41 These reports were obtained from SOAS, University of London Library. https://library.soas.ac.uk/Record/524079. 
42 Available online at http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SNA&f=group_code%3a201 







2.8.1.3.2 Notes on Data Construction 
• The current revision used as the benchmark level data is constructed according to the 2008 
UN System of National Accounts. 
• The data from 1982-2015 were obtained from the website of the LBS. We used the earliest 
year of this latest series as the benchmark for retropolation. 
• The base year for the benchmark level information is 2012. Following the GGDC ASD 
methodology, we used 2005 as our reference year.  
• The value-added historical series in current prices from 1964-1981 was obtained from the 
National Accounts and Statistical reports of LBS. The estimation of the value-added series 
was based on sectoral income so there is no information on prices from 1964-1979. The 
bureau started computing value added in constant prices in 1980. We filled this gap by 
constructing price series from 1964-1981 using information from the UN OCD and the 
ASY 
• We linked the historical series (1964-1981) to the benchmark level data (1982-2015) using 
the growth trend. 
• We then derived the volume data using the value-added series in current prices and the 
price series.  
• In 1972/73 only the wages and salaries of employees of the mining companies were taken 
into account when estimating value added for the Mining (C) sector. The LBS did not 
include the operating surplus.  
• In 1973/74, no company carried out mining activity in Lesotho, with the LBS estimate for 
this fiscal year based on diggers only. 
• In 1974/75, the estimate of the Mining sector (C) is based on the value of diamonds 
exported because diamonds were the only mineral extracted in Lesotho during this fiscal 
year.  
• From the fiscal year 1964/65 to 1974/75 value added data is estimated in thousands of 
Rand. We converted it to Maloti and then used the growth trend. The Maloti is pegged at 
parity with the Rand.  
• From 1964 to 1974, data were estimated according to the fiscal year. The LBS started 
estimating the value added in the calendar year in 1975. Therefore, the growth trend from 
the fiscal years 1964/65 to 1974/75 was used to estimate the levels data for the calendar 
years 1964 to 1974 in this update. 
• The recent revision of the national accounts which is online (1982-2015) does not report 
ownership of dwellings separately. However, the Statistical Reports published by the LBS 
contains figures on Ownership of dwellings. 
• Data on dwellings are taken from various Statistical Reports published by the LBS (see 
table above). 
2.8.1.3.3 Construction Notes on Employment 
Year Primary Sources Source of Publication 
1976 Sectoral Employment Levels from the 1976 PHC ILO 
1986 Sectoral Employment Levels from the 1986 PHC Lesotho Bureau of Statistics 








2006 Sectoral Employment levels from the 2006 PHC Lesotho Bureau of Statistics 
2008 Sectoral Employment Levels from the 2008 LFS Lesotho Bureau of Statistics 
2011 Sectoral Employment levels from the 2011 Lesotho 
Demographic Survey 
Lesotho Bureau of Statistics 
1980-2015 Economically Active Population in Agriculture FAOSTAT 
 
• LBS defines the minimum age of employment as 10 years. The data used covers persons 
engaged who are 10 years old and above.  
• We used sectoral employment levels from PHC of 1976, 1986, 1996, 2006 and 2011 and 
the 2011 Lesotho Demographic Survey as benchmarks. 
• From 1980 to 2015, for the agricultural sector, we interpolate between benchmark years 
using the growth trend of the economically active population in Agriculture. From 1970 
to 1980, we retropolate and extrapolate using the average trend of labor productivity.  
• For the other sectors, we retropolate and extrapolate using the average growth trend for 
labor productivity (see equation 7, 10, 11).  
2.8.1.4 Mozambique 
Background to National Accounts Statistics 
Period Sources Notes 
1991-2015 National Accounts, Instituto 
Nacional De Estatistica44  
Level data used for both value-added in constant and 
current prices. 
1966-1990 Africa Statistical Yearbooks, 1972-
1995 yearbooks45 
Trend used  
  
2.8.1.4.1 Notes on Data Construction 
• Revised value-added series starting from 1991 was obtained online from the National 
Statistical institute. 
• The revised series have been compiled in accordance with the 1993 UN System of National 
Accounts. We used the first year of this series as our benchmark data. 
• We obtained non-official information from the Africa Statistical Yearbooks from 1966-
1990. We linked this historical series to the benchmark level data using equation 1.  
• The National Statistical Institute does not publish a separate series for dwellings. However, 
reports of a mission from Statistics Denmark to Maputo indicate that INE construct series 
for Owner-occupied dwellings. Because we are not privy to this information, we applied 
the share of Dwellings in Business Services (J+K) of Tanzania to construct a separate series 
for Dwellings (70) because both countries have a similar economic structure. 
2.8.1.4.2 Construction Notes on Employment 
Year Primary Sources  Source of Publication 
 1970 Economically active population by industry from the 1970 Census ILO  





Sectoral employment distributions from Jones and Tarp (2013) UNU WIDER WP 
45/2013 
 
44 Available online at http://www.ine.gov.mz/estatisticas/estatisticas-economicas/contas-nacionais/anuais-
1/pib_optica_producao.xlsx/view 






1997 Sectoral Employment levels from the 1997 PHC IPUMS International 
2003 Sectoral Employment levels from the 2003 HS KILM 
2005 Sectoral Employment distribution from the 2004/2005 Integrated 
Survey on Labor Force 
INE 
2005 Sectoral Employment distribution from the 2005 HBS INE 
2009 Sectoral Employment levels from the 2008/09 Employment 
Survey 
INE 
2010 Sectoral Employment distribution from the 2010 HBS INE 
2007 Sectoral Employment Levels from the 2007 PHC IPUMS International 
2015 Sectoral Employment levels from the 2014/2015 HS INE 
1970-2015 General Employment Information from the Anuario Estatistico INE 
1980-2015 Total Economically Active Population in Agriculture FAOSTAT 
• Data from 1970, 1980, 1997, 2007, and 2015 are used as benchmarks. 
• We adjust the benchmark data for mining, manufacturing, and utilities sectors for 1970 
and 1980 using data from the Industrial Surveys.  
• We generate series for the period 1996-2015 using 1996, 2005, 2010 and 2015 data points 
from the Household Surveys as benchmarks, then linearly interpolating between these 
benchmark years. This results in a household Survey series that is used for interpolating 
between population census benchmarks. 
• Labor productivity series is generated for the period 1970-1996. Average labor productivity 
trends are obtained by calculating labor productivity for benchmark years and linearly 
interpolating between these benchmark years 
• For agriculture we interpolate between benchmark years using trends from the 
economically active population in Agriculture.  
• For the other sectors, we interpolate between benchmark years for the periods 1970-1996 
and 1997-2015 using labor productivity trends and trends from the generated Household 
Survey series, respectively. 
2.8.1.5 Namibia 
Period Sources Notes 
1980-2015 National Account Time Series46 Level data used for value added in constant 
and current prices 
1965-1979 Africa Statistical Yearbooks, 1972-1995 
yearbooks47 
Trend used  
Notes on Data Construction 
• The recent revision has been compiled in accordance with the 2008 UN System of National 
Accounts and retrospectively extrapolated to 1980 by the Namibia Statistical Agency. We 
used the earliest year of this series as our benchmark level data. 
• We obtained non-official information from the Africa Statistical Yearbooks from 1966-
1979. We linked this historical series to the benchmark level data using the growth trend.  
• Namibia does not report separate series on dwellings. As a result, we applied the share of 
dwellings in Business Services (J+K) of Lesotho to arrive at an estimate for Namibia. 
Namibia and Lesotho are in the Common Monetary Area (CMA) and have a similar real 
estate structure. 
2.8.1.5.1 Construction notes on Employment 
Year Primary Sources Source of Publication 
 
46 Available online at http://nsa.org.na/page/publications 





1960 Economically active population by Industry UNECA 
1970 Economically active population by Industry UNECA 
1980 Economically active population by Industry  UNECA 
1987-1996 Economically active population by Sector UNECA 
1991 Sectoral employment levels from the 1991 PHC NSA48 
2000 Sectoral employment levels from the 2000 LFS KILM 
2001 Sectoral employment levels from the 2001 PHC NSA 
2004 Sectoral employment levels from the 2004 LFS KILM 
2011 Sectoral employment levels from the 2011 PHC NSA 
2012 Sectoral employment levels from the 2012 LFS NSA 
2013 Sectoral employment levels from the 2013 LFS NSA 
2014 Sectoral employment levels from the 2014 L FS NSA 
2016 Sectoral employment levels from the 2016 LFS NSA 
1980-2016 Total economically active population in Agriculture FAOSTAT 
 
• Data from 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991, 2001, 2011, 2016 as benchmarks. 
• Note that the 1960, 1970, 1980 benchmarks were computed by applying the economy wide 
unemployment rate to each sector’s economically active population reported by UNECA 
in the Africa Statistical yearbooks.  
• The Namibia Statistical Agency (NSA) report the 2001 employment by 4 aggregate sectors: 
Agriculture, Manufacturing and other Industries, Trade Services, and Private and Public 
Services. To obtain data points for the 10 sectors, we used the sectoral distribution from 
the 2000 labor force survey to disaggregate the 4 sectors reported in the census report into 
10 sectors. 
• Sectoral employment levels for the 2016 benchmark was obtained from the 2016 labor 
force survey.  
• For the agricultural sector, we interpolate between benchmark years using the growth trend 
from the economically active population in Agriculture. From 1960 to 1980, we interpolate 
between benchmark years using the average trend of labor productivity.  
• For the other sectors, we interpolate between benchmark years using the average trend of 
labor productivity (see equation 7, 10, 11). Average labor productivity trends are obtained 
by calculating labor productivity for benchmark years and linearly interpolating between 
these benchmark years. 
 
2.8.1.6 Rwanda 
Period Source  Notes 
1999-2015 “GDP, National Accounts, 2015” National 
Institute of Statistics of Rwanda49 
Level used for value added in current and 
constant prices. 
1970-1998 UN National Accounts Official Country 
Data50 
Trend Used. Continuous series for value 
added in current prices were available. For 
value added in constant prices, data for the 
periods 1970-1975 and 1980-1981 were 
missing. We fill in these gaps using 
information from the 1976 and 1985 
Africa Statistical Yearbooks. 
1966-1969 Africa Statistical Yearbooks Trend used 
 
48 Namibia Statistical Agency 
49 Available online at http://www.statistics.gov.rw/publication/gdp-national-accounts-2015 






2.8.1.6.1 Notes on Data Construction 
• The earliest year of the recent value-added series is used as the benchmark level data. 
The recent data were obtained online from the website of National Statistical Institute 
of Rwanda. The series was compiled using the 1993 UN System of National Accounts. 
• From 1970 to 1998, the value-added series from the UN Official Country Data was 
used. We linked this series to the benchmark level information using the growth trend. 
Continuous series for value added in current price was available but continuous series 
for value added in constant prices was not available. For value added in constant prices, 
data for the periods 1970-1975 and 1980-1981 were missing. We fill in these gaps using 
price information from the Africa Statistical Yearbooks. 
• Sectors A-K correspond to the ASD classification, while sectors L-P differ slightly as 
Community and Government services are combined. We applied the aggregate growth 
rate for sectors L-P to both Government and Personal Services. 
• For 1987-1989, the value-added series in constant prices of sector G+H51 includes 
Transport, storage and communications and financial intermediation, Real estate, 
Renting and business activities. We applied the overall growth rate to all the sub-sectors 
defined in the ASD. 
• The Rwanda National Statistical Institute does not report a separate series for 
Dwellings (70). As a result, we applied the share of Dwellings in Business Services 
(J+K) of Uganda to estimate a separate series on Dwellings (70) for Rwanda. Uganda 
and Rwanda are neighbors and have a similar economic structure. 
2.8.1.6.2 Employment Construction Notes 
Year Primary Sources Sources of Publication 
1978 Sectoral employment levels from 1978 PHC ILO 
1989 Sectoral employment levels from 1991 PHC NISR 
2000 Sectoral employment levels from 2000 EICV 1 NISR52 
2002 Sectoral employment levels from the 2002 PHC KILM 
2005 Sectoral employment levels from the 2005 EICV II NISR 
2010 Sectoral employment levels from the 2010 EICV III NISR 
2012 Sectoral employment levels from the 2012 PHC NISR 
2013 Sectoral employment levels from the EICV IV NISR 
2014 Sectoral employment levels from the 2014 ES NISR 
2016 Sectoral employment levels from the 2016 LFS NISR 
1980-2016 Economically active population in Agriculture FAOSTAT 
 
• Employment data from the PHC of 1978, 1989, 2002, 2012, and the 2016 LFS were used 
as benchmarks.  
• In most sectors, the 2002 and 2012 PHC tends to underestimate employment. Therefore, 
the 2002 PHC benchmark is adjusted using the data from the 2000 Integrated Household 
Living Condition Survey (EICV I).  
• The 2012 PHC is also adjusted using information from the 2012 Integrated Living 
condition Survey (EICV III).  
• We interpolate between benchmark years using the trend in average labor productivity, 
except for the period 2000-2016 when the trend from the EICV is used. 
 
51 Wholesale, retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods; hotels and 
restaurants 





• For agriculture, we interpolate between benchmark years using the trend in the 
economically active population in Agriculture. 
 
2.8.1.7 Uganda 
Period Sources  Notes 
1997-2015 Statistical Abstracts, Uganda Bureau of Statistics53 Data used as benchmark level data for value 
added in constant and current prices 
1955-1996 UN Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1964-
2000 Publications.54 
Trend used. We checked for reliability, and 
when unusual growth rates are observed we 
replaced them with growth rates from UN 
OCD online or historical publication by the 
Uganda Bureau of Statistics (See rows 
below). 
1970-1996 UN National Accounts Official Country Data55 Trend used. For some years, information on 
producers of government services is not 
reported in the UN Yearbook, however, 
information on narrowly defined 
government and other community services 
from UN OCD is used to fill the gap.  
1955-1962 The Real growth of the economy of Uganda, 1954-
1962, Uganda. Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Statistics Branch. 
[Entebbe], 1964.56 
Trend used to complement the growth 
trend from UN Yearbooks. It was the first 
National Accounts estimation that reports 
on prices. As a result, several assumptions 
were made about some sectoral prices (See 
notes below).  
1956-1961 Statistical Abstract, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Statistics Branch, [Entebbe], 1962.57 
Trend used to complement the growth 
trend from UN Yearbooks. Some 
household production was excluded, and 
some accounts were reconciled after 
marketing boards were taken over by 
private firms (See notes below). 
2.8.1.7.1    Notes on Data Construction 
• Uganda revised its GDP in 2014, changing the base year from 2003 to 2009/2010. This 
revised GDP was compiled in accordance with the 2008 UN System of National Accounts 
and the International Standard for Industrial Classification (ISIC Rev.4). We used the first 
year of this revised series as our benchmark level data. 
• We linked the benchmark series to the historical series obtained from the UN Yearbook 
of National Accounts/UN OCD using equation 1. We complement this with information 
 
53 Available online at http://www.ubos.org/publications/statistical-abstract 
54 Available at SOAS, University of London Library. https://library.soas.ac.uk/Record/299769  and 
https://library.soas.ac.uk/Record/299769.  
55 Available online at http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SNA&f=group_code%3a201 
















from historical publications by the statistics branch of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
The historical National Accounts is published in three different SNAs: the 1953, 1968 and 
1993 Systems of Accounts.  
• For 1955-1971, data were obtained from the 1964, 1970 and 1975 UN Yearbooks of 
National Accounts. For the 1964 Yearbook, the industrial origin of production was 
published in current factor cost as well as 1960 factor cost. This was compiled according 
to the 1953 UN System of National Accounts but tailored to fit the “special character of 
the economy of Uganda” (UN Yearbook of National Accounts, 1964). The value-added 
series was published in millions of pounds. Wholesale and retail trade; and Banking, 
insurance and real estate were aggregated into one sector. We applied the growth rate of 
this aggregate sector to both Trade Services (G+H) and Business Services (J+K). 
Government is narrowly defined as Public Administration and Defence, while the 
contribution of education and health to GDP is transferred to Other Services (item 11 on 
the UN table). This does not uniquely map into Government services (L, M, N) and 
Personal Services (O, P) defined in this database. We added Public administration and 
Defence to Services to obtain an aggregate sector, then applied the growth rate to both 
Government Services (L, M, N) and Personal Services (O, P). For the 1975 yearbook, the 
value-added series was produced in accordance with the 1968 SNA. We used value added 
series from 1965-1971 from this yearbook. The figures were reported in Uganda Shillings. 
We map producers of Government Services to Government Services (L, M, N) defined in 
this database. The Sectoral data for 1964 was obtained from the 1970 Yearbook.  
• For 1972-1978, data were obtained from the 1980 UN Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics, Volume 1, Part 2. Value added in current and 1966 constant prices were 
published in accordance with the classifications and definitions recommended in the 1968 
UN System of National Accounts. Value added in constant prices was available from 1972 
to 1978 and value added in current prices was available from 1972 to 1976. There is no 
available data from 1976 to 1980 for value added in current prices and from 1978 to 1980 
for value added in constant prices. In these cases, we linearly interpolate for missing years. 
• For 1981-1988, data were obtained from the 1990 UN National Accounts Statistics: Main 
Aggregates and Detailed Tables, part II. Value added in current and 1987 constant prices 
were published in accordance with the classifications and definitions recommended in the 
1968 UN System of National Accounts. Community, Social and Personal Services were 
put together and no value was reported for Producers of Government Service. We used 
information from the UN OCD on Public administration and Defence; Compulsory social 
security (L); and Education; health and social work; other community, social and personal 
services (M+N+O). We map this to Government Services (L, M, N) and Personal Services 
(O, P) by using the aggregate growth trend.    
• For 1989-1996, data were obtained from the 2000 UN National Accounts Statistics: Main 
Aggregates and Detailed Tables. Value added in current and 1991 constant prices were 
published in accordance with the classifications and definitions recommended in the 1968 
UN System of National Accounts. In 1987, Uganda redenominated it currency, with 1 new 
shilling being equivalent to 100 old shillings. All data were converted to new shillings. 
Public administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education, Health and 
Social work; and Other community, Social and Personal Services were put together as one 
sector. We applied the aggregate growth rate to both Government Services (L, M, N) and 





• We obtained information on Dwellings (70) mostly from the Statistical Abstracts published 
by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics or the Statistics Branch of Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Entebbe. Owner occupied dwelling is reported under non-monetary GDP. From 
2008 to 2015, it was reported under real estate of non-monetary GDP.  
• We compared the growth rate from the UN historical data to the historical data published 
by the Government of Uganda. In cases where the UN estimate is not consistent, we 
replaced it with the growth rate from the National Accounts published by the Statistics 
Branch of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, [Entebbe]. Particularly for 1955-1963, two 
such publications were used: “The Real growth of the economy of Uganda, 1954-1962, 
Uganda” and the “Statistical Abstract, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Statistics Branch, 
[Entebbe], 1962”.  
• Several assumptions were made about prices and values of some items in these 
publications. For instance, a sale of cotton during the ending of the season is used as an 
indicator of the fixed value added of cotton. This presumes that cotton harvested towards 
the end of the season is the same as the cotton harvested for the entire calendar year. For 
milk, a constant price is assumed in the current price calculation, meaning that the constant 
value equals the current value. For beer, the quantity per capita is assumed to be constant 
for the whole period but to differ among districts. The 1960 price is applied to calculate 
the total consumption of beer. For transportation, net output per vehicle is assumed to be 
constant from 1954 to 1962, which means as a result that the constant value is the same as 
current value. Gross output of the sector differed because of the rising input price. 
Household activities such as food preparation and beer brewing for home consumption as 
well as peasant house construction were excluded.58 
 
2.8.1.7.2 Construction Notes on Employment Data  
Year Primary Sources Source of Publication 
1952-1961 Sectoral employment levels from the Annual Enumeration of 
Employees  
Statistics Branch, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 1962 
1969 Total Employment from the 1969 PHC. UBOS 
1965-1973 Number of employees by Industry from 1975 YBLS ILO (1975) Yearbook of Labor 
Statistics 
1970 Economically active population by Industry from 1975 ASY UNECA 
1980 Economically active population by Industry from the 1986 ASY UNECA 
1980 Employment by Occupation from the 1980 PHC UBOS 
1991 Employment by Occupation from the 1991 PHC UBOS 
2002 Sectoral employment levels from the 2002 PHC UBOS 
2003 Sectoral employment levels from the 2003 LFS KILM 
2005 Sectoral employment levels from the 2005 LFS KILM 
2005 Sectoral employment levels from the 2005 HIES KILM 
2009 Sectoral employment levels from the 2009 HIES KILM 
2012 Sectoral employment levels from the 2012 HIES KILM, unreliable 
2013 Sectoral employment levels from the 2013 HIES KILM 
2014 Sectoral employment levels from the 2014 PHC UBOS 
1980-2015 Economically active population in agriculture FOASTAT 
 
• We used data from the 1969, 1980, 1991, 2002 and 2014 Censuses as Benchmarks. 
 
58 See paragraph 1 of “Statistical Abstract, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Statistics Branch, [Entebbe], 1962” and 
paragraph 67-128 of “The Real growth of the economy of Uganda, 1954-1962, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Statistics 





• For the 1969 Benchmark, total employment is taken from the population census and 
disaggregated into sectors using the 1970 sectoral distributions of the economically active 
population reported in the 1975 Africa Statistical Yearbook. We repeated the same 
procedure to derive the 1980 Benchmark. Total employment was taken from the 1980 
census and sectoral distribution was taken from the economically active population by 
sector reported in the 1985 Africa Statistical Yearbook. 
• From 1952-1961, employment by sector was reported in the 1962 Statistical Abstract. 
These figures are based on the annual enumeration of employment. Because this is an 
employee survey; the agricultural sector, trade services and personal services are 
underestimated. We adjust the figures for these sectors using information from the 1969 
population census. 
• In 1991 employment by occupation is available. We map occupations into sectors using 
information from household surveys. 
• From 1952 to 1973, we interpolate between benchmark years using the trend in the 
number of employees by sector.  
• From 2000 to 2015, we interpolate between benchmark years using the trend in sectoral 
employment reported in household and income surveys.  
• For the remaining period, 1974 to 1999, we interpolate between benchmark years using 
the trend in average labor productivity. In the case of agriculture, we used the trend from 
the economically active population in Agriculture. 
2.8.1.8 Update of the ASD 
Country  Update Period Source of Data Notes 
Botswana 2006-2015 Gross Domestic Product, Third Quarter, Statistics 
Botswana59 
Level data used 
Ethiopia 2011-2015 Africa Statistical Yearbook, 2016, AfDB  Growth trend used 
Ghana 2011-2015 Revised Annual GDP 2015, Ghana Statistical Service  Level data used.  








Malawi 2009-2015 Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, National Statistical office of 
Malawi60 
Level data used. 
Mauritius 2006-2015 Digest, National Accounts of Mauritius61 Level data used 
Nigeria 1960-2015 GDP 1981-2010 Revision Post Rebasing and the Quarterly 
Statistical Bulletin62 
ASD, 1960-1980 
Level data Used 
 
Trend used 
Senegal 2011-2015 UN OCD Level data used 
South 
Africa 
2005-2015 GDP_Detailed Annual Tables, Statistics South Africa63 Level data used 
Tanzania 2005-2015 Gross Domestic Product, 2016. Highlights for the Third 
Quarters64 





61 http://statsmauritius.govmu.org/English/StatsbySubj/Pages/National-Accounts.aspx  
62 http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/report/371,   http://www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/report/220  
http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/elibrary?queries[search]=GDP       
63 http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P0441&SCH=6675   





Zambia 1960-2015 GDP by type of economic activity, Central Statistical 
Office, 2010-201565 
ASD, 1960-2010 
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3.1. Introduction  
Interest has recently been renewed in the role that structural change plays in the development 
experiences of countries (e.g., McMillan & Rodrik, 2011). Numerous reasons for this interest exist, 
with the evidence of premature deindustrialization suggesting that the role of manufacturing as a 
driver of long-run development is diminishing. Structural shifts to other sectors, such as modern 
services, are seen by some to be an alternative to a manufacturing-based development strategy 
(Connell, 2014; Hallward-Driemeier & Nayyar, 2018; Newfarmer, Page, & Tarp, 2018; Lavopa and 
Szirmai, 2018).  
Despite Africa being among the fastest-growing regions in the world in recent decades, these 
concerns about the role of economic structure for development are particularly acute in the case 
of Africa. One reason for this is that the continent depends heavily on the production and export 
of primary commodities. As a result, many African countries are vulnerable to fluctuations in 
commodity prices (UNECA, 2016). This has raised questions about the sustainability of the recent 
growth performance and of the ability of this growth to eliminate poverty on the continent. It has 
been argued that for this recent growth to be sustainable, African countries must actively create 
unique pathways of structural transformation that involve diversification, export competitiveness, 
technological upgrading, and improvements in human wellbeing (ACET, 2014). The key concern 
is whether this rapid growth is underpinned by growth-enhancing changes in the production 
structure, technological dynamism, and job creation. A further concern is that the process of 
deindustrialization has set in very early in the case of Africa, with certain services sectors – 
particularly non-tradable services that are often associated with high levels of informal employment 
– having grown relatively rapidly at the expense of manufacturing.  
Starting from the work of McMillan & Rodrik (2011), a number of studies have examined the role 
of structural change in fostering economic growth in Africa. Later studies by de Vries et al. (2013, 
2015) show that after independence, African countries moved resources towards manufacturing 
industries, but that this process stalled from 1975 onwards before rebounding in the 1990s. Despite 
the renewed shift towards manufacturing in this latter time period, labor was mostly relocated to 
informal trading activities. These services are neither tradable nor technologically dynamic (Rodrik, 
2016), and as a result, their productivity levels lag behind other sectors’ productivity. McMillan et 
al. (2014) find that the reallocation of workers across sectors was growth-reducing in the 1990s 
but growth-promoting in the 2000s, and that this improved performance in the 2000s may be more 
sustainable due to an expansion of the manufacturing sector. 
These studies – and others – focus on the relationship between the extent of structural change and 
productivity growth, which further implies that the direction of structural change is also relevant 
(i.e., a shift towards or away from high productivity sectors). In these studies, a finding that 
structural change has led to higher productivity growth is considered to be a case of successful 
structural change. While the above studies indicate that structural change has been an important 
phenomenon in the productivity growth of Africa, its impact on other outcomes – most notably 
labor market outcomes – are less well known. Indeed, these studies tend to ignore the impact of 
structural changes on other features of the economy, with its impact on labor markets, and labor 
market volatility in particular, being an important omission. While structural change may enhance 
aggregate productivity, there is also the possibility that it helps generate transitory unemployment 
and may lead to a reallocation of workers to lower-paid jobs or into the informal sector, leading to 
increased uncertainty for workers.  
In this chapter, we provide a fuller picture of the role of structural change in economic 
performance by combining an analysis of the impact of structural change on productivity growth 





contributes to the literature in three important ways, which are discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
The first contribution relates to the use of new sectoral indicators. A shortcoming of much of the 
literature on structural change is the lack of long time-series on economic structure for a relatively 
large number of countries. McMillan & Rodrik (2011), for example, address this problem by 
constructing sectoral data from 1990 to 2005, but this period misses important development 
episodes, especially the import-substitution era and the lost decades.67 A more comprehensive 
attempt was presented by the Africa Sector Database (ASD), developed by the Groningen Growth 
and Development Centre (GGDC), which provides long-run sectoral data for 11 African countries 
from the 1960s to 2010. The database is constructed on the basis of an in-depth study of available 
statistical sources on a country by country basis (De Vries et al., 2013). These contributions are 
limited in terms of the number of African countries for which data are available however, with the 
included countries also tending to be the relatively rich countries within Africa. Moreover, since 
the construction of the ASD, there has been a wave of statistical reforms in some of the countries 
in the ASD, leading to significant revaluations of GDP. These reforms have provided a clearer 
picture of the size and structure of production of the countries involved (Sy, 2015). For example, 
in 2014, Nigeria revised its GDP estimates and recalculated historical data back to 1981, which 
resulted in Nigeria being classified as a service-based economy (and not an industry-based 
economy as the original ASD suggests). In this chapter we use the extended database constructed 
in Chapter 2, which includes data for seven relatively poor African countries: Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda, thus addressing a criticism of 
existing studies that they are biased towards richer African countries (Diao et al., 2017:427).  
Using the extended database, we repeat and update the structural decompositions of McMillan et 
al. (2014) and de Vries et al. (2015), further considering the changing importance of structural 
change as a driver of productivity growth over time. The results indicate that, despite differences 
across country groups and across time, structural change has played an important role in driving 
the observed growth of labor productivity within Africa, particularly in East Africa, where 
structural change accounted for more than half of all productivity growth.  
The second contribution of the chapter is to consider whether structural change within Africa is 
associated with labor market turbulence. While structural change is found to have been 
productivity-enhancing, there has been a strong shift towards services, which may have important 
implications for labor market outcomes. As such, we construct various indicators of labor market 
turbulence and show that the effect of structural change on labor markets has been felt most 
strongly in the services sector, where employment has been subject to large fluctuations. Because 
of the labor-intensive and weather-dependent nature of agriculture, jobs are relatively stable but 
less productive, penalizing overall labor productivity in Africa. 
The third contribution of the chapter is to consider the determinants of labor market turbulence, 
and whether the presence of labor market rigidities can limit the extent of labor market turbulence 
in Africa. Given the observed increase in labor market turbulence, we consider whether there are 
policy responses that may alleviate the impact of recent structural changes on labor market 
turbulence. Lilien (1982) argues that sectoral shifts are the main culprits behind the 1970s 
unemployment fluctuations in the US because labor market frictions prevented displaced workers 
from immediately relocating from shrinking sectors to expanding sectors. It has been found that 
strict national employment protection legislation on regular contracts in the European Union 
adversely affects the net reallocation of workers to the services sector (D’Agostino, Serafini, & 
 





Ward-Warmedinger, 2006). McMillan et al. (2014:12) also find that the rate of labor productivity 
growth due to structural change is directly related to the degree of labor market flexibility. More 
flexible labor markets facilitate rapid structural change. Based upon these findings, we empirically 
examine the effect of labor market flexibility on labor market turbulence in Africa. Our findings 
indicate that a high level of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) is associated with lower 
levels of job reallocation, which, on the one hand, makes it more difficult for countries to reallocate 
surplus labor to sectors where they could be more productive, but, on the other hand, may provide 
more job security and certainty for workers.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2. reports descriptive statistics and 
long run stylized facts on sectoral development in Africa; Section 3.3 discusses the methodology 
and results of the productivity growth decomposition; Section 3.4 and 3.5 describes the result of 
the analysis of labor market turbulence and the effect of labor market flexibility on such turbulence; 
Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2. Stylized facts on sectoral development in Africa 
 The summary statistics presented in this section are based on the Expanded Africa Sector 
Database (EASD). The EASD updates and extends the Africa Sector Database constructed at the 
GGDC. It covers measures of output and employment for 18 African countries at the 10-sector 
level, usually from the 1960s to 2015 (see Chapter 2 for more details). Table 3.1 reports information 
using the EASD on the shares of employment by sector for the set of African countries as a whole. 
The table reveals that Africa remains predominantly agrarian. While the agricultural employment 
share decreased from 71.9% in 1960 to 49.4% in 2015, this share is still 13 percentage points higher 
than the next largest sector, services. The primary beneficiary of the reallocation of these workers 
has been the services sector rather than the industrial sector (see De Vries et al., 2015; Rodrik et 
al., 2017). Of the 22.5% of the labor force that moved from agriculture during the period 1960-
2015, the services sector received 19.1% and the industrial sector just 3.3%. Although the 
manufacturing share in total employment increased from 5.0% in 1960 to 7.6% in 2015, this 
change was not as rapid as the change in domestic trade services, which more than doubled within 
the same period.   
Table 3.1  Sectoral Employment Shares 
 Sectoral Employment Shares (in percent) 
Sector 1960 1975 1990 2000 2010 2015 
Agriculture 71.9 69.6 64.8 60.2 53.4 49.4 
Industry 10.8 10.2 11.2 11.1 12.5 14.2 
  Manufacturing 5.0 5.5 6.4 6.8 7.4 7.6 
  Mining 2.9 1.4 1.3 0.9 1.1 1.5 
  Utilities 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 
  Construction 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.6 4.6 
Services 17.3 20.2 24.0 28.7 34.1 36.4 
  Market Services 9.7 8.7 11.7 15.5 21.4 23.4 
   Trade, Restaurant and Hotels 7.3 6.0 8.5 11.0 15.2 16.7 
   Transport, Storage and Communications 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.4 3.0 3.0 
   FIRBS 0.6 0.7 1.2 2.1 3.2 3.8 
 Non-Market Services 7.5 11.5 12.3 13.1 12.8 13.0 
  Government Services 4.4 5.3 6.3 7.0 7.1 7.0 





Note: this table reports the share of total employment by sector for Africa. These percentages are unweighted averages 
of the 18 countries included in EASD. FIRBS stands for financial, real estate and business services. 
 
Table 3.2 reports sectoral relative productivity levels for the aggregate of African countries, 
constructed from the EASD as the ratio of each sector’s labor productivity to total economy labor 
productivity. Several patterns are immediately obvious. Despite advances in agricultural 
technology, relative productivity in agriculture has remained largely unchanged since 
independence, with average productivity in agriculture being 40% of the average productivity of 
the whole economy. Relative productivity in all other sectors is above one, with productivity in 
industry tending to be larger than that in services.  
 
Table 3.2 : Relative Productivity in Africa 
 Relative Productivity Levels 
Sectors 1960 1975 1990 2000 2010 2015 
Agriculture 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Industry 8.7 7.5 10.1 8.2 6.9 5.7 
 Mining 14.2 14.2 22.9 13.4 8.9 7.4 
 Manufacturing 2.5 2.7 3.0 3.2 2.4 2.3 
 Utilities 9.6 7.0 10.5 13.0 14.0 10.8 
 Construction 8.5 6.1 4.1 3.1 2.3 2.5 
Services 5.7 5.2 5.0 4.1 3.9 3.2 
 Market Services 8.2 7.5 6.9 5.6 5.4 4.4 
  Trade, Restaurants and Hotels 8.4 4.6 2.7 1.9 1.2 1.2 
  Transport, Storage and Communication 6.7 5.2 5.6 5.3 5.3 5.1 
  FIRBS 9.6 12.7 12.6 9.8 9.7 6.9 
 Non-Market Services 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.4 
  Government Services 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.5 2.1 2.0 
  Community, Social and Personal Services 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.8 
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on the Expanded Africa Sector Database (EASD). Relative productivity equals the 
ratio of each sectors output per worker to the output per worker of the whole economy. The figures are unweighted 
averages of the 18 countries included in EASD. FIRBS stands for financial, real estate and business services. 
 
Within services, a number of sub-sectors perform relatively well however, the major example being 
FIRBS (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Business Services). Within industry, productivity is 
relatively high in the capital-intensive mining sector and to a lesser extent in utilities, with 
manufacturing productivity being significantly lower than in these two sectors. Relative 
productivity in manufacturing increased from 2.5 to 2.7 during the golden era of industrialization 
despite the expansion in employment shares over this period, and further increased during the 
1980s and 1990s, but its relative productivity level in 2015 was below that achieved in 1960. 
Overall, the table reveals large productivity differences across sectors. In 2015, the industrial sector 
was about 14 times more productive than the agricultural sector and 5.7 times more productive 
than the whole economy. The services sector is on average 8 times more productive than the 
agricultural sector and about 3 times more productive than the economy as a whole. These 
productivity gaps have persisted since the 1960s and, while falling over time, remain large. This is 
indicative of the allocative inefficiency that penalizes overall labor productivity in Africa (McMillan 






3.3. Productivity Growth Decomposition  
Though the sectoral productivity gaps observed in Table 2 reflect duality and allocative 
inefficiencies, as emphasized by Lewis (1954),  their presence could also be a potential source of 
productivity growth as workers move from less productive sectors such as agriculture to more 
productive sectors such as manufacturing and market services. We therefore employ the well-
known productivity growth (shift-share) decomposition to study the productivity growth 
implications of structural change in the African economy. To begin, let 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 and 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡  be the total level 
of output (or value added) and total employment at time 𝑡𝑡 respectively. Economy-wide labor 
productivity 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡  is given as:  
3.1                        𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 =
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡� = ∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1        
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  is labor productivity of sector 𝑖𝑖 in time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the sectoral share of employment for 
sector 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑁𝑁 is the number of sectors. Given the above, the growth rate of economy-
wide labor productivity between time (𝑇𝑇) and (0) can be expressed as: 
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The first component on the right-hand side is the sum of each sector’s within-sector labor 
productivity growth rate, weighted by the sector’s initial labor share in the economy. In other 
words, it is that part of overall productivity growth caused by productivity growth within sectors.  
The final two terms capture the structural change or between effect. The second term is the static 
reallocation effect, which measures the part of productivity growth arising from changes in the 
sectoral composition of employment. It captures whether workers move to above-average 
productivity sectors. The third term—the interaction/dynamic reallocation effect—measures the 
joint effect of changes in employment shares and sectoral productivity. It captures whether 
productivity growth is higher in sectors that are expanding in terms of employment shares. It is 
positive when labor move from sectors with lower productivity growth to sectors with higher 
productivity growth. 
Our approach mimics the standard shift-share method (see Fabricant, 1942; Sánchez & Roura, 
2009; Timmer and Szirmai, 2000; De Vries et al., 2015; Rodrik & McMillan, 2011), albeit with the 
introduction of a referenced or economy-wide productivity level, 𝑦𝑦0 (Griliches & Regev 1995). 
The introduction of the referenced economy-wide productivity level helps to identify which of the 
sectors are contributing positively or negatively to the static shift effect. At the aggregate level, 
however, the sum of these positive and negative effects is the same as the unreferenced version. 
Table 3.3 reports the results from the shift-share analysis described above. The table reports the 
weighted average productivity growth of the sample of 18 African countries. The weights used to 
compute the indicative regional productivity are the total employment of each country since our 
measure of productivity reflects GDP per worker and not GDP per capita. From 1960 to 2015, 
weighted average labor productivity grew by 1.8% per annum, which is low when compared with 
the Asian annual average of 3.73% reported in Timmer et al (2014). Of this 1.8%, productivity 
growth within sectors accounted for 0.9 percentage point with structural change accounting for 
0.9 percentage point. For the entire period therefore, structural change has been growth-
enhancing, though in the context of weak productivity performance. This is obvious from the fact 





being the service sector which is about 11 times more productive than the agricultural sector for 
the entire period. Our findings of growth enhancing structural change contradict those of 
McMillan and Rodrik (2014) to some extent, with these authors concluding that structural change 
was growth retarding in the 1990s at least. 
We further divide the whole period into historical development episodes, namely: the import 
substitution era (1960-1975), the lost decades (1975-1990), the post structural adjustment era 
(1990-2000), and the recent or MDGs era (2000-2015). The whole period is divided according to 
the centrality of industrialization within the prevailing national development strategy. Whilst the 
import substitution era saw the projection and promotion of industrialization, the lost decades and 
the structural adjustment era have seen the marginalization of industrial development in favor of 
liberalization and privatization. However, since the failure of the structural adjustment programs, 
industrial policy has been part of national development strategies developed around the MDGs 
since the early 2000s.  
There were static gains and dynamic losses from structural change throughout the different 
development epochs, confirming the empirical findings of  de Vries et al (2015). While the service 
sector as a whole is more productive than the agricultural sector, the beneficiary of the reallocation 
is mostly trade services which have productivity levels far below modern market services and 
manufacturing, though still higher than agriculture. Whether structural change is growth-
enhancing or growth-reducing depends on the structural balance i.e. the sum of static gains and 
dynamic losses. Throughout the different periods, structural change has been growth-enhancing. 
Even during the lost decades when productivity growth was very low at 0.1%, structural change 
contributed 0.4% to productivity growth. The political turmoil and adverse economic conditions 
during the lost decades heavily impeded industrial innovation and technology adoption, and as a 
result within sectoral productivity declined by 0.3% per annum. In the other periods, within sector 
productivity growth contributed significantly and positively to total productivity growth.  
 
Table 3.3: Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 









Entire Period 1960-2015 1.8% 0.9% 1.1% -0.2% 0.9% 
Import Substitution 1960-1975 2.1% 1.2% 1.2% -0.2% 0.9% 
Lost Decades  1975-1990 0.1% -0.3% 0.5% -0.1% 0.4% 
Post SAP 1990-2000 1.4% 0.5% 1.0% -0.1% 0.7% 
MDGs 2000-2015 3.6% 2.4% 1.5% -0.3% 1.2% 
Source: Authors computations based on the Expanded Africa Sector Database. The sum of the within and structural 
change equals total productivity. Structural change is the sum of the static reallocation and dynamic reallocation. 
 
The period between 1960 and 1975 – the import substitution era – has been described as the 
golden age of Africa’s growth performance, with productivity growth of 2.1% and an annual 
average GDP growth rate of 6%. This was followed by disappointing growth across the region, 
chiefly attributed to the 1970 oil crisis, currency instability, political upheavals witnessed across the 
region from the mid-1970s and the cumulative effect of inefficiencies and distortions introduced 
during the import-substitution period (Ellis, 2002). Productivity growth steadily picked up after the 
implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs. The recent data show that the import 
substitution era is no more the golden era of Africa’s development. We observe the highest rates 





driven by the weights of Nigeria and Ethiopia, the two most populous countries in Africa – with 
a combined average employment share of 42.5% during the MDGs era – whose productivity grew 
by 5.3% and 5.4% per annum respectively during the same period. Despite the expanded sample, 
the results reported using the EASD compare well with the estimates of de Vries et al (2015).   
These general observations differ by country. The weighted annual average growth rates of labor 
productivity show that East Africa grew by 1.3% per annum, southern Africa by 1.6% and West 
Africa68 by 2.6% from 1960 to 2015.  
Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 show labor productivity growth for the three regions and for the countries 
within each of these regions. In West Africa, significant productivity growth comes from within 
sector productivity growth. This is the case for the five countries studied in the region. In Ghana 
and Nigeria, 100% and 80% respectively, of average productivity growth comes from within-sector 
productivity growth. In Francophone West Africa, structural change tends to play a more 
significant role in the growth process, but within-sector growth still dominates. In Burkina Faso 
and Cameroon, a little over half of average productivity growth comes from within-sector 
productivity. Structural change tends to be growth-enhancing but within sector productivity 
changes tend to be growth-reducing in Senegal, resulting in low aggregate productivity growth. 
The strongest productivity growth in this region is found in Nigeria. This is driven by the 4.6% 
productivity growth rate during the import substitution era (1960-1975) and the 5.3% growth rate 
in the MDGs era (2000-2015).69  
In East Africa, structural change contributed more to labor productivity growth than within sector 
productivity in five out of the six countries studied. In Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda almost all 
the productivity gains were due to the movement of workers from low productivity to high 
productivity sectors. This arises due to regional specialization patterns. In addition to the 
traditional primary products exported by most African countries, East African countries are 
specialized in services where jobs are currently being reallocated, most notably travel, tourism, and 
transport services.70 Conversely, West and southern African countries are specialized in mining 
which is capital intensive, hence the high within effect.71   
In the case of Rwanda more than half of the productivity gain is due to structural change. In 
Mauritius, structural change is growth-enhancing but within sector productivity growth is 
dominant. This latter result is not surprising given the relatively low share of agricultural 
employment in the country (see Diao et al., 2017). In Rwanda, productivity growth was negative 
during the lost decades, but robustly increased to 5.9% during the MDGs era. The performance 
of Uganda was relatively poor, with productivity growth falling from 3.2% in the 1990s to -0.3% 
in the 2000s. 
In southern Africa, within sector productivity contributes more to overall average productivity 
growth than structural change. However, individual country results are mixed. While structural 
change dominates in Lesotho and Malawi, within productivity growth dominates in Namibia and 
South Africa. Botswana is not only an outlier in this region but also in Africa. As is well-known 




68 Politically, Cameroon is not part of West Africa. It is part of Central Africa and shares a border with Nigeria but 
for convenience we added Cameroon to the group of countries that are politically part of West Africa. 
69 See Table A4 in the online Appendix for full results. 
70 Except Ethiopia which has coffee as its major exports in 2015. 
71 Except Malawi where 56% of their exports in 2015 is accounted for by Tobacco and structural change accounts for 





Figure 3.1: Labor Productivity Growth in West Africa, 1960s-2015 
 







Figure 3.2: Labor Productivity Growth in East Africa, 1960s-2015 
 
Note: EA_W is East Africa Weighted Average, ETH is Ethiopia, KEN is Kenya, MUS is Mauritius, RWA is Rwanda, TZA is 

























































































Figure 3.3 :Labor Productivity growth in Southern Africa, 1960s-2015 
 
Note: SA_W is Southern Africa Weighted Average, BWA is Botswana, LSO is Lesotho, MWI is Malawi, MOZ is Mozambique, 
NAM is Namibia, ZAF is South Africa, and ZMB is Zambia.  
 
3.4. Sectoral Reallocation and Labor Market Turbulence (LMT) in 
Africa 
In the preceding section we established that structural change is an ongoing process in Africa, 
being more rapid in East Africa than in other parts of Africa. The contribution of structural change 
to productivity growth is however lower than the experience of East Asia, in which there was a 
similar employment shift (of about 16%) from agriculture. Unlike the case of East Asia, where 
there was a shift towards manufacturing and high-tech services, in Africa there has been a strong 
shift towards lower paid jobs in services. Non-tradable services often associated with high levels 
of informality have grown relatively rapidly at the expense of tradable services and manufacturing. 
This may have important implications for labor market outcomes in Africa for several reasons. 
During structural transition, simultaneous job creation and job destruction could take place within 
narrowly defined industries or sectors (De Loecker & Konings, 2006). This could impact 
employment stability and the protection of workers within these sectors. To this end, we argue 
that the study of structural change needs to move beyond the usual labor productivity 
decomposition towards examining empirical relationships between sectoral shifts and key labor 
market outcomes. However, most studies of structural change in Africa neglect this very important 
feature of structural change. 
The effect of structural change on labor market outcomes such as the natural rate of 
unemployment and job mobility within and across sectors is well established in studies in advanced 
countries. Lilien (1982:777) argues that “most of the unemployment fluctuations of the seventies 
(unlike those in the sixties) were induced by unusual structural shifts within the U.S. economy”.  
Diprete et al. (1997) argue that job mobility is induced by either structural change (collectivist 
regime) or individual decisions (individualistic regime). Testing the sensitivity of the job mobility 
















































conclude that “U.S. rates of job mobility showed the greatest sensitivity to structural change and 
to the labor market resources of individual workers” (Diprete et al., 1997:318).  We fill this gap for 
Africa by examining the extent to which observed structural change within Africa is characterized 
by labor market turbulence. By analyzing turbulence in the labor market, we are able to identify 
sectors where the labor force is most affected as well as highlighting the differences that exist in 
the expanding and contracting sectors (Bachmann & Burda, 2009). 
To do this we estimate the labor turbulence effect of structural change in Africa appealing to the 
definition of Lilien (1982). The measures of job creation, job destruction and job reallocation 
follow Bartelsman (2013), Bartelsman et al. (2013), Davis et al (1996), and Haltiwanger et al (2014) 
and are given as follows: 
3.3                   Job Creation by sector:   𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  (𝛥𝛥𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡.  𝑙𝑙𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡����⁄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ) 
where 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the job creation effect of sector 𝑖𝑖 (belonging to economy 𝑗𝑗) in year 𝑡𝑡, 𝛥𝛥𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡.  is the 
sum of positive employment changes (employment gains) in an expanding sector over time,  𝑙𝑙𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡���� is 
the sector’s average employment over time and is given by  𝑙𝑙𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡���� =0.5 (𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇 + 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖0), and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  is the 
sector employment weight and is given by the average or mean employment of sector 𝑖𝑖 divided by 




 3.4                     Job Destruction by sector: 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  (𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡.  𝑙𝑙𝚤𝚤𝑡𝑡����⁄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ) 
where 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the job destruction effect of sector 𝑖𝑖 (belonging to the economy 𝑗𝑗) in year 𝑡𝑡, and 
𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡.  is the sum of the negative employment changes (employment losses in absolute value) in a 
contracting sector over time. 
The difference between 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is Net Employment Growth, which shows the total 
employment change and is given by: 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 −  𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 . 
The sum of  𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the Gross Job Reallocation rate, and measures the rate at which 
employment positions are reallocated across sectors and is given by:  𝑁𝑁𝐽𝐽𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  = 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 . 
Excess Job Reallocation is the difference between the gross job reallocation rate and the absolute 
value of net employment growth. It is a measure of job reallocation which is in excess of the 
amount of job reallocation necessary to accommodate a given net employment growth rate (Masso 
et al., 2005; De Loecker & Konings, 2006). Such a measure indicates the magnitude of deep 
restructuring that needs to take place in order to accommodate a given aggregate employment 
growth rate (De Loecker & Konings, 2006) and is given by: 
3.5                                               𝐸𝐸𝐽𝐽𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +  𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − |𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡| 
The average yearly Job Creation and Job Destruction rate is the sum of the positive and negative 
employment changes (employment losses in absolute value-levels) respectively in an expanding 
and a contracting sector divided by the number of years considered. 
Further to this, we assess the dispersion in employment growth using the Lilien Index given by:    
 3.6                                                       𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 = [∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1 𝜛𝜛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝜛𝜛𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡)2]0.5 
where 𝑘𝑘 is the number of (sub-)sectors, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the share of the 𝑖𝑖th sub-sector employment in total 
employment of the aggregated sector 𝑗𝑗, 𝜛𝜛𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the  rate of growth of employment in the 𝑖𝑖th sub-
sector and 𝜛𝜛𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 is the rate of growth of employment in the 𝑗𝑗th aggregated sector. The Lilien Index 
captures the structural shift of employment demand between sectors of the economy. This allows 






The results of the LMT72 analysis are reported in Tables 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and (A6 in the appendix), with 
Table 3.4 reporting results for job creation, job destruction and job reallocation for Africa as a 
whole and for the different regions of Africa (for comparison with the results from the shift-share 
decomposition above). Table 3.5 reports results from the Lilien index for each of the countries in 
our dataset and for both the total economy and for the aggregated sectors, agriculture, industry, 
and services. Finally, Table 3.6 reports the job creation, job destruction and job reallocation rates 
for Africa as a whole for the four different time periods used in the above analysis (i.e. the import 




72 This is a proxy measure of LMT at the aggregate level. The true measure of LMT are based on establishment or 






                                              Table 3.4: Job Creation, Job Destruction and Job Reallocation in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960s–2015 
      Africa (1960s-2015) 
Sector JC JD NEG GJR EJR 
Agriculture 1.2% 0.3% 1.1% 1.5% 0.4% 
Mining 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 
Manufacturing 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 
Utilities 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Construction 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 
Trade services 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 
Transport services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Business services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Government services 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 
Personal services 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 
Total Economy 2.5% 0.2% 2.3% 2.7% 0.4% 
 
West Africa Average (1960s-2015) 
Sector JC JD NEG GJR EJR 
Agriculture 1.3% 0.5% 0.8% 1.8% 1.0% 
Mining 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Manufacturing 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 
Utilities 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Construction 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Trade services 0.5% 0.1% 0.4% 0.6% 0.2% 
Transport services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Business services 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Government services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Personal services 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 
Total Economy 2.6% 0.2% 2.4% 2.8% 0.4% 
 
East Africa Average (1960s-2015) 
Sector JC JD NEG GJR EJR 
Agriculture 1.2% 0.1% 1.1% 1.3% 0.2% 
Mining 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Manufacturing 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 
Utilities 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Construction 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 
Trade services 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 
Transport services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Business services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Government services 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 
Personal services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 
Total Economy 2.6% 0.1% 2.5% 2.6% 0.1% 
 
Southern Africa Average (1960s-2015) 
Sector JC JD NEG GJR EJR 
Agriculture 1.2% 0.2% 1.0% 1.4% 0.4% 
Mining 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 
Manufacturing 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 
Utilities 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Construction 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 
Trade services 0.4% 0.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.2% 
Transport services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Business services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Government services 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 
Personal services 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 
Total Economy 2.4% 0.2% 2.2% 2.6% 0.4% 
 
Note: Note: JC = job creation; JD = job destruction; NEG = net employment growth; GJR = gross job reallocation; EJR = Excess job reallocation. Relative contributions to the economy are calculated 
by dividing the variables by corresponding total economy values. West Africa Average for Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal. East Africa Average for Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, 





Using the ten-sector dataset of the EASD, Table 3.4 shows that the annual job creation rate of the 
agriculture sector is 1.2 per cent, a figure that represents 48 per cent of the annual job creation rate 
in the region’s economy over the period 1960s-2015. This is followed by the service sector 
(aggregating the different service sectors) with an annual job creation rate of 1 per cent, the 
manufacturing sector with a job creation rate of 0.3 per cent and the non-manufacturing industrial 
sector (mining, utilities and construction) with a creation rate of 0.1 per cent over the same period. 
Lewis (1954) argued that structural change, and the associated poverty reduction, is more rapid 
when agricultural transformation and industrialization occur together. Increasing labor 
productivity in agriculture implies that fewer jobs are created in the sector, and that as a result 
labor is released for off-farm economic activities. Industrial hubs or urban growth poles draw this 
released rural labor into productive use (rural push versus urban pull effects) (Barrett et al, 2017). 
In the case of Africa, agricultural productivity has remained unchanged since independence (Table 
3.2), while at the same time the agricultural sector is creating more jobs despite reducing its value-
added share and shedding fewer workers (Table 3.4 and 3.6). Those workers that have moved have 
tended to move to the urban sector to engage in informal trading activities rather than to 
manufacturing. This is also true at the regional level where we observe the same trend. As a result, 
the rural push, urban pull effects suggested by Lewis (1954) and observed in East Asia in the last 
century are not observed in Africa, with rural stagnation and informal urban pull effects in Africa 
leading to a less productive structural transformation compared to the East Asian experience. This 
trend to some extent has contributed to the limited gains of structural change to productivity 
growth in the region over the period between 1960s-2015. 
Job creation rates in general dominate job destruction rates in all sectors. The average annual job 
destruction rate in the agricultural sector is 0.3 per cent, considerably lower than the job creation 
rate. Though job creation is higher than job destruction, it is not sufficient, however, to 
accommodate the 11 million young workers expected to enter the labor market each year for the 
next decade in Africa (ILO, 2018).  
 
Table 3.5: LMT (Lilien Index) Decomposition Results Africa (percentages), 1960-2015 
Country / Region Total Economy Agriculture Industry Services 
All Countries 3.75 1.07 2.08 2.47 
Botswana 7.72 2.47 4.97 4.61 
Burkina Faso 2.39 1.06 1.64 1.24 
Cameroun 1.13 0.36 0.35 0.99 
Ethiopia 3.76 0.60 1.71 3.13 
Ghana 4.87 0.86 2.76 3.34 
Kenya 3.16 1.33 1.51 2.30 
Lesotho 3.14 0.46 1.49 2.48 
Malawi 4.58 0.93 2.43 3.40 
Mauritius 6.01 1.85 4.08 3.47 
Mozambique 1.84 0.46 1.26 1.09 
Namibia 4.18 1.56 1.66 3.25 
Nigeria 4.95 1.46 3.01 3.10 
Rwanda 2.16 0.65 1.04 1.64 
Senegal 2.96 0.85 1.66 2.15 
South Africa 4.17 1.86 2.39 2.45 
Tanzania 3.79 0.76 2.02 2.82 
Uganda 2.63 0.78 1.00 2.19 
Zambia 4.13 0.91 2.37 3.03 





Agriculture in Africa is predominantly subsistence based, highly reliant on nature and affected by 
natural disasters and drought. The relative stability of jobs in agriculture is further shown by the 
Lilien Index reported in Table 3.5. The dispersion of annual agricultural employment growth is 
1.07% compared with 2.08% for industry and 2.47% for services. The sector remains one of the 
low productivity growth sectors because of its labor-intensive nature. Despite these results for 
Africa, we do however observe a relatively large (small) average JD (JC) rate and a negative NEG 
rate of the sector in countries such as Mauritius and South Africa signaling the significant positive 
structural change that these countries have achieved over the years as they have reallocated excess 
labor from the agricultural sector to more dynamic and productive sectors73. Excess job 
reallocation (EJR) in the agricultural sector, reported in Table 3.4, is 0.4 per cent, which is the 
highest of all the sectors reflecting significant underemployment within the agriculture sector. “It 
also signals the existence of barriers to more efficient allocation of factors of production” (Barrett 
et al., 2017:14). The underemployment of labor explains the large productivity gap between 
agriculture and modern market activities.  
In the manufacturing sector, the average yearly JC rate is 0.3%. At the same time, about one third 
of jobs created annually in the sector are on average destroyed between the 1960s and 2015. The 
sector recorded its highest annual job creation rate (0.4%) during the import substitution era. The 
years from the 1980s through to the year 2000 saw a sizable job destruction rate in the African 
manufacturing sector and a decline in the job creation rate as can be seen in Table 3.6. De Loecker 
& Konings (2006) find a similar result in many post-Soviet countries and attribute it to the 
downsizing that took place in the countries due to past labor hoarding in the sector. However, in 
Africa, this coincided with the economic and political crisis witnessed in the region, the 
introduction of structural adjustment programs and neoliberal policies during this period. In 
addition to this, and perhaps contributing to an explanation, there is evidence of global de-
industrialization (Lavopa & Szirmai, 2018) and premature de-industrialization in Africa, with many 
Africa countries reaching their peak and turning point of industrialization at a relatively low per 
capita income, a level that is a fraction of that at which the advanced economies started to de-
industrialize (Cadot et al., 2015; Rodrik, 2015). This trend only reversed during the MDGs era 
(2000-2015) as the sector recorded an increase in job creation and a decline in job destruction (see 
Table 3.6). This also coincided with the period in which the region recorded its highest labor 
productivity growth, with the contribution of structural change to productivity growth increasing 
to 1.4 per cent (see table 3.3)  
In the service sector, trade services generate the highest average annual job creation rate at 0.4 per 
cent, followed by government and personal services, with an annual job creation rate of 0.2 per 
cent. The lowest average annual JC rate in the sector is recorded in business services (0.1 per cent) 
over the period 1960s-2015, possibly as a result of the skilled-labor- and capital-intensive nature 
of the sector making it difficult for the sector to absorb labor released from the other sectors of 
the economy. As for the manufacturing sector, the highest average annual job creation in the 
sector, particularly in tradable services (trade, business), is recorded in the MDGs era (2000-2015), 
the period in which the region recorded its highest labor productivity growth. Overall, the rates of 
job creation are insufficient, however, to absorb a growing labor force. 
The relative high pace of GJR (i.e. the sum of JC and JD) in the service sector, particularly, in trade 
services gives an indication of the high degree of volatility associated with vulnerable employment 
growth in the sector. The dispersion of annual employment growth in the sector is 2.47%, the 
 
73 In Mauritius, the average yearly JC and JD rate in the agricultural sector is 0.2 per cent and 0.4 per cent respectively. 
Average yearly net employment growth of the sector is -0.2 per cent.  In South Africa, the average yearly JC and JD 





highest among the three major sectors. Two factors could explain this. Firstly, the service sector 
faces high volatility74 in product demand in part as a result of rapid changes in fashion, tastes, 
lifestyles, and technological advancement which is increasingly changing the mode of production 
and delivery of services in the sector. Secondly, we could deduce that the trade and personal service 
sectors – where informality is high – seems to have a high GJR, which translates into relatively 
high fluctuations in employment growth. 
Given the observed increased labor market turbulence in Africa, with more jobs created in the low 
productivity and productivity resistant agricultural sector and in informal, vulnerable low paid jobs 
in non-tradable services, we further consider whether there are policy responses that may alleviate 
the impact of labor market turbulence. The next section of the chapter therefore examines the 
effect of labor market institutions on job reallocation. 
 
74 Volatility is measured using the standard deviation of sectoral value-added shares. Volatility in the agriculture sector 







Table 3.6: Job Creation, Job Destruction and Job Reallocation in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Periods 
                         Import Substitution Era (1960s-1975) 
Sector JC JD NEG GJR EJR 
Agriculture 1.8% 0.1% 1.7% 1.9% 0.2% 
Mining 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
Manufacturing 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.1% 
Utilities 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Construction 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 
Trade services 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 
Transport services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Business services 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Government services 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 
Personal services 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 
Total Economy 3.0% 0.0% 2.9% 3.0% 0.1% 
 
The Lost Decades (1975-1990) 
Sector JC JD NEG GJR EJR 
Agriculture 1.8% 0.1% 1.7% 1.9% 0.2% 
Mining 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
Manufacturing 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 
Utilities 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Construction 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 
Trade services 0.4% 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.1% 
Transport services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Business services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Government services 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 
Personal services 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 
Total Economy 3.1% 0.1% 3.0% 3.2% 0.2% 
 
             Post Structural Adjustment (1990-2000) 
Sector JC JD NEG GJR EJR 
Agriculture 1.2% 0.2% 1.0% 1.4% 0.4% 
Mining 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
Manufacturing 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 
Utilities 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Construction 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 
Trade services 0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 0.6% 0.1% 
Transport services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Business services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Government services 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 
Personal services 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.1% 
Total Economy 2.3% 0.1% 2.2% 2.4% 0.2% 
 
                       MDGs (2000-2015) 
Sector JC JD NEG GJR EJR 
Agriculture 1.2% 0.0% 1.1% 1.2% 0.1% 
Mining 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Manufacturing 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 
Utilities 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Construction 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 
Trade services 0.9% 0.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.0% 
Transport services 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Business services 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 
Government services 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 
Personal services 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0% 







3.5. Job Reallocation and Productivity Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: The 
Role of Employment Protection Legislation 
The theoretical model of Aghion & Howitt (1994) and empirical work of Faggio & Konings (2003) 
predict that a higher pace of job reallocation is associated with higher growth. A great deal of labor 
market flexibility is needed for this process that allows labor resources to be reallocated to sectors 
where they can  
be more productive (Masso et al., 2005). Some studies find that stringent employment protection 
legislation adversely affects JR which could stifle economic growth (Haltiwanger et al., 2014; Micco & 
Pages 2007; Messina & Vallanti 2007).75  
As explained by Haltiwanger et al. (2014), standard labor market models predict that besides 
technology, entry costs and other market driven factors, and the institutional and regulatory apparatus 
within which sectors operate shape the direction, speed and effectiveness of labor market outcomes 
(job flows) within these sectors. The general prediction of these models is that stringent employment 
protection legislation reduces job reallocation (cf. Messina & Vallanti, 2007; Micco & Pages, 2007). As 
positive as this may be for guaranteeing workers job security, productivity growth could be penalized 
as a result, at least for countries at initial stages of development that demand positive structural change 
to unleash productivity growth (cf. Hopenhayn & Rogerson, 1993). 
Until now, Africa has not featured in these discussions even though many countries in the region are 
undergoing structural transformation with job reallocation that is taking place across sectors. But, to 
what extent do labor market regulations in Africa impact on this job reallocation? The World Bank’s 
2010 Doing Business (DB) report attributes employment creation and high labor productivity growth 
to flexible labor market regulations. In a related study UNDP made a case for developing countries to 
do away with rigid labor market regulations, replacing them with simpler rules while ensuring stricter 
levels of enforcement (UNDP, 2004; Boni, 2010). In a similar study, Czegledi (2006) finds that 
regulating the labor market less rigidly but more coherently is associated with higher growth. The 
extension of OHADA76 to include more member states in the harmonization of business law and 
labor codes in Africa continues to be a top priority for many donor and development agencies in 
Africa. Given the above we examine the effect of employment protection legislation (henceforth EPL) 
on job reallocation.  
Before discussing our methodology and results a caveat here is worth highlighting. Most employment 
relationships in Africa, particularly in Africa are informal. Available statistics indicate that the share of 
the labor force that earns a living working in the informal sector in Africa is about 72 per cent (Boni, 
2010). Working relationships in the informal sector are often based on casual employment and 
informal employment arrangements. As a consequence, the implications drawn from our analysis may 
apply to the formal part of the labor market in Africa where working relationships are based on 
contracts. In the context of Africa this is also due to another kind of employment protection, namely 
the “closed shop” which protects jobs for the elite of the labor force in manufacturing, government 
 
75 On the other hand, some studies, e.g., Vergeer & Kleinknecht (2011, 2014) and Vergeer et al. (2015) find that high 
labour turnover reduces productivity growth. According to the authors, “high labour turnover makes firm-sponsored 
training less attractive and diminishes loyalty and commitment of people” (Vergeer and Kleinknecht 2011: 393). Exiting 
workers could easily leak tacit knowledge to competitors and harm productivity and innovation in routinized innovation 
regime sectors (Schumpeter II) where continuous accumulation of knowledge is crucial (cf. Vergeer & Kleinknecht, 2011).  
76 Organisation for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa. It was created in 1993 in Port Louis (Mauritius). As at 






and formal services and locks a huge number of informal workers out of the formal labor market, 
further reducing labor reallocation (Visagie et al, 2012). In this closed shop agreement, a worker 
looking for formal employment must first be a member of a trade union before being considered for 
employment by an employer. The trade union thus becomes the sole agency for employers to recruit 
workers into their establishments.77  
For our analysis, we use EPL data from the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) 
(2000-2015) and use productivity and JR data (2000-2015) from the preceding sections. The EFW 
compile data from third party sources, such as the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the 
Global Competitiveness Report, and the World Bank’s Doing Business Project. An advantage of the 
EPL index is the transparency and easily replicable nature of the index.78 In addition, compared to 
other indicators that measure labor market regulation in developing economies, the EFW has extended 
data that tracks employment regulation over time and serves the purpose of this analysis (cf. 
Haltiwanger et al., (2014). EPL is measured on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 being the worst (most 
restrictive).     
 





 http://www.tonyhealy.co.za/law/11-trade-unions/27-the-return-of-the-closed-shop.html: 3/7/2018. 






Source: Authors computation based on the Expanded Africa Sector Database and EPL data from Fraser Institute Economic Freedom 
of the World (EFW). To capture the relationship between EPL and job reallocation, we plot EPL index from 2000-2015 
against gross job reallocation rate in each country for the same period. We observe a negative association between EPL 
and gross job reallocation rate given by the slope of the best-fit line. 
 
To provide an initial insight, Figure 4 presents a simple scatterplot of job reallocation and EPL, with 
the plot suggesting a negative relationship between the two, thus providing some support for the 
argument that high EPL constrains the efforts of job reallocation and positive structural change, 
making it difficult to reallocate surplus resources into sectors where they could be more productive, 
penalizing overall productivity growth (Hopenhayn & Rogerson, 1993). We now proceed to examine 
this relationship econometrically.  
Our empirical strategy follows Haltiwanger et al. (2014), Messina & Vallanti (2007) and Micco & Pages 
(2007) but is modified to suit the purpose of our study. The complete specification yields the following 
model: 
3.7                                 𝐽𝐽𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐽𝐽′𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
where 𝐽𝐽𝐺𝐺 is gross job reallocation in country 𝑖𝑖 in time 𝑡𝑡, 𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the index of employment protection 
legislation, and 𝐽𝐽′𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a vector of other control variables that includes the stage of the business cycle 
as measured by changes in GDP growth (Bachmann &  Burda, 2009; Messina & Vallanti, 2007; Kye, 
2008), within-sector labor productivity growth (Diao et al., 2017) and employment growth (Kye, 2008). 
As explained by the authors of the aforementioned studies, the stage of the business cycle affects job 
mobility. In recession, job mobility rates tend to fluctuate due to lay-offs and vice versa. In so doing, 
the level of employment at the industry level tends to rise and fall in tandem with business cycles, 
though the direction of causality is uncertain (Messina & Vallanti, 2007). Employment growth affects 
the job mobility rate by allowing for the creation of employment opportunities (Kye, 2008). As shown 
by Diao et al. (2017), there is a negative association between productivity growth within sectors and 
structural change given that wages move in tandem with high productivity growth within a sector. The 
model also includes country fixed effects 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 , with 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 being the error term. In our analysis, we estimate 
the models separately for the total economy and for each major sector. 
Econometric results are reported in Table 3.7. We find that on average a one point increase in the 
EPL index significantly decreases job reallocation in the total economy (JR_TE) by 0.26 per cent, by 
0.34 per cent in the total service sectors (JR_TS), by 0.43 per cent in market services (JR_MS), by 0.31 
per cent in non-market services (JR_NMS), and by 0.44 per cent in the manufacturing sector 
(JR_MAN), though the impact is not significant in the latter case. These results are in line with the 
findings of Haltiwanger et al. (2014), Messina & Vallanti (2007) and Micco & Pages (2007), and 
indicate that a more rigid labor market reduces job reallocation which adversely affects the potential 
for structural change by making it difficult to reallocate surplus labor resources into sectors where 
they could be more productive. 
Other control variables have the expected signs. For instance, having impartial courts and a legal 
system of high integrity increases job reallocation as it serves as a safeguard for both employers and 
workers to exercise their right to make justifiable decisions about their business and jobs. Similarly, an 
increase in within labor productivity growth is associated with lower job reallocation, which implies 
that when productivity growth of a sector increases, it is less likely for the workers in that sector to 
move to other sectors (Diao et al, 2017: 16). Employment growth positively and significantly impacts 






per cent of job reallocation arises to accommodate the distribution of the labor force to the various 
sectors as a result of employment growth in the economy.  
 
Table 3.7: The Effect of EPL on Job Reallocation in Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables JR_TE JR_TS JR_MS JR_NMS JR_MAN JR_NMIS 
Labor Market Regulations -0.266* -0.341* -0.435** -0.314* -0.448 0.408 
 (0.157) (0.180) (0.223) (0.169) (0.302) (0.209) 
Integrity of the legal system 0.062 0.024 0.367 -0.480 0.370 0.246 
 (0.131) (0.218) (0.257) (0.224) (0.269) (0.210) 
       
Impartial courts 0.175** 0.202** 0.270** -0.041 0.180 0.109 
 (0.080) (0.099) (0.121) (0.142) (0.248) (0.118) 
       
Productivity Growth (Within) -0.017 -0.015 -0.017 -0.022 -6.413** -0.002 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.050) (2.499) (0.038) 
       
Business Cycle -0.005 -0.009 -0.010 -0.003 0.012 -0.024* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.019) (0.012) 
       
Employment growth 1.934 3.096 5.138* 3.219 0.349 4.108* 
 (2.298) (2.635) (2.952) (2.594) (4.073) (2.097) 
       
Constant 3.520** 3.582* 1.291 5.985*** 1.237 -3.468 
 
Country Effects 

































Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Employment Protection Regulations have limited 
variation overtime but differ significantly across countries and so we do not include time effects variable. All regressions 
include weights/size of industry and controls for country specific effects. JR=Job reallocation: TE=Total economy: 
TS=Total service: MS=Market service: NMS=Non-market service: MAN=Manufacturing: NMIS= Non-Manufacturing 
Industrial Sector: Productivity growth within (2000-2015). 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter uses the new Expanded Africa Sector Database to combine a standard decomposition 
of labor productivity with an analysis of labor market turbulence, thus allowing us to study the role of 
structural change and job reallocation in the economic growth of African countries in the past fifty 
years. Using both strategies, we examine the relative contribution of structural change and its 
characteristic labor market outcomes across different countries within three regions of Africa.  
The results indicate similar trends to those found in previous studies, but also reveal new trends and 
insights into long run structural transformation of African economies and sets a new research agenda.  
Like previous studies (McMillan et al, 2014; de Vries et al, 2015; Daio et al, 2017) we document huge 
and persistent sectoral productivity gaps in Africa. The employment and value-added shares of 
agriculture have declined signaling the changing structure of production. However, the service sector 
is the main recipient of the workers exiting the agricultural sector. While some sub-sectors of services 






trade, government and personal services are only marginally more productive than the agriculture. A 
shift of resources from agriculture towards these less dynamic sectors means that structural 
transformation has been weaker than it would have been if resources had shifted to manufacturing or 
high-tech services. 
In contrast to previous studies, our data suggest that productivity of the service sector is higher than 
previously estimated (Table 3.2). This is due to the structural undercounting of some high-productivity 
services sub-sectors, such as telecommunications, business services; and, important sectors such as 
entertainment and the informal sector.79   
Structural change is also more important than previously estimated (Table 3.3) due again to the 
undercounting of services in previous data. We have seen a massive exodus of agricultural workers to 
trade services and a moderate movement to ICT services particularly in tech start-ups. The systematic 
undercounting resulted in an underestimation of productivity levels, and hence an underestimation of 
productivity growth due to the reallocation of labor to these services. Aggregate productivity growth 
due to innovation within sectors is mostly coming from manufacturing and agriculture. However, 
aggregate productivity due to reallocation of workers is mostly coming from trade and business 
services (see Table A5). This suggests that apart from manufacturing, dynamic services can play a key 
role in the transformation of African economies. This is beginning to show in the case of East African 
economies. 
Our productivity decomposition results suggest that the golden era of African labor productivity 
growth is not the import-substitution era as suggested by de Vries et al (2015), but the period between 
2000 and 2015, when the highest productivity growth is achieved. While this may raise some sense of 
optimism in the recent growth performance of African economies, given the moderate increase in the 
contribution of structural change to productivity growth in the region, primarily as a result of a slight 
increase in job creation in manufacturing and business services recorded within the period, the general 
direction of change of the structure of African economies may not bode well for sustainable growth 
and poverty reduction in Africa. 
Particularly, there is still a strong shift towards services where the highest annual job creation in the 
sector is in the wholesale and retail trade services (largely informal) and personal and government 
services due to potentially restrictive opportunities that limit the labor absorption into other dynamic 
modern market services. The expansion of these non-tradable services has crystallized concerns about 
the direction of structural change since jobs in these sectors are often temporary or part-time in nature, 
less well paid and protected, and having few fringe benefits and opportunities for career development. 
This could increase earnings inequality and stall the expected poverty reduction associated with 
structural change because business services which is a high-wage service sector is creating fewer 
opportunities compared with lower-wage non-tradable services. 
The labor market institutional arrangements in many countries in Africa have played a significant role 
 
79 For instance, the old GDP estimates of Nigeria used in the ASD ranks Wholesale and Retail trade as the largest 
component of the service sector, followed by Hotels and Restaurants, and Real Estate. However, the revised GDP used 
for this research suggest that Telecommunications ranks next to Wholesale and Retail trade. The telecommunication sector 
is more dynamic than the hospitality sector leading to relatively higher productivity. The revised data includes new activities 
such as entertainment, research, patents and copyrights in addition to a wider coverage of the informal sector. The 
correction of the undercounting of these sectors increased the services share of GDP from 23.6% to 50.2% (Nigeria 
Bureau of Statistics, 2014). Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia all revised their GDP estimates to account for 







in these outcomes. We find that rigid labor market institutional arrangements in the region discourage 
job reallocation, making it difficult to reallocate surplus labor into sectors where they could be more 
productive, penalizing productivity growth as a result. Although the EASD and job turnover rates 
cover the entire labor force, i.e., formal and informal workers, the implications drawn from the 
correlation between labor market institutions and job dynamics may be limited due to the high level 
of informality in Africa where working relationships are casual. For the region to experience the 
desired growth enhancing structural change will require not only a high degree of labor market 
flexibility that will drive this process, but also policies and reforms that will move labor into the formal 
sector, with a huge number of workers and held-back firms locked in the informal sector due to high 
entry costs and other regulations.  
Due to negative consequences of this ‘peculiar’ structural change, the chapter sets a new research 
agenda by arguing that studies on structural transformation in Africa should move beyond a 
consideration of the extent of structural change and labor productivity to examine labor market 
outcomes as well. As a first step, we bring this to fruition by examining the labor market turbulence 
effect of structural change. A clear policy direction from this exercise is that while the main 
development framework in Africa should hinge on industrialization, complementary policies and 
strategies should aim at agricultural transformation, improvement in intra-sectoral productivity and 
employment stability particularly within the service sector bearing in mind the different contexts and 
specific circumstances of the economies. This could be a potential way to achieve the rapid structural 
change and poverty reduction predicted by Lewis (1954) and growth with depth as emphasized by 



































3.7. Appendix to chapter 3 
Table A3.1 Sectoral Value-Added Shares 
 Real Value-Added Shares (in per cent) 
Sector 1960 1975 1990 2000 2010 2015 
Agriculture 37.9 30.1 24.7 23.9 20.4 17.2 
Industry 21.0 25.4 26.1 25.1 23.8 24.2 
  Manufacturing 7.9 10.1 12.2 11.9 11.1 10.3 
  Mining 7.5 7.6 7.6 5.9 4.8 4.7 
  Utilities 0.5 1.3 1.8 2.7 2.4 2.3 
  Construction 5.1 6.4 4.5 4.6 5.5 6.8 
Services 41.1 44.6 49.2 51.0 55.8 58.7 
  Market Services 29.8 30.6 31.9 34.7 40.0 42.8 
   Trade, Restaurant and Hotels 15.9 13.9 13.9 14.7 16.3 17.5 
   Transport, Storage and Communications 5.7 6.5 6.1 7.0 10.4 11.2 
   FIRBS 8.3 10.2 11.9 12.9 13.3 14.1 
 Non-Market Services 11.3 14.0 17.2 16.4 15.8 15.9 
  Government Services 8.6 11.6 14.6 13.5 12.8 12.7 
  Community, Social and Personal Services 2.7 2.4 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.2 
 
Table A3.2:  Volatility of Value-Added Shares of Sectors 
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Agriculture 24.0 5.57 17.1 31.9 
Industry 23.8 1.16 22.2 25.2 
Mining 6.1 1.45 4.4 7.80 
Manufacturing 10.4 1.60 7.3 11.7 
Utilities 1.9 0.59 1.2 2.5 
Construction 5.4 0.83 4.4 6.4 
Service 52.2 5.71 45.8 59.7 
Trade, Restaurants and Hotels 14.2 1.65 13.0 16.8 
Transport Storage and Communication 7.0 2.03 5.4 9.9 
FIRBS 16.2 1.30 14.5 17.7 
Government Services 12.2 1.73 9.4 14.0 
Community, Social and Personal 2.6 0.49 2.0 3.4 
Market Services 37.4 4.69 33.0 44.4 





















Total Economy 1.9% 1.0% 1.2% -0.3% 0.9% 
Agriculture 0.08% 0.31% -0.21% -0.02% -0.23% 
Mining 0.06% 0.10% 0.02% -0.07% -0.04% 
Manufacturing 0.23% 0.12% 0.13% -0.02% 0.11% 
Utilities 0.04% 0.01% 0.05% -0.02% 0.03% 
Construction 0.13% 0.02% 0.14% -0.04% 0.10% 
Trade services 0.29% -0.17% 0.52% -0.06% 0.46% 
Transport services 0.20% 0.13% 0.09% -0.02% 0.07% 
Business services 0.22% -0.02% 0.27% -0.03% 0.24% 
Government services 0.27% 0.16% 0.13% -0.02% 0.11% 
Personal services 0.07% 0.05% 0.04% -0.02% 0.02% 
 Notes: The table shows the productivity decomposition by sector for Africa (18 countries)-unweighted.  The sum of the 
within and structural balance equals total productivity. Structural balance is the sum of static reallocation and dynamic 
reallocation. 
Table A3.4: Productivity Decomposition Results by Country (1960-2015) 









Botswana 1968-2015 5.5% 3.8% 3.7% -1.9% 1.8%  
1968-1975 14.0% 2.6% 12.7% -1.2% 11.5% 
 
1975-1990 7.6% 6.2% 2.9% -1.5% 1.4%  
1990-2000 1.4% 2.1% -0.2% -0.5% -0.6% 
 
2000-2015 2.3% 3.0% 2.9% -3.6% -0.7%  
Burkina Faso 1970-2014 2.9% 1.7% 1.4% -0.2% 1.2%  
1970-1975 3.4% 3.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
1975-1990 4.1% 4.2% -0.1% 0.0% -0.1%  
1990-2000 2.9% 1.2% 1.8% -0.1% 1.7% 
 
2000-2014 1.6% -1.1% 3.2% -0.5% 2.8%  
Cameroun 1965-2015 2.3% 1.3% 1.1% -0.1% 1.0%  
1965-1975 6.1% 6.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
1975-1990 4.1% 3.2% 0.9% -0.1% 0.9%  
1990-2000 1.8% -1.5% 3.6% -0.3% 3.3% 
 
2000-2015 -1.8% -2.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2%        
Ethiopia 1961-2015 1.3% 0.2% 1.3% -0.2% 1.1%  
1961-1975 0.4% -0.7% 1.1% 0.0% 1.1% 
 
1975-1990 -1.6% -1.7% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%  







2000-2015 5.4% 3.4% 2.5% -0.6% 2.0% 
 
Ghana 1960-2015 1.4% 1.4% 0.2% -0.2% 0.0% 
 
1960-1975 -1.0% -0.7% -0.2% -0.1% -0.3% 
 
1975-1990 -1.2% -1.1% -0.1% 0.0% -0.1% 
 
1990-2000 3.3% 2.7% 0.6% 0.0% 0.6% 
 
2000-2015 5.1% 5.2% 0.4% -0.6% -0.1% 
       
Kenya 1969-2015 0.1% -0.6% 0.9% -0.2% 0.7% 
 
1969-1975 1.5% 1.1% 0.7% -0.3% 0.4% 
 
1975-1990 0.5% -0.3% 1.1% -0.2% 0.8% 
 
1990-2000 -2.6% -4.8% 2.6% -0.3% 2.2% 
 
2000-2015 0.8% 1.2% -0.3% -0.1% -0.4% 
 
Lesotho 1970-2015 1.9% 0.8% 1.3% -0.2% 1.1% 
 
1970-1975 -2.3% -2.5% 0.4% -0.1% 0.3% 
 
1975-1990 1.8% 0.9% 1.0% -0.1% 0.9% 
 
1990-2000 4.6% 3.4% 1.2% -0.1% 1.2% 
 
2000-2015 1.6% 0.0% 1.9% -0.3% 1.6% 
 
Malawi 1966-2015 1.2% 0.0% 1.6% -0.3% 1.2% 
 
1966-1975 3.0% 1.8% 1.2% 0.0% 1.2% 
 
1975-1990 -1.1% -0.7% 0.4% -0.7% -0.3% 
 
1990-2000 1.4% 0.0% 1.6% -0.1% 1.4% 
 
2000-2015 2.4% -0.2% 2.9% -0.3% 2.6% 
 
Mauritius 1970-2015 3.4% 2.7% 1.2% -0.4% 0.7% 
 
1970-1975 13.2% 11.3% 2.6% -0.8% 1.8% 
 
1975-1990 1.1% 0.3% 1.3% -0.6% 0.7% 
 
1990-2000 4.3% 3.1% 1.3% -0.1% 1.2% 
 
2000-2015 1.9% 1.8% 0.4% -0.3% 0.1% 
 
Mozambique 1970-2015 2.5% 2.4% 0.3% -0.1% 0.2% 
 
1970-1975 -6.4% -6.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
1975-1990 -2.2% -2.0% 0.0% -0.2% -0.2% 
 
1990-2000 8.9% 9.1% 0.0% -0.2% -0.2% 
 
2000-2015 5.9% 5.1% 0.8% 0.0% 0.8% 
 
Namibia 1965-2015 1.3% 1.1% 0.6% -0.4% 0.2% 
 
1965-1975 0.4% -0.2% 0.7% -0.1% 0.6% 
 
1975-1990 0.6% 0.7% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% 
 
1990-2000 2.9% 2.9% 0.5% -0.5% 0.1% 
 







Nigeria 1960-2015 3.0% 2.4% 0.8% -0.1% 0.6% 
 
1960-1975 4.6% 3.3% 1.5% -0.3% 1.2% 
 
1975-1990 0.5% 0.8% -0.1% -0.1% -0.2% 
 
1990-2000 0.8% 1.2% -0.3% -0.1% -0.4% 
 
2000-2015 5.3% 3.7% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 
 
Rwanda 1970-2015 3.5% 1.7% 1.9% -0.1% 1.8% 
 
1970-1975 6.5% 6.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
1975-1990 -1.1% -2.5% 1.7% -0.2% 1.5% 
 
1990-2000 5.0% 4.7% 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 
 
2000-2015 5.9% 2.2% 3.9% -0.2% 3.7% 
 
Senegal 1970-2014 -0.7% -1.5% 1.0% -0.1% 0.9% 
 
1970-1975 -2.1% -2.9% 0.8% 0.0% 0.8% 
 
1975-1990 -2.7% -3.3% 0.7% 0.0% 0.7% 
 
1990-2000 0.9% -0.2% 1.2% -0.1% 1.1% 
 
2000-2014 0.9% -0.1% 1.3% -0.3% 1.0% 
 
South Africa 1960-2015 1.7% 0.9% 0.9% -0.1% 0.8% 
 
1960-1975 4.1% 2.5% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 
 
1975-1990 0.0% -1.2% 1.3% -0.1% 1.2% 
 
1990-2000 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% -0.3% -0.1% 
 
2000-2015 2.1% 2.0% 0.3% -0.2% 0.1% 
 
Tanzania 1960-2015 2.0% -0.1% 2.5% -0.5% 2.0% 
 
1960-1975 2.1% -0.7% 3.9% -1.0% 2.8% 
 
1975-1990 -0.5% -1.2% 0.8% -0.1% 0.7% 
 
1990-2000 0.7% 0.1% 0.6% 0.0% 0.6% 
 
2000-2015 5.3% 1.7% 4.2% -0.6% 3.5% 
 
Uganda 1960-2015 0.9% -0.3% 1.4% -0.2% 1.2% 
 
1960-1975 0.1% -1.1% 1.4% -0.2% 1.2% 
 
1975-1990 1.4% -0.6% 2.1% -0.1% 2.0% 
 
1990-2000 3.2% 0.4% 3.0% -0.2% 2.8% 
 
2000-2015 -0.3% 0.4% -0.6% -0.1% -0.7% 
 
Zambia 1965-2015 -0.7% -0.3% -0.3% -0.1% -0.4% 
 
1965-1975 -2.7% -1.1% -1.7% 0.0% -1.7% 
 
1975-1990 -2.2% -0.2% -2.0% 0.0% -2.0% 
 
1990-2000 -1.2% -1.3% 0.2% -0.1% 0.1% 
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4.1. Introduction and Motivation 
Evidence of cross-country (spatial) externalities is suggestive of the importance of global technological 
interdependence. Technological advancement in one country depends on the level of technological 
development in another country (Ertur & Koch, 2007), with technological spillovers flowing in 
particular from advanced countries to developing countries. This is due to the fact that advanced 
countries, particularly the US, are considered to operate on the technology frontier while developing 
countries, including those in Africa, operate inside the technology frontier (Caselli & Coleman, 2006; 
Filippetti & Peyrache, 2017; Kumar & Russell, 2002). With technological progress playing a crucial 
role in the long run growth of countries (Grossman & Helpman, 1991a; Romer, 1990, 1994), 
developed countries at the technological frontier rely on R&D investments to shift the frontiers of 
knowledge in order to generate long-run growth, while developing countries are able to assimilate 
technologies already developed in advanced countries to generate growth, especially if they have 
developed their absorptive capacity to a level that is necessary and sufficient to benefit from existing 
technologies (Abramovitz, 1986; Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). The non-rival nature of technology makes 
this relation feasible as developed countries’ investment in new knowledge does not only benefit these 
advanced countries but also contributes to the global knowledge pool that can spill over to developing 
countries if conditions allow (Keller, 2004). Endogenous growth models have emphasized that the 
international spillover of knowledge is a major source of productivity growth in receiving countries. 
These international spillovers from advanced countries are received in developing countries through 
human capital interactions, international trade, and foreign direct investment (Borensztein, De 
Gregorio, & Lee, 1998; Coe & Helpman, 1995; Wolfgang Keller, 1998, 2009; Wolfgang Keller & 
Yeaple, 2013).  
Given the recent pace of technological change and globalization, African countries are expected to 
adopt, assimilate, and ultimately benefit from technology developed in frontier countries without 
much friction. Thus, the geographic distance between Africa and frontier countries should not matter 
for the technology diffusion process if “there is a global pool of technological knowledge or a 
country’s technology level depends on only idiosyncratic non-spatial factors” (Keller, 2002:120). 
However, the international diffusion of knowledge is not global. Keller (2002) established that the 
international diffusion of technology is geographically localized in the sense that knowledge gained 
from R&D decreases with geographic distance. Thus the “spatial diffusion of technological knowledge 
may be geographically bounded, so that the stock of knowledge in one region may spill over into other 
regions with an intensity which decreases with geographical distance” (Basile, Capello, & Caragliu, 
2011:21). “Technology diffusion declines with distance because in equilibrium technology transfer to 
remote locations is relatively costly, so there is less of it” (Keller, 2009: 59).  
Recent exogenous growth models consider technological interdependence between countries by 
modeling spatial externalities. The implication of the spatially augmented Solow model is that “the 
stock of knowledge in one country produces externalities that may cross national borders and spill 
over into other countries with an intensity which decreases with distance”(Ertur & Koch, 2007). Ertur 
& Koch (2007) tested the spatially augmented Solow model and found spatial externalities to be 
statistically significant.  
While geographical proximity is essential for knowledge spillovers, Basile et al. (2011:21) have shown 






alone. Gravity models (Ertur & Koch, 2007; Keller & Yeaple, 2013) are often used to capture the 
spatial dimension of knowledge spillovers, but gravity models do not explain an important component 
of technological spillover i.e. “the learning processes of agents and contexts”. Two countries at the 
same geographical distance from the technological leader may benefit differently from technology that 
spills over from the frontier because of the different learning processes and institutional contexts. To 
capture the learning process in the technology diffusion framework, Basile et al. (2011:21) introduced 
the concept of relational proximity. Relational proximity is defined as “the similarities of two areas in 
terms of shared behavioral codes, common culture, mutual trust, sense of belonging and cooperation 
capabilities.” Relational proximity facilitates cooperative learning processes through which knowledge 
accumulation takes place. Their empirical analysis showed that relational proximity is not only crucial 
in the knowledge absorption process but that it also complements the positive effect of geographical 
proximity. Finally, evolutionary theory suggests that technological diffusion is difficult if the 
technology gap between the frontier and the laggard country is large. Beyond a certain threshold, this 
technology gap widens over time (Verspagen, 1991). The technology gap between African countries 
and the US - normally considered in the catch-up literature as the frontier – is huge, persistent, and 
widening over time.  
The peculiar nature of African development presents unique technological challenges. This often 
requires African-induced innovations. These innovations could facilitate knowledge accumulation and 
catch-up because of the closeness of African countries in terms of geography, institutions, and the 
technology gap. For example, because of geography and idiosyncratic reinforcing factors such as 
institutions, the disease burden of Africa is relatively high compared to other regions. Effective 
treatment and medicines are, therefore, needed. However, it is estimated that 42% of detected 
counterfeit – i.e., substandard or falsified – pharmaceutical drugs occurred in Africa (WHO, 2017). 
While pharmaceutical counterfeiting is common in all developing countries, the risk of penetration is 
high for most African countries. Most Food and Drugs Boards (FDBs) and crime units responsible 
for fighting this crime are not well-equipped to mitigate this public safety risk. As a result, an estimated 
64-158 thousand lives are lost annually to malaria alone in Africa due to fake drugs (ENACT, 2018). 
To crackdown on this crime, mPedigree developed a technological platform that stores pedigree 
information of pharmaceutical products of participating manufacturers in a central registry and 
connects this registry to GSM mobile networks so that with a simple short code consumers can verify 
the authenticity of the drugs or products they are buying. mPedigree observed this peculiar problem 
in Ghana, but because of the relational proximity – institutional similarity – to other countries, similar 
levels of penetration of counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs were observed in most African countries. 
To fight the menace, the technology has been adopted in most African countries and has extended its 
application to other sectors such as Agro-industries (seeds), textiles, and domestics.  In particular, the 
Nigerian National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) formed a 
consortium including mPedigree and other technology companies to roll out the mobile medicine 
authentication process in Nigeria since 2014.   
In relation to the counterfeiting problem, multiple infections are common in Africa. While it is rare to 
find someone in advanced countries infected with malaria, Hepatitis, Zika, and HIV at the same time, 
it is common in Africa. In the traditional medical system, a person living with two or more infectious 






the Ebola virus in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, Doctor Nyan81 developed a rapid diagnostic test 
that can detect up to seven infections in about ten to forty minutes (Economist, 2017). The battery-
powered technology provides a fast and cheap alternative to the traditional laboratory test, which 
remains expensive to the poor and uninsured. (See the Economist (2017) for other technological 
innovations induced by specific problems in Africa).  
Furthermore, before the mobile money revolution, the majority of Africans were unbanked due to 
high transaction costs emanating from high levels of perceived risks and information asymmetries for 
the traditional banking system leading to low levels of financial inclusion. The exclusion of the majority 
of people from the financial system means they cannot easily smoothen their income and consumption 
patterns over time, exposing them to potential shocks (Pelletier, Khavul, & Estrin, 2019). The 
introduction of the MPesa in Kenya and the subsequent spread of mobile money services across the 
continent has revolutionized transactions across the continent, with the majority of digital-wallets 
users being previously unbanked. The unprecedented growth of mobile money services has 
modernized the banking system and supported rapid financial inclusion. For instance, the growth of 
mobile financial services has sped up and simplified remittance transactions and supported the growth 
of e-commerce in a way that would otherwise be impossible in Africa.  These are a few examples of 
peculiar development problems and how African-induced innovations are helping to tackle them.  
Given that African countries are geographically and relationally closer to each other than the US and 
given the huge productivity gap between Africa and the US, this chapter departs from the existing 
literature and studies technological change and technological catch-up within African by considering 
catch-up with respect to an African technology leader. We do this using a linear programming 
technique (i.e. data envelopment analysis (DEA)) to estimate a virtual production frontier for Africa, 
using this estimate to then construct the productive efficiency of each country relative to the frontier. 
The dynamic efficiency of each country is examined using the Malmquist productivity index to 
decompose total productivity growth into technological catch-up (movement toward or away from 
the frontier) and technological change (i.e., a shift of the frontier over time). One advantage of the 
DEA over the other usual approach of measuring technology gaps and catch-up relative to some 
defined frontier is that it defines best practice based on the sample. Unlike Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA), DEA does not require any assumption about market structure and functional specification of 
the production technology.  
The analysis shows that Botswana and Mauritius are the only two countries in Africa that have 
successfully converged to the efficiency82 level of the frontier. In 1970, South Africa, Rwanda and 
Zambia were on the African production possibility frontier. By 2014, Rwanda and Zambia had fallen 
behind while Botswana and Mauritius had caught up with South Africa. The Malmquist productivity 
decomposition indicates that productivity convergence of Botswana and Mauritius is driven more by 
a movement toward the production possibility frontier – i.e., technological catch-up – and less by the 
shift of the production possibility frontier – i.e., technological change.  The productivity growth of 
 
81 Dougbeh Chris Nyan is a Liberian medical doctor, a biomedical research scientist, social activist and inventor. 
82 Efficiency is achieved when the maximum possible number of goods and services are produced with a given amount of 
inputs. This will occur on the production possibility frontier and the lowest point of the average cost curve of the decision-








almost all the countries in Africa in our dataset is driven more by improvements in efficiency change 
or technological catch-up.  
To further understand the special role efficiency change (catch-up) played in the convergence of 
Botswana and Mauritius to the technology leader, we examine whether this process was driven by 
structural change. To determine the extent to which a transformation in production could contribute 
to catch-up, we follow the structural approach of Lavopa & Szirmai (2014) to estimate the annual rate 
of catch up to the frontier by decomposing relative labor productivity to the frontier into a catch-up 
rate due to the adoption of best practice within sectors (within), the catch-up rate due to the movement 
of workers to sectors with a smaller technology gap relative to the frontier (structural change), and 
due to initial specialization. By doing this, we trace the sectoral origin of aggregate efficiency change. 
In this estimation, South Africa (SA) is used as the technological frontier for two reasons: First, the 
DEA analysis indicates that SA has been on the African production possibility frontier since 1970. 
Second, SA leads the rest of Africa in terms of innovation, intellectual property production, and 
education (Section Appendix). Successful catch-up to the technology leader (i.e., SA) has huge 
implications for (transitory) growth and development in Africa, implying a movement from the current 
average GDP per capita of $1500 to a GDP per capita of about $10000.  
We find that structural change contributes more to technological convergence than the within and 
specialization effects. The potential explanations for these findings are as follows: the discovery of 
diamonds in Botswana and the development of an exporting manufacturing sector in Mauritius and 
subsequent movement of workers to these sectors led to the relatively successful transition of these 
two countries. Botswana’s geographical and relational proximity to SA enabled effective development 
of the mining and auxiliary sectors since, by 1970, SA had established itself as a global leader in mining-
related technology (Kaplan, 2012). By interacting with SA, Botswana adopted the appropriate 
technology and best management practices to explore its diamond deposits and launched itself upon 
a consistent growth path. In Mauritius, conversely, the policies deployed after the creation of the 
export processing zones (EPZs) in the early 1970s led to successful diversification and catch-up. For 
instance, duty-free access to capital goods and a raft of tax incentives granted to firms operating within 
the EPZs acted as subsidies to encourage export-oriented manufacturing. Mining-led and 
manufacturing-led catch-up in Botswana and Mauritius, respectively, may suggest that catch-up within 
Africa is a sector-specific phenomenon. This analysis reinforces the argument that developing 
countries can successfully climb up the income ladder through a two-pronged transformation – 
structural change and technological catch-up (Lavopa & Szirmai, 2018).  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 briefly discusses the datasets used for the 
analysis. Section 4.3 analyzes efficiency convergence and decomposes dynamic efficiency change in 
Africa. Section 4.4 decomposes the relative productivity to the frontier and explores the role of 
structural change in technological catch-up. Section 4.5 concludes.  
4.2. Data Sources and Description 
Data on value added and employment were sourced from the Expanded Africa Sector Database 
(EASD) presented in Chapter 2. We complement the EASD with capital stock data from the PWT 
9.0 database. The EASD is converted from local currencies to international dollars using the 2011 






PPPs are not available for the seven newly added countries in the EASD. The capital stock reported 
in the PWT 9.0 is measured in 2011 PPPs. Using 2011 PPPs to convert value added data therefore 
gives output and capital input in a single unit. 
4.3. Nonparametric Estimation of Technology gaps in Africa  
DEA is often used to measure the productive efficiency of a set of decision-making units (DMUs) 
with multiple inputs and outputs by employing standard mathematical linear programming algorithms 
(Wang & Lan, 2011; Kumar & Russel, 2002; Coelli, Prasada, & Battese, 1998). Originally proposed by 
Charnes et al. (1978) and later named the CCR model to reflect the acronyms of all the authors 
(Charnes-Cooper-Rhodes), the DEA approach has been improved and widely used in productivity 
analysis.  
Using a linear programming technique, DEA envelops the dataset under consideration to construct a 
convex cone or piecewise hull (the technology frontier). The upper boundary of the convex cone 
represents the best practice (production frontier) and is made up of all technically efficient DMUs 
(Kumar & Russel, 2002; Van Dijk & Szirmai, 2011). By so doing, the DEA approach of measuring 
productive efficiency constructs a virtual production frontier for the sample of economies and 
associated efficiency indexes of individual economies. By constructing a virtual production frontier, 
we can measure how far or close each African economy is to the production frontier and how much 
inefficient economies need to adjust their production technology to become efficient. All African 
economies operating below the production frontier are considered technically inefficient as the 
combination of inputs yields output smaller than what could have been produced. Technically efficient 
economies operate on the production frontier. Technically efficient economies have an efficiency 
index of 1, and technically inefficient economies have an efficiency index of less than 1.  The efficiency 
index could be interpreted as encompassing both technological phenomena as well as the set of 
institutions and policies deployed in each economy to drive technical change (Kumar & Russel, 2002).  
In summary, DEA has an advantage over standard methods of studying catch-up relative to some 
defined frontier, which reduces the best-practice frontier to a point and compares other countries to 
the point in terms of efficient and inefficient utilization of factor supplies (Kumar & Russel, 2002). 
Also, unlike standard stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) or econometric estimation of catch-up that 
assumes the shape of the production function, the nonparametric, data-driven DEA approach requires 
no specification of the functional form—an advantage DEA has over SFA and econometric 
approaches. Initially, an assumption about the returns to scale of technology is required, but with 
advances made in the statistical analysis of DEA, one can choose the appropriate returns to scale of a 
production technology through a formal statistical test (see test below). Assumptions about free 
disposability of inputs and outputs are, however, required (Kumar & Russel, 2002; Van Dijk & Szirmai, 
2011).  
4.3.1. The DEA Model 
We calculate the Farrell (output-based) technical efficiency index of DMUs (countries) by solving the 
linear programming problem for each observation. We assume output (value added) is produced by 
two inputs (capital and labor). We also assume free disposability of inputs and outputs. We compute 






increasing returns to scale (NIRS). Suppose there are 𝐽𝐽 countries to be evaluated, given 𝑙𝑙  inputs and 
𝑤𝑤 outputs.  
                          The technology set is defined as:  
4.1           𝑇𝑇 (𝜃𝜃∗) = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡|𝐽𝐽𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶) = Minimize 𝜃𝜃,                                     












 ≤ 𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾𝑙𝑙 ,        𝑙𝑙 = 1, … … …𝑁𝑁                                             
                               𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗  ≥ 0, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … . 𝐽𝐽                                                                             
Where 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡, 𝐾𝐾𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 and 𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 are the labor, capital, and output of each country 𝑗𝑗 in time 𝑡𝑡.  The convex 
cone formed by these column vectors is the technology set 𝑇𝑇 (𝜃𝜃∗), with 𝜆𝜆 being a 𝐽𝐽 × 1 vector of 
constants. The 𝑙𝑙 and 𝑤𝑤 inequalities capture the free disposability of inputs and output assumption 
and represent the 𝑙𝑙th inputs and 𝑤𝑤th output for DMUs, respectively. The value of 𝜃𝜃 that solves the 
linear program problem gives the technical efficiency index for each country 𝑗𝑗 in time 𝑡𝑡.83 If 𝜃𝜃∗= 1, 
the DMU is on the frontier, and current inputs cannot be reduced (proportionally). The DMU is below 
the frontier if 𝜃𝜃∗ < 1. Equation (4.1) yields efficiency estimates under a constant returns to scale 
assumption. Efficiency estimates for other returns to scale specifications can be modeled by altering 
the constraint on the process operating levels vector, 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗. For efficiency estimates under variable returns 
to scale –  𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡|𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶) – the convexity constraint ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗=1 =1 is imposed, whereas for 
efficiency estimates under nonincreasing returns to scale –  𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡|𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶) – the inequality 
∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗=1 ≤ 1 is added to the set of constraints on inputs and output in equation (4.1) 
4.3.2.  Nonparametric Test of Returns to Scale 
The returns to scale assumption used to specify the production technology is very important in DEA 
as efficiency estimates vary under different returns to scale assumptions (see Table 4.3). We, therefore, 
compute the scale efficiency for each country and test for the returns to scale assumption under which 
each country is scale efficient. The measures of (radial) technical efficiencies under CRS, NRS, and 
 
83 This is from the optimistic DEA point of view since we maximize the efficiency of DMUs within the range of zero to 
one. In the case of the pessimistic DEA, the efficiency of DMUs is minimized relative to others within a range no less 
than one. For instance, measuring efficiency using the pessimistic DEA, a DMU will be pessimistically inefficient if the 






VRS returns scale explained above can be used to compute the scale efficiency defined by Färe & 
Grosskopf (1985) as follows:  
4.2       𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗0(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡) =
 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡|𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�
 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡|𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)
   
4.3         𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗1(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 ,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡) =
 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡|𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�
 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡|𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)
   
Where the ratio 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗0 measures how close the data point – in our case – (𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡)84 is to the maximum 
productive scale size. If 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗0(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 ,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡)=1, then the data point (𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡, 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡) is scale efficient. If 
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗0(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡)>1, the data point (𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡) is scale inefficient because it is either operating on the 
decreasing portion of the technology, 𝑇𝑇 (𝜃𝜃∗), i.e. if   𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗1(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡) = 1, or on the increasing portion 
of the technology, 𝑇𝑇 (𝜃𝜃∗), i.e. if   𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗1(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡) > 1.  
If the global technology 𝑇𝑇 (𝜃𝜃∗) in equation (4.1) exhibits CRS, then the VRS estimator is less efficient 
than the CRS estimator and vice versa (Badunenko & Mozharovskyi, 2016). To impose the right 
returns to scale (RTS) assumption, Simar & Wilson (2002) suggest the following tests:  
                        Test #1 :  𝐻𝐻0: 𝑇𝑇 (𝜃𝜃∗) 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑏𝑏𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦 𝐽𝐽𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶  versus 𝐻𝐻1: 𝑇𝑇 (𝜃𝜃∗)  𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the following less restrictive test is conducted: 
                       Test #2 :  𝐻𝐻0: 𝑇𝑇 (𝜃𝜃∗) 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑏𝑏𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦 𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶  versus 𝐻𝐻1: 𝑇𝑇 (𝜃𝜃∗)  𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶 
 The test statistic for test #1 and test #2 is computed as follows:  
 4.4                                   𝜏𝜏1 = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗0(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡)
𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗=1 𝐽𝐽−1 
 4.5                                   𝜏𝜏2 = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗1(𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 ,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡)
𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗=1 𝐽𝐽−1  
Where 𝜏𝜏1  represents the average ratio of the technical efficiencies under CRS technology to technical 
efficiencies under VRS. If the null hypothesis is true, then the distance between the CRS and VRS 
frontier is negligible. If the alternative hypothesis is true, then the average ratio of technical efficiencies 
between both frontiers is significantly different from 1. If the alternative hypothesis is true, then test 
#2 is performed.  Analogous to test #1, if the null hypothesis is true, then the mean distance between 
the NRS and VRS frontiers is statistically indifferent from 1.  If the alternative is true, then the average 
distance between the NRS and VRS is statistically larger than 1.    
A bootstrapping procedure is often used to calculate the test statistic of test #1 and test #2. Simar & 
Wilson (2000, 2011) provide a detailed explanation of the concept and implementation of the 
bootstrapping technique. The bootstrapping method for output-based efficiency estimates relies on 
one fundamental testable assumption, namely whether the output-based efficiency estimates are 















sample are similar in terms of technology and characteristics (homogeneous) or are not similar 
(heterogeneous).  If output-based efficiency estimates are independent of the mix of outputs, a 
homogeneous bootstrap technique is used in the statistical test. If output-based efficiency estimates 
are dependent on the mix of outputs, a heterogenous bootstrap technique is preferred. The 
Heterogeneous bootstrap is used in this case since a formal test of independence indicates output-
based measures of technical efficiency are not independent of the mix of outputs (Badunenko & 
Mozharovskyi, 2016:256). The test confirms the empirical reality that African countries are different 
in terms of the adoption and usage of technology as well as other idiosyncratic factors.  The test of 
returns to scale assumption shows that all countries are statistically scale-efficient under constant 
returns to scale technology in the heterogeneous bootstrap (see Table 4.1). Therefore, the preferred 
efficiency scores are the ones under constant returns to scale specifications. 
 
Table 4.1: Test of Returns to Scale 
Scale Analysis—1970 Scale Analysis—2014 
 
DMU SE Scale Efficient 
under CRS 
(Heterogeneous) 
DMU SE Scale Efficient 
under CRS 
(Heterogeneous) 
BWA 1.12 scale efficient BWA 1.00 scale efficient 
BFA 1.03 scale efficient BFA 1.07 scale efficient 
CMR 1.03 scale efficient CMR 1.00 scale efficient 
ETH 1.16 scale efficient ETH 1.12 scale efficient 
GHA 1.04 scale efficient GHA 1.02 scale efficient 
KEN 1.21 scale efficient KEN 1.09 scale efficient 
LSO 1.03 scale efficient LSO 1.66 scale efficient 
MWI 1.00 scale efficient MWI 1.10 scale efficient 
MUS 1.63 scale efficient MUS 1.00 scale efficient 
MOZ 1.03 scale efficient MOZ 1.07 scale efficient 
NAM 1.33 scale efficient NAM 1.01 scale efficient 
NGA 1.32 scale efficient NGA 1.00 scale efficient 
RWA 1.00 scale efficient RWA 1.24 scale efficient 
SEN 1.02 scale efficient SEN 1.07 scale efficient 
ZAF 1.00 scale efficient ZAF 1.02 scale efficient 
TZA 1.19 scale efficient TZA 1.01 scale efficient 
UGA 1.04 scale efficient UGA 1.06 scale efficient 
ZMB 1.00 scale efficient ZMB 1.01 scale efficient 
*SE= statistically scale efficient under CRS 
 
4.4. Efficiency Results 
In figures 4.1 and 4.2, we analyze the evolution of the distribution of output per worker and capital 
per worker between 1970 and 2014, respectively. The distribution of output per worker (Figure 4.1) 






the distribution increased from $3,833 to $8,490 (Table 4.2). While in 1970 there was no country in 
Africa with the productivity level of $10,000 or above, in 2014, a few countries reported a productivity 
level close to $30,000, a $20,000 change in productivity for the countries in the upper end of the 
distribution.85 This transformation in labor productivity could be interpreted as the emergence of 
lower middle-income countries in the region. 
A similar observation is made in Figure 4.2, which shows that in 1970 many countries had a low capital 
stock and a resultant low capital per worker. By 2014, the distribution of capital per worker in Africa 
had transformed drastically, with labor having more capital to work with. On average, productive 
efficiency is unchanged, decreasing slightly from 0.71 to 0.70 (see Table 4.2). However, this average 
trend in efficiency differs by country.  
                         Figure 4.1: Evolution of Output per worker 
 
 
Note: A kernel density plot visualizing the distribution of output per worker in 1970 and 2014 computed from EASD 
 
 
             
 
 
85 For purposes of comparison, this compares well with the change in labor productivity in the US, which increased by 






                           Figure 4.2: Evolution of Capital per Worker 
 
 
Note: A kernel density plot visualizing the distribution of capital per worker in 1970 and 2014 computed from EASD and 
PWT 9.0 
 
Table 4.3 reports the radial technical efficiencies by country in 1970 and 2014, respectively. The radial 
index measures inefficiency in terms of distance to the production frontier, whereas the non-radial 
measure defines inefficiency in terms of efficient subsets as opposed to the production frontier. For 
robustness, non-radial measures are also reported in Table A4.3 & A4.4 in the appendix. The results 
of both radial and non-radial measures are quantitively and qualitatively the same.  In 1970, Rwanda, 
South Africa, and Zambia were on the production frontier. By 2014, Rwanda and Zambia had fallen 
behind, with Botswana, Cameroon, Mauritius, and Nigeria joining South Africa as frontier countries. 
In terms of GDP per worker or GDP per capita, it is only Botswana and Mauritius that have converged 









Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Note: As a standard DEA procedure, the technical efficiency is computed for the beginning period and the end period.   
However, in a similar analysis of Kumar & Russell (2002), Sierra Leone, which is one of the most 
technologically backward countries in the world, was on the technology frontier with the US. The 
plausible explanation often stated for these peculiar observations is that the DEA is constructed such 
that it places a lower boundary on the frontier under the assumption of constant returns technology 
and as a result it may fail to identify the true but unknown frontier especially at low capital-labor ratios 
(Kumar & Russell, 2002).  
  
Table 4.3: Radial Measures of Technical Efficiency for African Countries 
              1970                                      2014 
DMU TErdCRS_LK TErdNRS_LK TErdVRS_LK TErdCRS_LK TErdNRS_LK TErdVRS_LK 
Botswana 0.73 0.73 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Burkina Faso 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.88 
Cameroon 0.47 0.49 0.49 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Ethiopia 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.42 0.42 
Ghana 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.43 0.43 0.44 
Kenya 0.44 0.53 0.53 0.70 0.76 0.76 
Lesotho 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.60 0.60 1.00 
Malawi 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.35 0.35 0.39 
Mauritius 0.61 0.61 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Mozambique 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.81 0.81 0.87 
Namibia 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.84 0.84 0.85 
Nigeria 0.76 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Rwanda 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.81 1.00 
Senegal 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.65 0.65 0.70 
South Africa 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Tanzania 0.38 0.45 0.45 0.36 0.37 0.37 
Uganda 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.48 0.51 0.51 
Zambia 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.43 0.43 
* TErdCRS = the radial output-based measures of technical efficiency under the assumption of constant returns to scale 
* TErdNRS = the radial output-based measures of technical efficiency under the assumption of non- increasing returns to scale 
* TErdVRS = the radial output-based measures of technical efficiency under the assumption of variable returns to scale 
Variables  Observation Mean SD Min Max 
Output per worker in 1970 18 3,833 3,978 650.7 15,780 
Output per worker in 2014 18 8,490 9,225 1,101 28,556 
Capital per worker in 1970 18 9,105 9,191 495.8 31,673 
Capital per worker in 2014 18 51,958 61,798 7,725 216,694 
Average efficiency index with only labor in 1970 18 0.292 0.307 0.0400 1 
Average efficiency index with only labor in 2014 18 0.366 0.373 0.0500 1 
Average efficiency index with only capital in 1970 18 0.626 0.264 0.210 1 
Average efficiency index with only capital in 2014 18 0.615 0.242 0.300 1 
Average efficiency index with both inputs in 1970 18 0.709 0.246 0.220 1 






* LK = both labor and capital used as inputs. 
 
In our case, while Botswana and Mauritius have the highest capital-labor ratios in our sample, 
Cameroon and Nigeria have ratios below the average of the sample. In the face of this observation, 
we conclude that Botswana and Mauritius are the two countries that have robustly converged to the 
efficiency level of the frontier. All the other countries are either slowly converging or falling away.   
 
4.5. Dynamic Efficiency in Africa  
The slow rate of technological catch-up is often stated as the main cause of nonconvergence or slow 
convergence of productivity. For example, in the earlier (mainstream) literature on convergence, the 
slow diffusion of technology is often cited as the main cause of the slow convergence of productivity 
(Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Mankiw et al., 1992). In the current context, technology is denoted by 
the state-of-the-art production frontier. A shift in the production frontier denotes technological 
change, and a movement toward the frontier represents technological catch-up. To understand why 
some African countries converged to the productivity level of the frontier while others did not, we 
decompose productivity growth into these two components – technological catch-up and 
technological change – using the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI).86 The DEA (distance 
function)-based MPI decomposes productivity changes attributable to changes in efficiency 
(technological catch-up) and changes in technology (shift of the frontier). In a broader sense, 
technological catch-up captures changes in a country’s productive behavior and performance over 
time due to policy initiatives. That is, the innovative initiatives of the country that lead to a productive 
reward. Conversely, technological change denotes general technical progress and the ability of 
countries to absorb this new knowledge to improve production. The change in efficiency is further 
decomposed into a pure efficiency and a scale efficiency change. Scale efficiency measures how close 
the data points of DMUs are to the potentially most productive or the optimal scale size and whether 
a DMU must reduce or increase its scale while maintaining the best practices it already has. 
All assumptions made in constructing the DEA model above when estimating the Farrell (output-
based) technical efficiency index of DMUs apply here. Suppose there are 𝐽𝐽 DMUs to be evaluated 
given 𝑙𝑙 inputs and 𝐸𝐸 outputs in time periods 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 + 1 respectively, four indicators of technical 
efficiencies are required: (1) technical efficiencies at the base-period, 𝑡𝑡, (2) technical efficiencies at the 
current-period, 𝑡𝑡 + 1,  and two counterfactuals, (3) potential base-period efficiency of DMUs using 
current-period technology, (4)  potential current-period efficiency of DMUs using base-period 
technology. We denote inputs of DMUs by 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 , 𝐾𝐾𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 and 𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 . The solution of the optimistic DEA-
based MPI is given as follows.  
Technical efficiencies of DMUs in the base-period ( 𝑡𝑡 ): 
4.6            𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡|𝐽𝐽𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶) =  Minimise  𝜃𝜃,                                                                          
 
86 The MPI is originally named after Professor Sten Malmquist, whose idea the MPI is based upon. Originally used to 
estimate a consumer-based index by Professor Malmquist, Caves et al. (1982) replaced the indifference curve with a 
technology frontier to define a productivity index.  Färe, Grosskopf, & Lindgren, (1992) made substantial efforts to 
combine the efficiency measurement of Farrell, (1957), Charnes et al (1978) and the productivity measurement of Caves 


















≤ 𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 ,          𝑙𝑙 = 1, … … … ,𝑁𝑁                                                             
                    𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗  ≥ 0, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽                                                                                                         
Technical efficiencies of DMUs in the current period: 
4.7        𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1|𝐽𝐽𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶) =  Minimise  𝜃𝜃,                                                                












≤ 𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡+1,         𝑙𝑙 = 1, … … … ,𝑁𝑁                                                            
                 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗  ≥ 0, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽                                                                                                         
Technical efficiencies of DMUs in the base-period using current-period technology: 
4.8            𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡|𝐽𝐽𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶) =  Minimise  𝜃𝜃,                                                                             

















≤ 𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 ,               𝑙𝑙 = 1, … … … ,𝑁𝑁                                                           
                𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗  ≥ 0, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽                                                                                                         
Technical efficiencies of DMUs in the current-period using base-period technology: 
4.9         𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1|𝐽𝐽𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶) =  Minimise  𝜃𝜃,                                                              












≤ 𝜃𝜃𝐾𝐾𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡+1,            𝑙𝑙 = 1, … … … ,𝑁𝑁                                                            
                 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗  ≥ 0, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽                 
 
As explained above,  𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 ,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡) and 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1) measure efficiencies of DMUs in 
time periods 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 + 1, respectively, 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1) denotes efficiencies of DMUs in time 
𝑡𝑡 + 1 using production technology of time 𝑡𝑡 and 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡) efficiencies of DMUs in time 𝑡𝑡 
using production technology of time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 (Wang & Lan, 2011).  
4.5.1. Malmquist productivity index 
Proposed by Färe, Grosskopf, & Lindgren, (1992), the resultant Malmquist productivity index that 
measures productivity changes of DMUs in time periods 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 + 1 takes the form: 








2                                           
There is an improvement in productivity growth between time periods 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑡𝑡 + 1 if MPI (optimistic) 
is greater than 1. A value of MPI equal to one implies that productivity has stagnated, while a value 
less than one means that there has been a productivity decline.  Färe, Grosskopf, & Lindgren, (1992) 
further decomposed the MPI (optimistic) into two separate components.  
4.11          MPI=�𝐸𝐸
𝑡𝑡 �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1�
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡)
� ×[(  𝐸𝐸
𝑡𝑡 �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡�
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1 (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡)





2       
Where the first and second term on the right-hand side represent productivity changes attributable to 






change (whether or not the frontier is shifting out over time) respectively. Using both CRS and VRS 
DEA frontiers to estimate the distance function in Equation (11), technical efficiency is further 
decomposed into a scale and a pure efficiency change given by: 
4.12 Pure Efficiency Change = 
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠) �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1�
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠) (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡)
   
4.13 Scale-Efficiency-Change=[𝐸𝐸
𝑡𝑡+1(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠) �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1�/𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1(𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠) �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1�
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠) (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡)/𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1(𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠) (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡)
×
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠) �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1�/𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠) �𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡+1,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡+1,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1�
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠) (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡)/𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡(𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑠𝑠) (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 ,𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡,𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡)
]1/2      
A country which has a scale efficiency change equal to one means the country is operating at the 
optimum scale. Based on the statistical test of returns to scale above, we used constant returns to scale 
technology to estimate the MPI. 
 
4.5.2. Technological Catch-up Within Africa 
The result of the output based MPI for each of the 18 countries in our sample is reported in Table 
4.4. As a standard procedure, the MPI is calculated using five-year intervals because technological 
change or efficiency change at the country level normally happens in the medium to long term. In 
confirmation of the existing finding that convergence is primarily driven by technological catch-up, 
the stellar total productivity growth of Botswana and Mauritius is driven more by technological catch-
up and less by technological change. Total productivity growth grew by 7% and 9% every five years 
on average in Botswana and Mauritius, respectively, between 1970 and 2014. Of these, technological 
catch-up accounts for 4% and 6% in Botswana and Mauritius, respectively.  The MPI also shows that 
the total productivity of Cameroon and Ghana improved by 3.0 and 1.0% (quinquennially), 
respectively. In the case of Cameroon and Ghana, however, all productivity gains were due to 
improvements in efficiency levels (catch-up). Productivity in all the other countries, either stagnated 
or declined. Technological catch-up was significant in Cameroon (9%), Ghana (8%), Kenya (5%), and 
Nigeria (3%). However, this, in combination with a negative technical change (i.e. an inability to 
benefit from the shift in the production frontier), penalized overall total productivity growth. This 
indicates that faster productivity convergence is possible through a combination of technical progress 
and technological catch-up. The ability of individual countries to benefit from general technological 
progress often depends on the level of capitalization of the country. Highly capitalized countries have 
the infrastructural architecture necessary to gain from the shift in the production frontier (Kumar & 
Russell, 2002). Botswana and Mauritius are highly capitalized, and as a result, they gained from the 
shift of the African production frontier. 
The results are very interesting in the sense that while technological progress has contributed positively 
to productivity growth of these two relatively rich countries, the same cannot be said for the other 
two relatively poor countries (Cameroon and Ghana) that experienced productivity improvements 
over the same period but with a technological regression. What this means is that technological 






conclusion that wealthy economies have benefitted from technological progress to a greater extent 
than poor economies (cf. Kumar & Russel, 2002: 538). 
In Figure 4.3, we observe that highly capitalized economies tend to be wealthy economies with high 
per capita incomes in the context of Africa. In our sample, Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius, and South 
Africa could be classified as rich African countries given the relatively high per capita incomes of these 
countries within Africa. The rest of the countries could be classified as poor African countries, given 
their low per capita incomes. A substantial outward shift in the frontier (technological progress) in 
Botswana and Mauritius (see figures 4.4 & 4.5) at high capital-labor ratios (see fig 4.3) means that 
technological change tends to take place in highly capitalized economies which happen to be relatively 
wealthy economies. Thus, even in Africa, wealthy economies tend to benefit more from technological 
change if they are highly capitalized. 
 
 
















Botswana 1.07 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.01 
Burkina Faso 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.01 1.00 
Cameroon 1.03 0.95 1.09 1.08 1.00 
Ethiopia 0.88 0.97 0.91 0.91 1.00 
Ghana 1.01 0.94 1.08 1.08 1.00 
Kenya 0.98 0.93 1.05 1.04 1.01 
Lesotho 0.91 0.96 0.95 1.00 0.95 
Malawi 0.94 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.99 
Mauritius 1.09 1.04 1.06 1.00 1.06 
Mozambique 0.90 0.91 0.99 0.99 1.00 
Namibia 0.97 0.96 1.01 0.98 1.03 
Nigeria 0.99 0.96 1.03 1.00 1.03 
Rwanda 0.89 0.91 0.98 1.00 0.98 
Senegal 0.95 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 
South Africa 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Tanzania 0.92 0.92 1.00 0.98 1.02 
Uganda 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 1.00 
Zambia 0.87 0.95 0.91 0.911 1.00 












Figure 4.3: Output Per Worker 2014 Plotted Against Capital Per Worker 2014 
 
 















4.6. Catch-up Within Africa: Is structural change important? 
In the previous section, we established that technological catch-up, on average, has been more 
important than technological change in productivity convergence within Africa. For example, 
technological catch-up is the primary factor behind the successful convergence of Botswana and 
Mauritius. Technological catch-up was also important in countries such as Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, 
and Nigeria, although, however, the positive gains from technological catch-up were outweighed by 
the negative contribution of technological change, slowing down the speed of productivity 
convergence. The convergence of countries to the productivity frontier through efficiency change and 
technological change is strongly underpinned by structural shifts of resources (both labor and capital) 
across sectors. Using a sample of 39 countries between 1973 and 1990, Fagerberg (2000) finds that 
structural change matters for overall growth and convergence and that countries that have managed 
to increase their presence in the technologically most progressive industries have experienced higher 
productivity growth. To understand further the importance of structural change to productivity 
convergence in Africa, we decompose technological catch-up using a structural shift-share model.  
This allows us to reflect on the role of structural change in the catch-up of the region. With this 
approach, we are able to examine if countries in the region are moving resources to sectors where the 
technology gap with the frontier is lower or decreasing over time.  
Since the allocation of resources across sectors involves both labor and capital, the ideal strategy would 






capital, we resort to the second-best solution, where we use only labor as inputs in the structural shift-
share model. To this end and within the context of the structural model, we define technological catch-
up as a process where a country eliminates the labor productivity gap with the frontier by moving 
workers into sectors with a lower technology gap with the frontier (i.e. a static effect) or a decreasing 
technology gap with the frontier (i.e., a dynamic effect). For this exercise, we use South Africa as the 
technological leader for two reasons: South Africa has been on the African technology frontier since 
1970 (see section 4.3 DEA results in Table 4.3). Second, South Africa leads the rest of Africa in terms 
of quality education, innovation, and intellectual property production (see Appendix A for further 
explanation), this is particularly important for maintaining its technological hegemony in the region.   
. 
4.6.1. Decomposition of Technological Catch-up 
The technology gap is measured as the aggregate labor productivity of each country relative to the 
aggregate labor productivity of South Africa (SA). This approach allows us to decompose annual 
catch-up (i.e. the percentage reduction in the technology gap) into an initial specialization effect, a 
reallocation effect and a within effect. This approach bears a resemblance to the shift-and-share 
methodology widely used in the literature to study productivity growth. However, this approach 
focuses on the technology gap instead of productivity growth (Lavopa, 2015).  
The approach adopted was developed by Lavopa (2015) to study catch up by decomposing technology 
gaps in modern market activities within the context of high income and emerging countries.  We adopt 
this approach but focus on aggregate technology gaps within Africa. The aggregate technology gap is 
postulated as:  
 4.14                                   𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 =
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓                              
Where 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  is the technology gap of country 𝑖𝑖 in time 𝑡𝑡, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is the aggregate labor productivity of 
(laggard) country 𝑖𝑖 in time 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓  is aggregate labor productivity of the frontier country 𝑓𝑓 in time 
𝑡𝑡, with SA being the frontier in this case. The aggregate productivity of country 𝑖𝑖 is the sum of the 
sectoral productivities weighted by their employment shares (𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  ). This is given as: 








𝑗𝑗 = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗        
Where 𝑌𝑌 is value added and 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  is the employment share of sector 𝑘𝑘 at time 𝑡𝑡.  Substituting (4.15) 
into (4.14) gives:                                           












𝑓𝑓  𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓
𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖                     
The technology gap of an African country can be measured as the multiplication of the sectoral 
productivity relative to the frontier (𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ), the sectoral employment share in the laggard economy (𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ), 
and the sectoral productivity of the frontier country relative to the aggregate frontier productivity (𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓 ) 
and, as discussed, 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡






economy productivity in the frontier. It is a proxy for the technological sophistication of the sector in 
question. Productivity improves if laggard countries reduce the technology gap with sectors of the 
frontier with higher 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓 .  Taking the time difference of (4.16) with 0 and 𝑇𝑇 as initial and final time 
gives: 
 4.17      ∆𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖 − 𝜃𝜃0
𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇
𝑓𝑓
𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘0𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘0
𝑓𝑓
𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘0𝑖𝑖                           
Applying the idea of the shift-and-share method and manipulating equation (4.17), we decompose the 
technology gap into four components that explain the underlying drivers of technological catch-up 
within Africa as:  
 4.18       ∆𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘0𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇
𝑓𝑓
𝑘𝑘 ∆𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘0𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇
𝑓𝑓
𝑘𝑘 ∆𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇
𝑓𝑓 ∆𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ∆𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘0𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘0𝑖𝑖 ∆𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘
𝑓𝑓       
The first component of the right-hand side is the sum of each sector’s within-sector catch-up term. It 
is that part of the overall catch-up caused by the reduction of technology gaps at the sectoral level. 
The reduction of sectoral productivity gaps could be due to the introduction of new technology (e.g., 
resulting from the adoption of a mix of innovations), changes in organizational structure, downsizing 
(e.g., shedding surplus labor) or increased competition within a sector. The next two components 
measure catch-up due to labor reallocation. The first term is the between static reallocation catch-up 
term. It captures whether workers move to sectors with a smaller or larger technological gap relative 
to the frontier economy. The reallocation of workers to sectors with a smaller (larger) gap will tend to 
reduce (increase) the aggregate gap (Lavopa, 2015). The second term is the dynamic reallocation catch-
up term. It measures the joint effect of changes in both employment shares as well as changes in 
sectoral technology gaps during the period. It captures whether catch-up is higher or lower in sectors 
that expand in employment shares. The final term measures the effect of initial specialization. That is 
the effect of the structure of the economy at the initial period and the changes in the relative sectoral 
productivity of the frontier. If a country within Africa manages to maintain the initial technology 
distance with the leading economy and specializes in sectors that are dynamic in the leading economy, 
the initial specialization term will contribute positively to aggregate catch-up. However, if the 
technology gap widens, specializing in sectors that are dynamic in the leading economy may not 
contribute positively to catch up because the positive effect of specialization could be offset by the 
negative effect of increasing technology distance. 
 
4.6.2. Long-run Relative Productivity Patterns and Technological Catch-up 
in Africa 
The long run trend of relative labor productivity to SA across the 17 African countries studied is 
depicted in Figure 4.6. The clear pattern shown is that three African countries have separated 
themselves from the rest of Africa with the productivity of Botswana (blue round dot line) and 
Mauritius (square dot line) converging to and leapfrogging the productivity level of the technology 
leader. Namibia shows signs of convergence but never really touching the productivity level of the 
technology leader.  The rate of labor productivity growth differs among the three countries mentioned 
above in relation to South Africa. The annual average productivity growth of South Africa, Botswana, 






Since Botswana’s annual rate of increase has been the fastest in Africa, by 1995, its productivity level 
had converged with the frontier (i.e., South Africa). This was followed by Mauritius, the second-fastest 
growing country, whose productivity converged to the productivity level of the frontier in 2000.  
Namibia (dashed line) has not been able to catch-up with South Africa, although the technology gap 
was small in the late 1990s and again by 2014. Another striking observation is that Zambia (green 
dash-dot line) had very good initial conditions, as measured by the initial technology gap, compared 
to Botswana and Mauritius. Despite this, Zambia has fallen behind the frontier, with its relative 
productivity decreasing from 0.66 in 1965 to 0.28 in 2015.  
What underlies the successful catch up of Botswana and Mauritius and the relative failure of other 
countries such as Zambia in Africa? To understand the successful catch-up of Botswana and Mauritius 
and the falling behind of other African countries from a structural change perspective, we applied the 
methodology outlined above to the EASD data. We split the entire period into four distinct periods 
as in Chapter 3.   We assess the degree of technological catch-up of the RoA with respect to SA for the 
entire period (1960s-2015) as well as catch up during each of the sub-periods outlined above. The 
results are reported in Table 4.5. 







































































































Table 4.5: Decomposition of Technological Catch-up to SA  








Rest of Africa (ROA) 1960-2015 1.0% 0.4% 1.2% -0.3% -0.4%  
1960-1975 -0.2% -1.6% 1.8% -0.2% -0.2% 
 
1975-1990 0.3% 0.3% 0.6% -0.2% -0.4%  
1990-2000 2.4% 1.9% 1.1% -0.1% -0.5% 
 
2000-2015 1.1% 0.3% 1.7% -0.5% -0.3% 
Notes: The table reports the decomposition of catch-up (relative labor productivity to SA) into within-sector catch-up, 
static between-sector catch-up, dynamic between-sector catch-up and initial specialization by period based on the EASD.  
 
The analysis shows that, on average, structural change contributes more to catch up than the within 
effect for the entire period. The African experience contradicts the observation for high-income 
countries where the within effect dominates the between effect (see Lavopa, 2015). This implies that 
most African countries are moving workers to sectors where the technology gap with SA is decreasing 
over time. We have seen the movement of workers mostly from agriculture to services across Africa, 
and over time, the productivity of labor in services in the RoA is converging towards that of SA, 
translating into the dominant reallocation effect. Though, on average, the within effect is not as strong 
as the between effect, the within effect was stronger than the between effect in the 1990s. The within 
effect has contributed positively to relative productivity growth in each sub-period except for the 
import substitution era. The protective policies implemented by most African countries led to 
inappropriate technology adoption (particularly in State-Owned Enterprises) that stifled innovation 
and hence technology growth within that period. The initial specialization effect has contributed 
negatively to technological growth in all periods. This means that most African countries are 
specializing in sectors where South Africa has not been very dynamic. Since Africa is highly specialized 
in agriculture, but South Africa is dynamic is mining activities, the initial specialization components 
tend to contribute negatively to technological catch-up.  To summarize, while the within effect and 
the between effect help the RoA to catch up with SA, the initial specialization effect tends to be a drag 
on technological catch-up. 
4.6.3.  Catch-up by Country 
Of the 17 countries studied in relation to SA, two countries (Botswana and Mauritius) converged to 
the productivity level of SA, four countries (Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, and Zambia) were found to fall 
further behind, and the other eleven countries were found to catch up with SA, but at a relatively slow 
pace (Table 4.6). Why have Botswana and Mauritius been successful while others been unsuccessful 
in catching-up? We speculate that Botswana's proximity to SA in combination with the discovery of 
diamonds in the late 1960s and Mauritius’s industry-friendly policies adopted in the early 1970s played 
a significant role in the successful take-off and subsequent catch-up of these two countries. 
Immediately after independence in 1966, Botswana discovered a huge diamond reserve. By that time, 
SA had established itself as a leader in mining-related technology in the sub-region. By interacting with 
SA, Botswana adopted the appropriate technology and best management practices to exploit its 






learning process has been strongly attributed to the “intensity of interactions” with SA as well as 
“investment and trade linkages to the SA economy” (Yaremye, 2008). Botswana’s interactions with 
SA accounts for more than 70 percent of its capital imports, a major source of technology inflow 
(Yaremye, 2008).   
After establishing a very productive mining sector through its technological interactions with SA, 
mining sector employment in Botswana increased from about 1000 in 1968 to about 10000 by 1976, 
or from 1.1% to 9.6% of total employment. The reallocation of workers to mining and auxiliary sectors 
in Botswana led to a rapid catch-up rate of 10.3% between 1968 and 1975.  The between effect was 
so strong that the countervailing forces of the within and specialization effects did not matter (See 
Table A4.6 in the Appendix). The strength of the between effect decreased over time, such that by 
1990 it had become a drag on productivity growth (see also McCaig, McMillan, & Jefferis, 2015:6), 
partly due to the decline of the productive mining sector over time and the lack of diversification into 
other high productivity sectors.                                                                                                      
Hillborn (2008) attempts to explain this more clearly. In 1968, agriculture dominated Botswana’s 
economy, contributing more than 40% to the country’s GDP only to decline to less than 3% in 2004. 
The agriculture sector continues to hold a very modest position in the country in terms of GDP 
contribution. The mining sector instead expanded, contributing about 8% of GDP in 1974/75 before 
expanding to 53% in 1988/89 only to shrink back again to roughly 35% in 2002. Although the 
industrial sector has grown significantly in relative terms, it is mainly due to the expansion of the 
mining sector. At the same time, manufacturing maintains a share of around 4% of GDP, with figures 
falling in recent years. Some have argued that governments’ effort to diversify the economy has failed 
and has left the economy of Botswana vulnerable in the long run. (Leith 2005:100; Siwawa-Ndai, 1997). 
Table 4.6: Catch-up by Country (average annual percentage change) 




Between Dynamic Initial 
Specialization 
Botswana 1968-2015 4.5% 3.3% 3.7% -1.9% -0.5% 
Burkina Faso 1970-2015 2.0% 1.0% 1.4% -0.2% -0.3% 
Cameroun 1965-2015 1.4% 0.3% 1.3% -0.1% -0.1% 
Ethiopia 1961-2015 0.3% -0.6% 1.2% -0.2% 0.0% 
Ghana 1960-2015 0.8% 0.8% 0.3% -0.2% -0.1% 
Kenya 1969-2015 -0.8% -1.0% 0.9% -0.2% -0.5% 
Lesotho 1970-2015 1.1% 0.9% 1.3% -0.2% -0.9% 
Malawi 1966-2015 -1.7% -2.6% 1.6% -0.4% -0.3% 
Mauritius 1970-2015 2.6% 2.4% 1.2% -0.4% -0.6% 
Mozambique 1970-2015 1.8% 1.8% 0.3% -0.1% -0.1% 
Namibia 1965-2015 0.7% 1.4% 0.5% -0.4% -0.8% 
Nigeria 1960-2015 2.8% 2.1% 1.2% -0.1% -0.4% 
Rwanda 1970-2015 2.6% 0.9% 1.9% -0.1% -0.1% 
Senegal 1970-2015 -1.6% -2.1% 1.0% -0.1% -0.3% 
Tanzania 1960-2015 0.5% -0.9% 2.1% -0.3% -0.3% 
Uganda 1960-2015 0.7% -0.2% 1.3% -0.2% -0.2% 







The experience of Mauritius is, however, quite different. After independence in 1968, Mauritius was a 
monocrop (i.e., sugar) economy, highly vulnerable to terms of trade shocks, and susceptible to 
potential conflict due to ethnic diversity. These unfavorable conditions led two Nobel laureates87 to 
conclude that the economic future of Mauritius is a predictable dud (Subramanian, 2009). Contrary to 
this prediction, Mauritius has managed to sustain a high growth rate for over four decades leading to 
catch-up with the African frontier. The catch-up process in Mauritius was facilitated by reinforcement 
of both the within and the between effects. Between 1970 and 1975, the catch-up rate was 9.9%, with 
8.4% of this percentage change being due to technological progress within sectors (Table A4.5). The 
years 1975-1990 saw the implementation of industrial policies and structural reallocation of resources 
across sectors in the country. 
For this reason, out of the 1 percent productivity growth recorded in the country during this period, 
structural change contributed 70 percent, whereas the within effect contributed 30 percent (see 
Mensah et al. 2018). While reallocating resources across sectors, the effective industrial policies that 
were put in place made sure that over time the efficiency of firms improved, leading to a strong 
contribution of the within effect and a moderate contribution of the between effect to the country’s 
productivity growth in the periods after 1990. For instance, between 1990 and 2000, productivity 
growth of the country was 4.3 percent. Out of this, the within effect contributed 3.1% while the 
between effect contributed 1.2%. Between 2000 and 2015, the within effect accounted for nearly all 
(1.8%) of the country’s productivity growth of 1.9 percent (Mensah et al. 2018). Overall structural 
change was important in Mauritius’s productivity growth (e.g., moving from sugar to textiles, tourism, 
finance, etc.) from the late 1970s to 1990, but later on, within effects started to dominate. 
The strong within and moderate between effect is explained by the policies deployed after the creation 
of the export processing zones (EPZ) in the early 1970s. First, duty-free access was granted on all 
imported inputs. The free import of capital goods that embodied technological knowledge contributed 
positively to productivity growth and technological spillovers within sectors. Second, a raft of tax 
incentives was granted to firms operating in the EPZ. This had the same effect as export subsidies in 
encouraging exports. The effect of tax incentives on the growth of the export sector was 
complemented by the preferential market access granted by Mauritius’ major trading partners, such as 
the European Economic Area and the USA (Subramanian, 2009). Exporting to the EU and the USA 
requires product certification that meets the market standards of these countries. To meet these 
standards, firms operating in an EPZ often adopt technological knowledge and management practices 
to improve existing production and delivery processes. This resulted in enhanced firm efficiency, and 
hence a strong within sector technological growth and moderate between effect. In summary, while 
the between effect created the technological momentum for catch up in Botswana, the within effect 
was the main driving force behind Mauritius’ catch-up.  
In contrast to the success of Botswana and Mauritius, the technology gap between Kenya, Malawi, 
Senegal, Zambia, and the technology leader is widening over time. They are falling behind at an average 
annual rate of 0.8%, 1.7%, 1.6% and 1.3% respectively (Table 4.6). The technology gap between Kenya 
and SA has increased from 0.79 in 1969 to 0.86 in 2015. That of Malawi has increased marginally from 
 






0.94 in 1966 to 0.95 in 2015, while Senegal’s productivity gap had widened by a third from 0.58 in 
1970 to 0.80 in 2014. Finally, the most dramatic free fall of relative productivity is seen in the case of 
Zambia. Zambia’s technology gap has increased from 0.26 in 1965 to 0.72 in 2015 (Figure 4.7).  
Although there are country-specific idiosyncratic factors that may explain each country’s technological 
decline, inappropriate technology policies adopted during the import substitution era and the structural 
adjustment era created an inertia that hampered technology growth. For example, during the import-
substitution period, most governments imposed strict price controls and forced producers to purchase 
local intermediates input whenever available. This made domestic intermediates more expensive than 
what is available on the international market. This was exacerbated by foreign exchange controls where 
approval is required by government agencies before the allocation of foreign exchange needed for the 
purchase of essential intermediates input. Furthermore, infant industries were protected from 
competition, and as a result there was no urge to create a market niche through the adoption of 
efficient production techniques and processes. This set of policies implemented during the IS strategy 
hampered productivity growth during the era. For example, the relative productivity growth of Kenya, 
Senegal, and Malawi – three out of the four countries falling behind – decreased by 1.6%, 4.9%, and 
4.2% respectively during the import-substitution era.   
Most infant industries hardly broke even and consistently survived on the books of central 
governments. During the period of structural adjustment programs, almost all state-owned enterprises 
became targets for public sector rationalization. They were cleared off the book of central 
governments and subsequently collapsed. This caused a massive movement of workers from import 
substitution industries to the non-wage agricultural sector, the distributive trading sector, and other 
informal ventures. These sectors offer very little opportunity for technological learning. Finally, except 
for Botswana and Mauritius, all African countries witnessed political upheavals either during the 1970s, 
1980s, or 1990s, which adversely affected the inflow of technologically embedded FDI into the region.  
Figure 4.7: Countries Falling Behind 
 












































































Economic systems of Africa present unique technological challenges. This often requires a unique 
combination of technical knowledge developed in advanced countries or African-induced innovation 
to surmount the technological challenges. In this chapter, we have examined how African countries 
are catching-up with the best practice within Africa from a nonparametric perspective. The analysis 
shows that technological catch-up is an important driver of efficiency convergence within Africa. We 
further decomposed technological catch-up using a structural model. The results confirmed our 
conjecture that structural change is an important driver of technological catch-up within Africa. On 
average, structural change contributed more than half of the annual catch-up rate to the technology 
leader. However, the average productivity of the Rest of Africa (RoA) has not converged to the 
productivity level of the technology leader. Botswana and Mauritius are notable exceptions to this 
general trend. Botswana and Mauritius are the only two countries in Africa that have converged to the 
productivity level of the frontier. All the other countries have neither converged to the productivity 
level nor the efficiency level of the technology leader. In the case of Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, and 
Zambia productivity levels have fallen behind the productivity level of the leading economy. 
Protectionist policies implemented during the IS era led to the concentration of knowledge production 
and diffusion and slowed-down the catch-up rate. In this regard, the introduction and implementation 
of intraregional free trade agreement (AfCFTA) seems to be timely to boost catch-up efforts in the 
region.  
In addition, the average result of the Malmquist productivity decomposition (average of five-year 
interval period) shows that Africa achieved a productivity decline of –4.0 percent between 1970 and 
2014. The decline in productivity growth is almost entirely attributable to lack of technological 
progress and less to technological catch-up. This contribution of technological regress to the region’s 
productivity decline is primarily driven by the experience of relatively poor countries in the region 
rather than relatively wealthy and highly capitalized economies in the region. Two important lessons 
emerged from this exercise. First, successful productivity convergence requires the combination 
technical progress and technological catch-up. Second, structural change exerts significant influence 















4.8. Appendix to Chapter 4 
4.8.1. South Africa: A Leader in Education and Innovation  
South Africa is the technological hub of Africa. It is home to world-class academic and research 
institutions that attract young talent from across Africa. The Times Higher Education (THE) and QS 
ranking consistently place seven of the top ten African universities in South Africa. The country has 
consistently been ranked among the most innovative countries in Africa by the Global Innovation 
Index, and in 2017 was ranked as the most innovative African country. While other highly innovative 
countries such as Mauritius, Botswana and Nigeria are performing below their level of development, 
South Africa is performing at a level consistent with its development (Global Innovation Index 
Report, 2017). Patent data at the US Patent and Trademark Office also shows that South Africa 
recorded the highest number of (residential) patents applications between 2001 and 2014 in Sub-
Sahara Africa (see Table A2 in Appendix).  
In addition to its leadership in education and innovation, South Africa has established itself globally 
in some technological domains – mining-related technology – that are particularly important for 
Africa. This is important because most of the economies of the other 17 countries in our sample 
depend heavily on mineral exports. South Africa has developed a globally competitive and advanced 
technological capacity in “mining equipment and specialist services sector”. The share of mining-
related technology patents is higher than other comparator countries which are considered to have 
technological leadership in mining (Table A1). The share of mining-related technology patents for SA 
is 4.5% compared with a global average of 0.54%. The revealed comparative advantage in mining-
related innovations (RCAI) is therefore 8.4, which is higher than that of comparator countries which 
are considered to be global leaders in mining related technology. “This indicates that South Africa has 
a very significant global comparative advantage in mining related technology innovation” (Kaplan, 
2012: 426). 
 
Table A4.1: SA’s Leadership in Mining and Related Services 
Panel A: Patent Quantity 
Country All Patents Mining Technology 
Patents 
Share (%) RCAI 
South Africa 3151  142  4.51 8.35 
United States 1,587,915   7882 0.5 0.93 
Australia 16,283   311 1.9 3.52 
Canada 65,580   853 1.3 2.41 
Global total/average 3,189,941  17,098 0.54 ----- 
Panel B: Patent Quality 
All countries All Patents Mining-related 
tech. patents 
Other patents  
Citations received (not truncation corrected) 
South Africa 5.52  7.05  5.44  
United States 8.52  6.99  8.53  
Australia 5.39  4.15  5.41  
Canada 6.60  4.70  6.72  
Average 6.53  5.73  6.53  
Citations received (truncation corrected) 






United States 14.13  9.97  14.16  
Australia 9.41  6.16  9.47  
Canada 11.43  6.91  11.49  
Average 10.73  8.01  10.76  
Source: Kaplan (2012) 
Note: The table show the number of patents and mining related patents granted at the USPTO 1976–2006; South Africa 
and Comparator Countries. RCAI is ratio of the share of mining related patent granted to the average global share of 
mining related patents granted. “The truncation–correction refers to the fact that it takes time for citations to arrive. Older 
patents will naturally have more citations than younger ones. A truncation correction allows for a ‘fairer’ comparison 
between samples of patents with different age distributions” 
 Table A4.2: Ranking of Universities, Innovation, and Intellectual Properties in Africa 
 
Source: The Times Higher Education and QS Ranking; Global Innovation Index Report (2017); and USPTO.  Note: The 













Figure A4.1: Decomposition of Productivity Growth, Technology and Efficiency Indexes: Africa Period Averages: 
1970-2014 
 
4.8.2. Robustness Checks of Efficiency Measures 



















BWA 0.73 0.73 0.81 0.20 0.20 0.49 0.41 0.42 0.42 
BFA 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.61 0.75 0.75 
CMR 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.27 0.44 0.44 
ETH 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.74 1.00 1.00 
GHA 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.09 0.21 0.21 
KEN 0.44 0.53 0.53 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.49 0.49 
LSO 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.20 0.20 1.00 0.56 0.56 1.00 
MWI 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.35 0.43 0.43 
MUS 0.61 0.61 1.00 0.41 0.41 1.00 0.27 0.34 0.34 
MOZ 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.67 0.84 0.84 
NAM 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.61 0.61 1.00 0.30 0.40 0.40 
NGA 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.19 0.57 0.57 0.43 1.00 1.00 
RWA 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 1.00 1.00 1.00 
SEN 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.33 0.56 0.56 
ZAF 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.38 1.00 1.00 






UGA 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.38 0.52 0.52 
ZMB 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.54 0.88 0.88 
* TEnrdCRS = tenonradial output-based measures of technical efficiency under assumption of constant returns to scale 
* TEnrdNRS = tenonradial output-based measures of technical efficiency under assumption of non- increasing returns to scale 
* TEnrdVRS = tenonradial output-based measures of technical efficiency under assumption of variable returns to scale 
* LK = both labor and capital used; L= only labor used; K = only capital used 
 
 



















BWA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.38 0.38 0.38 
BFA 0.82 0.82 0.88 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.82 0.82 0.88 
CMR 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.16 0.20 0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ETH 0.37 0.42 0.42 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.37 0.42 0.42 
GHA 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.37 0.41 0.41 
KEN 0.70 0.76 0.76 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.70 0.76 0.76 
LSO 0.60 0.60 1.00 0.27 0.27 1.00 0.42 0.42 1.00 
MWI 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.35 0.35 0.39 
MUS 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.93 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.52 
MOZ 0.81 0.81 0.87 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.81 0.81 0.87 
NAM 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.45 0.45 0.47 
NGA 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.37 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.00 1.00 
RWA 0.81 0.81 1.00 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.81 0.81 1.00 
SEN 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.59 0.59 0.60 
ZAF 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.67 
TZA 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.32 0.37 0.37 
UGA 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.48 0.51 0.51 
ZMB 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.22 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.30 
* TEnrdCRS = tenonradial output-based measures of technical efficiency under assumption of constant returns to scale 
* TEnrdNRS = tenonradial output-based measures of technical efficiency under assumption of non- increasing returns to scale 
* TEnrdVRS = tenonradial output-based measures of technical efficiency under assumption of variable returns to scale 




















Figure A4. 2: Relative Labor Productivity as a measure of Technology gap: USA==1 
 
4.8.3. Decomposition of catch-up by country and period 
Table A4.5: Decomposition of Catch Up to SA for Whole Period and Sub-Periods 








Rest of Africa (ROA) 1960-2015 1.0% 0.4% 1.2% -0.3% -0.4%  
1960-1975 -0.2% -1.6% 1.8% -0.2% -0.2% 
 
1975-1990 0.3% 0.3% 0.6% -0.2% -0.4%  
1990-2000 2.4% 1.9% 1.1% -0.1% -0.5% 
 
2000-2015 1.1% 0.3% 1.7% -0.5% -0.3%        
Botswana 1960-2015 4.5% 3.3% 3.7% -1.9% -0.5%  
1968-1975 10.3% -0.1% 12.7% -1.4% -0.8% 
 
1975-1990 7.7% 8.3% 2.9% -1.6% -1.9%  
1990-2000 1.4% 0.7% -0.2% -0.4% 1.3% 
 
2000-2015 0.8% 1.6% 2.9% -3.5% -0.2%        








































































































1970-1975 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
 
1975-1990 4.1% 4.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 
 
1990-2000 2.9% 2.2% 1.8% -0.1% -1.0% 
 
2000-2015 -0.4% -2.9% 3.2% -0.5% -0.2% 
       
Cameroun 1965-2015 1.4% 0.3% 1.3% -0.1% -0.1% 
 
1965-1975 3.2% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 
 
1975-1990 4.8% 4.3% 1.1% 0.0% -0.7% 
 
1990-2000 1.9% -2.1% 4.0% -0.4% 0.5% 
 
2000-2015 -3.2% -3.2% 0.2% 0.0% -0.2% 
       
Ethiopia 1961-2015 0.3% -0.6% 1.2% -0.2% 0.0% 
 
1961-1975 -3.8% -4.6% 0.6% -0.1% 0.2% 
 
1975-1990 -1.5% -2.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.8% 
 
1990-2000 0.7% 0.3% 1.2% 0.0% -0.8% 
 
2000-2015 3.9% 2.4% 2.5% -0.6% -0.5% 
       
Ghana 1960-2015 0.8% 0.8% 0.3% -0.2% -0.1% 
 
1960-1975 -4.9% -5.2% 0.3% -0.1% 0.1% 
 
1975-1990 -1.0% -1.1% -0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
 
1990-2000 3.3% 3.1% 0.6% 0.0% -0.3% 
 
2000-2015 3.6% 4.1% 0.4% -0.6% -0.3% 
       
Kenya 1969-2015 -0.8% -1.0% 0.9% -0.2% -0.5% 
 
1969-1975 -1.6% -1.6% 0.7% -0.2% -0.5% 
 
1975-1990 0.6% -0.1% 1.1% -0.2% -0.2% 
 
1990-2000 -2.6% -3.7% 2.6% -0.3% -1.1% 
 
2000-2015 -0.7% 0.0% -0.3% -0.1% -0.4% 
       
Lesotho 1970-2015 1.1% 0.9% 1.3% -0.2% -0.9% 
 
1970-1975 -5.2% -4.5% 0.4% -0.1% -0.9% 
 
1975-1990 1.9% 1.8% 1.0% 0.0% -0.8% 
 
1990-2000 4.7% 5.0% 1.2% -0.1% -1.5% 
 
2000-2015 0.1% -1.0% 1.9% -0.3% -0.5% 
       
Malawi 1966-2015 -1.7% -2.6% 1.6% -0.4% -0.3% 
 
1966-1975 1.0% -0.5% 1.6% -0.1% 0.0% 
 
1975-1990 -7.7% -6.9% 0.4% -0.8% -0.3% 
 
1990-2000 1.4% 0.5% 1.6% -0.1% -0.5% 
 
2000-2015 1.0% -1.3% 2.9% -0.4% -0.3% 
       
Mauritius 1970-2015 2.6% 2.4% 1.2% -0.4% -0.6% 
 







1975-1990 1.2% 1.1% 1.3% -0.6% -0.6% 
 
1990-2000 4.3% 4.2% 1.3% 0.0% -1.1% 
 
2000-2015 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% -0.3% -0.2% 
       
Mozambique 1970-2015 1.8% 1.8% 0.3% -0.1% -0.1% 
 
1970-1975 -9.2% -10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 
 
1975-1990 -1.9% -1.7% 0.0% -0.2% 0.0% 
 
1990-2000 9.2% 9.8% 0.0% -0.1% -0.5% 
 
2000-2015 4.3% 3.8% 0.8% 0.0% -0.3% 
       
Namibia 1965-2015 0.7% 1.4% 0.5% -0.4% -0.8% 
 
1960-1975 -0.9% 0.2% 0.4% -0.2% -1.3% 
 
1975-1990 0.6% 1.7% 0.0% -0.1% -1.0% 
 
1990-2000 3.0% 3.4% 0.5% -0.3% -0.7% 
 
2000-2015 0.1% 0.4% 1.1% -1.0% -0.4% 
       
Nigeria 1960-2015 2.8% 2.1% 1.2% -0.1% -0.4% 
 
1960-1975 8.1% 3.7% 5.5% 0.1% -1.2% 
 
1975-1990 0.7% 2.0% -0.1% -0.1% -1.1% 
 
1990-2000 0.8% 0.6% -0.3% -0.1% 0.6% 
 
2000-2015 3.8% 2.4% 1.6% -0.1% -0.1% 
       
Rwanda 1970-2015 2.6% 0.9% 1.9% -0.1% -0.1% 
 
1970-1975 3.3% 1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 
 
1975-1990 -1.0% -3.4% 1.7% -0.2% 0.8% 
 
1990-2000 4.9% 6.8% 0.3% 0.0% -2.2% 
 
2000-2015 4.4% 1.0% 3.9% -0.3% -0.3% 
       
Senegal 1970-2015 -1.6% -2.1% 1.0% -0.1% -0.3% 
 
1970-1975 -4.9% -6.1% 0.8% -0.1% 0.4% 
 
1975-1990 -2.6% -2.9% 0.7% 0.0% -0.4% 
 
1990-2000 0.9% 0.6% 1.2% -0.1% -0.8% 
 
2000-2015 -1.1% -1.9% 1.3% -0.3% -0.1% 
       
Tanzania 1960-2015 0.5% -0.9% 2.1% -0.3% -0.3% 
 
1960-1975 -2.4% -5.1% 3.3% -0.5% -0.1% 
 
1975-1990 -0.3% -1.0% 0.8% -0.1% -0.1% 
 
1990-2000 0.7% 1.1% 0.6% -0.1% -0.9% 
 
2000-2015 2.7% -0.1% 3.7% -0.6% -0.3% 
       
Uganda 1960-2015 0.7% -0.2% 1.3% -0.2% -0.2% 
 
1960-1975 -1.8% -3.4% 1.6% -0.3% 0.2% 
 







1990-2000 4.0% 1.9% 3.0% -0.2% -0.6% 
 
2000-2015 -1.4% 0.0% -0.4% -0.2% -0.7% 
       
Zambia 1965-2015 -1.3% -0.6% 0.0% -0.2% -0.5% 
 
1965-1975 -4.2% -2.2% -0.1% 0.0% -1.9% 
 
1975-1990 -2.1% 1.5% -2.0% -0.1% -1.5% 
 
1990-2000 -1.2% -2.7% 0.2% 0.0% 1.3% 
 
2000-2015 0.8% -0.6% 1.9% -0.4% -0.1% 
 
 
Table A4.6: Decomposition of Catch Up to USA for Whole Period and Sub-Periods 








Africa 1960-2015 0.9% -0.5% 1.2% -0.3% 0.5% 
 
1960-1975 2.6% 1.0% 1.7% -0.2% -0.1%  
1975-1990 -0.3% -1.3% 0.7% -0.2% 0.6% 
 
1990-2000 0.9% -0.9% 1.1% -0.2% 0.9%  
2000-2015 1.3% -0.1% 1.6% -0.5% 0.3% 
       
Botswana 1960-2015 4.5% 2.7% 3.7% -1.9% -0.1% 
 
1968-1975 13.5% 3.2% 12.7% -1.0% -1.4%  
1975-1990 6.7% 4.4% 2.9% -1.4% 0.7% 
 
1990-2000 0.1% 0.4% -0.2% -0.5% 0.3%  
2000-2015 1.0% 2.3% 2.9% -3.7% -0.5% 
       
Burkina Faso 1970-2015 1.9% 0.1% 1.4% -0.2% 0.6% 
 
1970-1975 2.7% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% -0.6%  
1975-1990 3.2% 2.6% -0.1% 0.0% 0.7% 
 
1990-2000 1.5% -1.1% 1.8% -0.1% 1.0%  
2000-2015 0.4% -2.9% 3.2% -0.5% 0.6% 
       
Cameroun 1965-2015 1.3% -0.7% 1.3% -0.1% 0.8% 
 
1965-1975 6.2% 5.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7%  
1975-1990 3.9% 2.0% 1.1% -0.1% 0.9% 
 
1990-2000 0.6% -4.2% 4.0% -0.4% 1.3%  
2000-2015 -3.1% -3.8% 0.2% 0.0% 0.5% 
       
Ethiopia 1961-2015 0.2% -1.7% 1.2% -0.2% 0.9% 
 
1961-1975 -1.0% -2.8% 0.6% 0.0% 1.2%  
1975-1990 -2.4% -3.6% 0.1% 0.0% 1.0% 
 
1990-2000 -0.6% -3.0% 1.2% 0.0% 1.3%  
2000-2015 4.0% 1.5% 2.5% -0.6% 0.5% 






Ghana 1960-2015 0.6% -0.3% 0.3% -0.2% 0.9% 
 
1960-1975 -2.0% -2.7% 0.3% 0.0% 0.4% 
 
1975-1990 -2.0% -2.9% -0.1% 0.0% 1.0% 
 
1990-2000 1.9% 0.2% 0.6% 0.0% 1.1% 
 
2000-2015 3.7% 3.0% 0.4% -0.5% 0.8% 
       
Kenya 1969-2015 -1.0% -2.1% 0.9% -0.2% 0.5% 
 
1969-1975 1.0% 0.4% 0.7% -0.3% 0.2% 
 
1975-1990 -0.3% -1.7% 1.1% -0.2% 0.5% 
 
1990-2000 -3.9% -6.8% 2.6% -0.4% 0.7% 
 
2000-2015 -0.5% -0.5% -0.3% -0.1% 0.4% 
       
Lesotho 1970-2015 0.8% -0.4% 1.3% -0.2% 0.1% 
 
1970-1975 -2.9% -2.9% 0.4% -0.1% -0.2% 
 
1975-1990 0.9% 0.0% 1.0% -0.1% 0.0% 
 
1990-2000 3.2% 2.0% 1.2% -0.2% 0.1% 
 
2000-2015 0.3% -1.5% 1.9% -0.3% 0.2% 
       
Malawi 1966-2015 0.4% -1.5% 1.6% -0.4% 0.6% 
 
1966-1975 3.9% 1.9% 1.6% 0.0% 0.4% 
 
1975-1990 -1.9% -2.0% 0.4% -0.8% 0.5% 
 
1990-2000 0.1% -2.3% 1.6% -0.2% 1.0% 
 
2000-2015 1.1% -2.0% 2.9% -0.3% 0.5% 
       
Mauritius 1970-2015 2.3% 1.2% 1.2% -0.4% 0.4% 
 
1970-1975 12.5% 10.9% 2.6% -0.9% -0.1% 
 
1975-1990 0.2% -1.1% 1.3% -0.6% 0.5% 
 
1990-2000 2.9% 0.9% 1.3% -0.1% 0.8% 
 
2000-2015 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% -0.3% 0.0% 
       
Mozambique 1970-2015 1.4% 0.5% 0.3% -0.1% 0.7% 
 
1970-1975 -7.0% -6.9% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 
 
1975-1990 -3.0% -3.7% 0.0% -0.2% 0.8% 
 
1990-2000 7.5% 6.6% 0.0% -0.2% 1.1% 
 
2000-2015 4.6% 3.1% 0.8% 0.0% 0.7% 
       
Namibia 1965-2015 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% -0.4% -0.1% 
 
1960-1975 1.9% 2.1% 0.4% -0.2% -0.3% 
 
1975-1990 -0.2% 0.2% 0.0% -0.1% -0.3% 
 
1990-2000 1.6% 1.3% 0.5% -0.4% 0.2% 
 
2000-2015 0.2% -0.1% 1.1% -0.9% 0.1% 
       







1960-1975 11.4% 6.3% 5.5% 0.1% -0.4% 
 
1975-1990 -0.3% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 
 
1990-2000 -0.5% -1.2% -0.3% 0.0% 1.1% 
 
2000-2015 4.0% 1.9% 1.6% 0.0% 0.5% 
       
Rwanda 1970-2015 2.4% -0.3% 1.9% -0.2% 0.9% 
 
1970-1975 5.9% 6.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 
 
1975-1990 -1.9% -4.9% 1.7% -0.2% 1.5% 
 
1990-2000 3.7% 2.5% 0.3% 0.0% 0.9% 
 
2000-2015 4.6% 0.4% 3.9% -0.3% 0.5% 
       
Senegal 1970-2015 -1.7% -3.2% 1.0% -0.2% 0.6% 
 
1970-1975 -2.7% -3.7% 0.8% 0.0% 0.2% 
 
1975-1990 -3.5% -5.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.8% 
 
1990-2000 -0.4% -2.5% 1.2% -0.1% 1.0% 
 
2000-2015 -0.3% -1.6% 1.3% -0.3% 0.3% 
       
South Africa 1960-2015 0.0% -0.7% 0.7% -0.2% 0.1% 
 1960-1975 2.9% 2.2% 1.1% 0.0% -0.4% 
 1975-1990 -0.9% -2.2% 1.3% -0.1% 0.1% 
 1990-2000 -1.3% -1.6% 0.2% -0.2% 0.4% 
 2000-2015 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% -0.3% 0.2% 
       
Tanzania 1960-2015 0.5% -1.9% 2.1% -0.3% 0.6% 
 1960-1975 0.4% -2.9% 3.3% -0.3% 0.4% 
 1975-1990 -1.3% -2.7% 0.8% -0.1% 0.7% 
 1990-2000 -0.6% -2.3% 0.6% -0.1% 1.1% 
 2000-2015 3.0% -0.5% 3.7% -0.6% 0.4% 
  
     
Uganda 1960-2015 0.6% -1.2% 1.3% -0.2% 0.7% 
 1960-1975 1.1% -1.2% 1.6% -0.3% 0.9% 
 1975-1990 0.9% -1.7% 1.8% -0.1% 0.8% 
 1990-2000 2.6% -1.2% 3.0% -0.3% 1.1% 
 2000-2015 -1.2% -0.8% -0.4% -0.1% 0.2% 
  
     
Zambia 1965-2015 -1.4% -1.3% 0.0% -0.2% 0.1% 
 1965-1975 -1.5% 0.3% -0.1% 0.0% -1.6% 
 1975-1990 -3.0% -0.8% -2.0% -0.1% -0.1% 
 1990-2000 -2.5% -3.9% 0.2% -0.1% 1.3% 















 Chapter 5: Is Africa Deindustrializing?  
 
               
 




















Without question, Africa is the least industrialized region of the world, mostly dependent on the export 
of primary commodities and imports of manufactures. Some observers argue that Africa has not only 
failed to industrialize but also that it faces the risk of premature deindustrialization. For example, 
Rodrik (2016) argues the region88, which could potentially become the next leader in labor-intensive 
manufacturing, is surprisingly deindustrializing prematurely in employment and output. The peak of 
the manufacturing share in both employment and output is lower than the lowest level of any other 
region. Tregenna (2015:15) characterized this as ‘pre-industrialization deindustrialization’ because 
there has not been any real industrialization before deindustrialization began. Page (2012) also 
documents that Africa has deindustrialized in three dimensions: relative size – the manufacturing share 
of employment or output, diversity – the variety of manufactured goods a country produces, and 
sophistication – the relative knowledge intensity of the manufactured goods a country produces.  
At the same time, the emergence of new technologies such as automation, artificial intelligence (AI), 
and information communication technology (ICT) suggests that the traditional industrialization path 
of development is increasingly becoming difficult for late industrializers. The potential for Africa to 
become the next labor-intensive manufacturing powerhouse is threatened by recent advancements in 
artificial intelligence and automation, which could remove the labor cost advantage and actively 
discourage the labor intensity of manufacturing. With Google establishing an Artificial Intelligence 
Lab in Ghana, the use of robots in Africa in the near future is more of a reality than a possibility. 
Conversely, this technological progress, mainly, the rapid spread of  ICT and changes in transport 
costs has led to the emergence of certain services which have similar properties to manufacturing, 
opening a new pathway for services-driven structural transformation in Africa (Newfarmer et al., 
2018). 
The critical nature of this phenomenon has motivated a series of theoretical89 and empirical90 studies 
into the trends and underlying causes of deindustrialization in general. In Africa, in particular, 
individuals91 and organizations92 have been involved in the broader study of structural change. One 
resonating conclusion from these studies is that structural change in Africa is (informal) services-
driven, raising the question of deindustrialization in the region. While there is agreement on the 
patterns of deindustrialization in other regions of the world, there is no consensus in the case of Africa, 
partly because of the limited sectoral data on Africa countries. For example, Diao et al. (2017), based 
on the same dataset Rodrik (2016) used, argue that it is difficult to conclude that Africa is 
 
88 Without Mauritius in the sample of 11 countries. Namely, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal 
South Africa, and Tanzania.  
89 See Acemoglu & Guerrieri, 2008; Alvarez-Cuadrado, Van Long, & Poschke, 2017; Comin, Lashkari, & Mestieri, 2015; 
Foellmi & Zweimüller, 2008; Kongsamut, Rebelo, & Xie, 2001; Ngai & Pissarides, 2007; Rodrik, 2016.  
90 See Rowthorn & Ramaswamy, 1997; Saeger, 1997; Rowthorn & Coutts, 2004, 2013; R. Rowthorn & Ramaswamy, 1999; 
Kollmeyer, 2009; van Neuss, 2018.  
91 See, for example, Diao, Harttgen, & McMillan, 2017; Diao & McMillan, 2018; Diao, McMillan, & Rodrik, 2017; Diao, 
McMillan, & Wangwe, 2018; Mccaig, McMillan, & Jefferis, 2015; M. S. McMillan & Harttgen, 2014;  McMillan & Rodrik, 
2011; McMillan, Rodrik & Verduzco-Gallo, 2014; de Vries, Timmer, & de Vries, 2015; Rodrik, 2018. 
92 ACET produces the Africa Transformation report; GGDC maintains the Africa Sector Database, UNU-WIDER 
initiated the Learning to Compete project (L2C) and Jobs, Poverty, and Structural Change in Africa projects; World Bank-
AFRCE initiated the Industrializing for Jobs in Africa project. The AfDB, AFREXIM Bank, and UNECA have strong 






deindustrializing. Among the many issues raised in their research is the representativeness of the 
sample of countries in the Africa Sector Database (ASD) used by Rodrik. The ASD, they argued, 
covers 11 relatively rich African countries in Africa with better educational, health, and nutritional 
outcomes. In Chapter 2, we expanded the ASD to include seven relatively poor countries in Africa. 
Using the Expanded Africa Sector Database (EASD), Naudé (2019) strongly argues that 
manufacturing is resurging in Africa. A recent study by the World Bank using data on a sample of 41 
Africa countries further shows that there is no evidence in support of the widespread view that Africa 
is deindustrializing prematurely (Nguimkeu & Zuefact, 2019).93  
The existing debate is either based on a limited sample of countries (Rodrik, 2016) or a heavily 
unbalanced panel with data on as many as seven countries starting from the 2000s only (see Nguimkeu 
& Zuefact, 2019). In this chapter, we provide extensive evidence on the patterns of deindustrialization 
using multiple databases that cover all countries in  Sub-Saharan Africa over a similar timespan, 
providing a complete picture of manufacturing performance in Africa. The major aim of the chapter 
is to reassess Rodrik’s(2016) result using a larger sample of countries. This chapter contributes to the 
limited but essential discussion on the patterns, causes, and consequences of (de)industrialization in 
Africa in the last six decades. First, it re-examines the evidence on the trends of deindustrialization in 
Africa. Second, it examines the factors responsible for the manufacturing employment outcomes in 
Africa.  
The analysis elicits several findings of long-run manufacturing performance in Africa based on a 
sample of 46 countries for real value added and 18 countries for employment. Key among these 
findings are: (1) There is little evidence in support of the general view that Africa is deindustrializing 
prematurely by relative size. (2) While there is no evidence in support of the premature 
deindustrialization thesis for a typical African country in our sample, manufacturing performance in 
Africa is generally disappointing. For instance, the manufacturing share of employment increased from 
about 5% in 1960 to about 7% in 2015. (3) We document significant heterogeneity across different 
geographical groups, with southern African countries, in particular, experiencing rapid 
deindustrialization since the 1980s. The analysis shows that several factors account for these outcomes 
with preferences, technological progress, and international trade playing an important role. In 
particular, while trade among Africa countries has played a limited role in the industrialization of the 
continent, exporting to advanced countries increases manufacturing employment shares, but 
importing, in general, has adverse effects on employment shares. The negative effect is more 
substantial for imports coming from other developing countries outside Africa.  The rest of the 
chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 discusses methods, data sources, and indicators of 
deindustrialization; Section 5.3 discusses patterns and trends of deindustrialization in Africa; Section 
5.4 provides statistical evidence on deindustrialization in Africa; Section 5.5 discusses the key drivers 
of manufacturing performance; and Section 5.6 concludes. 
5.2. Methods and Data Sources 
The methodologies and the datasets used to answer the two distinct, but related, research questions 
are discussed in this section. First, we describe the methods and the a priori expectations. Second, we 
 






describe the measures and sources of the dependent variable, followed by a description of the 
independent variables.   
5.2.1. Models and a priori expectations 
To show whether Africa is deindustrializing or not, we consider simultaneously the income effect, 
population effect and country-specific idiosyncratic factors that may affect the degree of 
industrialization in the long run. Over the course of development – i.e., as income and population 
increases – manufacturing activities are expected to have an inverted U-shape relationship with income 
per capita. To delineate the development effect from the time trend, this section follows Rodrik (2016) 
by including income per capita, population, and their quadratic terms in the model. The basic 
econometric model is stated as:             
  5.1                          𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ln Y𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2(ln𝑌𝑌)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 + 𝛽𝛽3 ln pop𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 
                                         𝛽𝛽4(ln𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 + 𝛾𝛾𝐽𝐽𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                    
 
Where 𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the manufacturing share of employment or output of country 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡, 𝛽𝛽0 is 
the constant, ln𝑌𝑌 and (lnY)2 are the natural logarithm of per capita income and its squared value,  
ln𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝 and (ln𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝)2 are the natural logarithm of population and its squared value and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 are country 
fixed-effects that take into account any time-invariant country-specific features such as geography, 
endowments, and history that generate a varying degree of industrialization across different countries 
relative to the baseline conditions. After controlling for income, population, and country-specific fixed 
effects, we capture the patterns of industrialization over time using period dummies (𝐽𝐽𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡) for 
the different episodes of development in Africa: the import substitution era (1960-1975), Lost decades 
(1976-1989), Post-Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) era (1990-1999), and the MDGs era (2000-
2015). The estimated coefficients of the period dummies show the degree of (de)industrialization of 
each period relative to the control period (import-substitution era). As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
periods are defined according to the centrality of industrialization within the prevailing national 
development plan. The ISI era is used as the benchmark period because it is usually referred to as the 
golden era of industrialization driven by import-substitution and nationalist aspirations for rapid 
development. 
To further understand the underlying drivers of manufacturing outcomes in Africa, we estimate a 
variant of the models of Kollmeyer (2009) and van Neuss (2018). These models follow the tradition 
of Chenery (1960). In addition to the variables in 5.1, we include key independent variables and other 
control variables that have the potential to drive industrial development in the current context of 
globalization. The model is explicitly stated as follows: 
5.2 𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1 ln Y𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2(ln𝑌𝑌)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 + 𝛽𝛽3 ln𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4(ln𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 +







        
Where 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃 is is the unbalanced labor productivity growth which captures cross-sector differences in 
labor productivity, 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 is international trade in manufactures, 𝐽𝐽𝑉𝑉′ stands for other control variables, 
𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 represents time fixed effects and  𝜀𝜀 the idiosyncratic error term. In equation 5.2, we replace the 
period dummies with time fixed effect to account for the change occuring across time but common 
to all countries in year t. Our model is similar to the models of Kollmeyer (2009) and van Neuss (2018) 
but not comparable in the sense that in addition to per capita income, we control for population to 
account for the fact that the size of the domestic market is essential for industrial development.  
A large domestic market is indicative of a large potential demand, although this will depend upon the 
level of income i.e., for a given level of income, a higher population is associated with a larger market. 
All else equal therefore, we expect a rising population to increase the demand for manufactures, with 
manufacturing firms responding by producing more manufactures at a lower cost per unit, generating 
scale economies. As the unit cost of manufactures falls, firms become more competitive domestically 
and internationally leading to further increases in demand and higher employment demand. Thus, we 
expect a positive relationship between population and manufacturing output/employment. However, 
beyond a certain threshold, population growth becomes a drag on manufacturing development 
(Malthus trap). From a classical Malthusian perspective, if agricultural technology is not well developed 
(as in many Africa countries), beyond a certain critical level of population when population growth 
outpaces the growth of agricultural output, agricultural consumption per capita will be lower than the 
subsistence level, industry will be denied critical raw materials, theoretically leading to a breakdown of 
the growth process (Zhou, 2009).   
The level of income has long been recognized as a key driver of structural change. According to 
Engel’s law and Bell’s Law, structural change is driven by changes in the structure of demand resulting 
from changes in real income. Particularly, Engel’s law states that as income increases, the share of 
income spent on agricultural products decreases. Bell (1976) argues that at the early stages of 
development, the proportion of income spent on manufactures will increase but during the post-
industrial phase of development, there will be a secular shift of demand from manufactures to services. 
Recent literature on structural change shows that the process of the reallocation of economic activity 
across sectors is partly driven by changes in the structure of demand resulting from changes in real 
income (van Neuss, 2018, 2019). Theoretically, structural change driven by non-homothetic tastes is 
modelled using the Stone-Geary utility function, which generates non-linear Engel curves. In this 
framework, the marginal rate of substitution (budget share) between different goods varies as income 
increases, inducing some activity reallocation towards the sectors which meet higher-order needs (van 
Neuss, 2019). The extended version of Engel’s law shows that the budget share spent on 
manufacturing goods increases during initial stages of development then stabilizes, and eventually falls 






between per capita income and the manufacturing output/employment share. Structural change 
induced by changes in real income is often described as ‘preference-driven structural change.’ 94  
Another primary cause of employment deindustrialization is rapid technological progress, which 
induces differential patterns of productivity growth at the sectoral level. The classical studies show 
that productivity gains in manufacturing exceed productivity gains in services because manufacturing 
often involves standardized and repetitive processes, which can easily be automated or mechanized, 
and this leads to a decline in the manufacturing share of employment. If the productivity gap between 
the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors continuously persists, and the pattern of demand 
among these sectors is constant, then employment growth should shrink in the manufacturing sector 
and expand in the non-manufacturing sector (Kollmeyer, 2009a). Furthermore, Baumol (1967), 
through the idea of the ‘cost disease’ hypothesis, argued that cross-sector differences in technology 
drive the reallocation of economic activities across sectors. The cost disease hypothesis states that 
labor moves from sectors characterized by a relatively high rate of technical progress – dynamic sectors 
– to stagnant sectors, increasing the cost burden of the economy. Manufacturing is considered the 
progressive sector, whereas the service sector is characterized as the non-progressive sector.  
Ngai & Pissarides (2007) provide a more persuasive premise and generalization to Baumol’s cost 
disease hypothesis, showing that the reallocation of labor to a stagnant sector depends on the elasticity 
of substitution in demand between manufacturing goods and non-manufacturing goods. If the 
elasticity of substitution is less than one – i.e., if the consumers' relative choice over the consumption 
of manufacturing goods changes by less than the change in relative price – technological progress in 
manufactures leads to a decline in the employment share of manufacturing. If the elasticity of 
substitution is greater than one, the manufacturing share of labor is increasing in technological 
progress in manufacturing. In this case, while technological progress in manufacturing reduces 
employment, a technology-induced reduction in the relative price of manufacturing creates a more 
than proportionate increase in demand for manufactures, so the net effect is a growth in employment. 
Most empirical evidence supports a negative relationship between technological progress and 
employment in manufacturing. However, Nordhaus( 2005), using sectoral data for the US economy, 
argued that rapid technological progress leads to employment growth in manufacturing because 
international competition reduces the market price of manufacturing goods, which in turn stimulates 
greater demand.  In this case, the price effect creates more jobs than the technology effect displaces.  
Rodrik (2016) shows that the effect of technological progress in manufacturing is not only mediated 
through the elasticity of substitution in demand between manufactures and non-manufactures but also 
the ratio of (domestic) supply to demand in manufacturing. In a case where the ratio is less than one 
– i.e., where the country is a large net importer of manufacturing goods – technological progress in 
manufacturing may increase manufacturing employment even if demand for manufactures is inelastic. 
If the proportion of domestic supply in total consumption (of manufactures) is low, the effect of 
 
94 The preceding paragraphs discuss how income and population relate to both manufacturing output and employment. 
In answering our second research question (i.e. equation 5.2) we focus on manufacturing employment only. This is because 
“the employment-based measure of deindustrialization is, by far, the most studied in the scientific literature. This is likely 
due to the fact that manufacturing employment is the most visible measure of the size of manufacturing in any country, 







technological progress in domestic manufacturing on relative prices is also low, compared to a country 
where the proportion of domestic supply in total consumption is high. As a result, for small open 
economies like many African countries, technological progress in manufacturing can lead to higher 
manufacturing output and employment.  
Conversely, importing manufacturing goods to meet excess domestic demand can transfer the 
technology effect on relative prices elsewhere on domestic manufacturing employment, leading to a 
situation known as ‘imported deindustrialization’. Technological progress in China, the EU, and the 
US – Africa’s major trading partners – has made manufactured imports relatively cheaper than 
domestic goods, rendering the domestic manufacturing sector less competitive. Therefore for 
technological progress in (domestic) manufacturing to boost employment in African countries, the 
relative productivity growth in manufacturing must exceed the reduction in the relative price of 
manufactures on the world market (Rodrik, 2016). Most African countries in our sample are net 
importers of manufactures, so whether the domestic technology effect or imported deindustrialization 
effect will dominate is a matter of empirics.   
Another driver of manufacturing employment is international trade. In the literature, economic 
globalization is implicated in the deindustrialization of advanced countries. It was at the core of the 
debate when deindustrialization coincided with unfavorable labor market developments in the North, 
with the fear being that trade with the South creates structural unemployment, drives a wedge between 
wages of skilled and unskilled labor, and contracts the absolute and relative manufacturing share of 
employment in the North (Saeger, 1997). This called for policy coordination to protect the 
manufacturing sector from low-wage competitors in the South.  The theoretical basis for this debate 
is rooted in the framework of Frobel, Heinrichs, & Kreye (1980) which shows the evolving 
relationship between economic globalization and the patterns of manufacturing employment in the 
global North and South. During much of the industrial age, world trade patterns followed the classical 
international division of labor, in which developing countries specialized in the production of primary 
products and advanced countries specialized in the production of finished goods, creating a dynamic 
manufacturing sector in the North. However, these existing world trade patterns changed in the late 
1960s creating a phenomenon described by Frobel, Heinrichs, & Kreye (1980) as the  “new 
international division of labor”. The new international division of labor involves the globalization of 
manufacturing supply chains, with multinational firms reducing production costs by relocating routine 
manufacturing jobs to the South, where wages are generally lower. This was made possible by the 
emergence of new technology such as ICT, which reduced barriers associated with geographic distance 
(Kollmeyer, 2009). Africa has not featured prominently in these discussions except for the argument 
of Page (2012) that the geographic shift (net relocation) of production from (out of) Africa was 
consistently negative between 1990 and 2005, resulting in a fall of manufactured exports. This is 
beginning to change with the reallocation of Chinese jobs to the garment sector of Ethiopia, for 
example.  
A related theoretical literature has shown that under certain conditions, international trade spurs 
industrial development through technology spillover (Grossman & Helpman, 1991a; Romer, 1990). 
Trade allows the import of intermediates, which often embody technological knowledge. By accessing 






manufacturing capabilities initially through reverse engineering and incremental innovation, before 
moving to the production of more sophisticated goods. The intensity of learning opportunities offered 
by intermediate inputs often depends on the technological distance from trading partners, with 
learning and spillover effects being stronger when trading partners share similar production 
capabilities (Amighini & Sanfilippo, 2014). Conversely, it is argued that nascent industries in 
developing countries are not able to exploit economies of scale to the same extent as trade 
competitors, with premature exposure of these industries to international competition potentially 
destroying industries in the South (Chang, 2003). This argument stems from the logic that trade leads 
developing countries to specialize according to their comparative advantage on sectors with poor 
dynamic learning externalities, and that as a result developing countries may suffer dynamic losses 
from free trade. The infant-industry argument is, however, based on the assumption that there exist 
in these countries traditional technology with growth potential. The prevalence of traditional 
technology with poor growth potential in developing countries breaks down the infant-industry logic 
(Sauré, 2007).  
The other (control) variables often cited as important drivers of industrialization are the real exchange 
(RER) rate, human capital, foreign direct investment (FDI), and fixed domestic capital. The index of 
(RER) undervaluation is the ratio of the price of tradable goods to non-tradable goods. 
Undervaluation increases the price of the tradable sector (manufacturing sector) relative to the non-
tradable sector. This enhances the relative profitability of the tradable sector and causes it to expand 
(Rodrik, 2008). The stock of human capital affects a country’s specialization patterns. For African 
countries, improvements in the quality of human capital could change their specialization patterns 
from the production of primary commodities towards knowledge-intensive manufactured goods. FDI 
is an important source of employment creation either directly or indirectly through technology transfer 
particularly if it is channeled to the tradable sector. FDI increases manufacturing employment directly 
by creating jobs that did not exist in the manufacturing sector of the host country especially if it 
involves greenfield investment. The direct job creation is often higher if the greenfield investment 
goes to labor intensive sectors such as manufacturing (Jenkins, 2006; Jude & Silaghi, 2016). FDI can 
also affect the manufacturing labor demand of host countries indirectly through both competition 
effects and the spillover effects. On the one hand, if FDI entry creates competitive pressure that 
crowds-out domestic firms, the labor intensity of the receiving industries might be negatively affected 
(Mencinger, 2003). On the other hand, if foreign subsidiaries of multinational firms source locally, 
demand addressed to upstream sectors could increase, thus stimulating employment (Javorcik, 2004). 
Similarly, the efficient allocation of domestic investment should increase the relative size of the 
manufacturing sector, provided it is targeted at the tradable sector.  
 
5.2.2.  Data sources 
The sectoral data for the measurement of the relative size of manufacturing – defined as the 
manufacturing share of employment or output – come from three main sources: the Africa Sector 
Database which is integrated into the GGDC 10-sector database (Timmer et al., 2015), the Expanded 
Africa Sector Database (Mensah & Szirmai, 2018) and the UN National Accounts: Analysis of Main 






the manufacturing share of total employment, the manufacturing share of real value added, and the 
manufacturing share of nominal value added. In the context of the existing debate, we show trends in 
all three shares, although our focus is on employment and real value added since nominal value added 
conflates movements in quantities and prices, making both movements inseparable. 
Income and population data are sourced from the Maddison Project Database (Bolt, Inklaar, de Jong, 
& van Zanden, 2018),  which provide information on income per capita (in 2011 US$) and population 
for all countries in the sample. We measure the technology-induced effect on manufacturing 
employment using the indicator of unbalanced productivity growth, which measures cross-sector 
differences in labor productivity growth. Unbalanced productivity growth (UBP) is the ratio of labor 
productivity in manufacturing to labor productivity in services. Following the existing literature on 
deindustrialization, we use UBP to capture the idea of Baumol’s cost disease hypothesis.  UBP is 
computed using data on real value added (converted to 2011 PPP) and employment from EASD. The 
third explanatory variable aims at capturing the effect of international trade on manufacturing 
employment. Many studies use variables such as the terms of trade, the degree of openness to trade, 
import penetration, or the trade balance (total or in manufacturing) to capture the effect of foreign 
trade on manufacturing employment. We follow the approach of Kollmeyer (2009) and van Neuss 
(2018) to disaggregate trade flows into exports (and imports) to (and from) Africa, the North, and the 
South. The North is defined as Europe and North America whereas the South is defined as Middle 
East and North Africa, Asia, Central and South America, and Oceania, with some adjustments. We 
adjust the North and South classification by moving Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Japan, and South 
Korea to the North, and by moving Mexico and Turkey to the South. The classification is essential 
because the potential benefits that countries get from imported inputs depend on the technological 
distance with trade partners. For the export side, the distinction is important because there are a 
number of studies that have found a strong relationship between the country-of-destination 
characteristics and export performance (e.g. Baldwin & Harrigan, 2011). There are number of reasons 
why manufacturing firms exporting to the US and EU may generate a differential employment impact 
than countries exporting to African countries only, for example. According to the income preference 
hypothesis, higher income countries prefer more knowledge-intensive goods, therefore countries 
exporting to advanced countries may learn more than countries exporting to neighboring African 
countries. Even when the technology intensity of goods being exported to advanced countries, 
developing countries, and other African countries are the same however, product certification and 
market standards differ. As a result, firms exporting to advanced economies adopt the best production 
techniques and management practices to improve existing production and delivery processes. The 
resulting efficiency may lead to a differential employment effect. Furthermore, there is strong evidence 
that manufacturing goods from the North and the South embody different factor intensities. 
Consistent with the work of Kollmeyer (2009) and van Neuss (2018), trade in manufactures is defined 
as imports and exports in standard international trade classification (SITC) 5 to 8. Trade data are 
obtained from the World Trade Flows database (Feenstra et al., 2005) for the period 1962-2000 and 
the BACI database for the period 2001-2015. We reclassify the BACI dataset from HS6 to SITC4 
using a trade concordance table. We then expressed the value of imports and exports as a percentage 
of total manufacturing value added instead of total value added or GDP to avoid the potential 






Our measure of undervaluation follows the index of Rodrik (2008), which measures the domestic 
price level adjusted for the Balassa-Samuelson effect. We use data on exchange rates (XR) and PPP 
from the Penn World Tables version 9.1 to compute the real exchange rate (RXR).95 We adjust for 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect by controlling for GDP per capita (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) and time fixed effects (𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡).96 
The estimated coefficient of GDP per capita is -0.20, indicating that as income increases by 10% the 
real exchange rate falls by 2.0% in Africa. The results show a strong Balassa-Samuelson effect. Finally, 
the index of undervaluation is computed as the difference between the actual real exchange rate and 
the Balassa-Samuelson-adjusted rate.97 
Data on net FDI inflows is taken from UNCTAD and expressed in its natural logarithm. Data on the 
stock of human capital is taken from the Penn World Tables version 9.1. Finally, fixed capital as a 
percentage of GDP is taken from World Development Indicators.  
 
5.2.3. Estimation strategy  
The estimation of the econometric model (5.1) stated above to investigate the presence or otherwise 
of deindustrialization in Africa may suffer from two main problems. First, since the manufacturing 
share of employment or output is bounded (fractional response variable), the linear fixed effects model 
– i.e. equation 5.3 – may suffer similar drawbacks as linear probability models (LPM). Therefore, 
Nguimkeu & Zuefact (2019) suggest the use of a fixed-effects fractional logit model for studying 
deindustrialization. However,  fixed effects are generally not consistent in nonlinear models such as 
logit. Treating 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 as a parameter to be estimated in a maximum likelihood framework is usually not 
consistent as the number of cross-sectional unit (𝑖𝑖 ) grows with the time period (𝑡𝑡 ) fixed. This is 
known as the incidental parameters problem. Fixed effects fractional logit models yield consistent 
results only if cross-sectional units are fixed and the number of years per unit approaches infinity. The 
gold standard in estimating a consistent and robust fractional response specification is the method 
developed by Papke & Wooldridge (2008), which relies on the Chamberlain-Mundlak method. The 
method as developed and applied by Papke & Wooldridge (2008) is limited to balanced panels. 
Furthermore, Papke & Wooldridge (2008:130), in the same paper, remark that “It seems evident that, 
for estimating the marginal effect of a given percentage change in [the independent variable], the 
difference between linear and nonlinear models is not important.” Since we are interested in the 
marginal effects, particularly of the period dummies, we applied the fixed-effects linear panel estimator 
(with panel-corrected standard errors for robust inference) to the above specification.  
The second econometric challenge is that the usual test of a hump-shaped relationship between the 
manufacturing share of employment or output and per capita income may not be appropriate. In the 
literature that tests for the presence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between manufacturing 
activities and per capita income, the most common approach includes a quadratic term for income in 
a standard regression. Once the coefficient on income is positive and significant, and the coefficient 
of the quadratic term is negative and significant and, in addition, the estimated turning point is within 
the data range, it is common to argue for the presence of an inverted U-shaped relationship. Lind & 
 
95𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = ln (𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡/𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) 
96 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺)𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                                      






Mehlum (2010) have, however, shown that this criterion used for testing for the presence or otherwise 
of a U-shaped relationship is too weak. It is particularly problematic because when the true relationship 
is non-monotone over a small range of data but monotone over most of the data range, imposing a 
quadratic specification will yield an extremum point (Lind & Mehlum, 2010:110). Therefore to identify 
a true inverted U-shape relationship between manufacturing activities and per capita income over 
relevant data values, the test must identify whether the relationship is increasing at low values within 
this interval and decreasing at high values within the interval. We, therefore, used the FE estimator 
(with panel-corrected standard errors for robust inference) in combination with the Lind & Mehlum 
appropriate U test to examine the degree of deindustrialization or otherwise in Africa.98 
Finally, we also adopt a fixed-effects specification to study the drivers of manufacturing employment 
in Africa (i.e., model 5.2). The choice of a fixed-effects framework is based on two reasons: First, the 
Hausman test shows that the unique errors are correlated with the model’s regressors. Second, the 
fixed effects framework eliminates time-invariant confounding factors, estimating the coefficient on 
each regressor using only the within-country variation (Mummolo & Peterson, 2018). This allows us 
to emphasize the ‘within’ effect of each of the key independent variables, namely the impact of changes 
in preferences, technology, and trade in manufacturing performance within countries. This approach 
is preferred when evaluating the relative importance of the key factors of deindustrialization for policy 
purposes. We further estimate the fixed effect model with panel-corrected standard errors suggested 
by Beck & Katz (1995). 
 
5.3. Patterns and Trends of Deindustrialization           
5.3.1. Evidence on the Changing Structure of the World Economy 
To motivate our analysis of Africa, we show the evolution of the structure of employment with respect 
to per capita income in the world. A long-standing observation is that the structure of production 
changes in the process of development ( Lewis, 1954; Rostow, 1960). Kuznets (1973), in his Nobel 
Prize speech, referred to structural change as one of the main features of modern economic growth. 
At the early stages of development, countries are characterized by the preponderance of agricultural 
production, where most people live in the countryside and are mostly preoccupied with subsistence 
farming. The agricultural share of the labor force and national income is very high during this stage of 
development. At later stages of development, the industry share of the labor force and national income 
rises to a point and then declines, while the services share of labor and income increases 
monotonically. Figure 5.1, panels A-D, depicts this path of economic development in the last six 
decades.  In Figure 5.1, Panel A, the agriculture share of total employment is as high as 90% at lower 
levels of income. However, as income increases, the proportion of the labor force in agriculture 
declines exponentially throughout the entire path of economic development.  
Generally, the fraction of the labor force in agriculture continues to fall around the world, although 
the size of the share significantly differs even among developing regions. For example, while the 
agriculture share of employment is declining in Africa (blue diamonds), it is still high when compared 
 






with other regions. Three views explain the declining trend of the agricultural employment share: the 
labor push hypothesis, the labor pull hypothesis, and the subsistence constraint hypothesis. The labor 
push hypothesis states that the combination of improvements in farm technology and less-than-unity 
income elasticity of demand for food releases the agrarian workforce to other sectors as income 
increases (Caselli & Coleman, 2001; Matsuyama, 1992). The labor pull hypothesis states that it is faster 
productivity growth in the modern sector due to advances in industrial technology that induces more 
workers in the agricultural sector to relocate to the modern industrial sector. Complementing the labor 
push hypothesis is the subsistence constraint hypothesis, which states that if a country consumes 
neither more nor less of the subsistence level of agricultural products99, then the fraction of labor in 
agriculture is directly proportional to the subsistence level of consumption and inversely proportional 
to the level of productivity in agriculture. This implies that when agricultural productivity is low, more 
workers are required to produce the minimum subsistence consumption and vice versa. 
Alvarez-Cuadrado & Poschke (2011) explore the historical experiences of 12 countries using data from 
the 19th century onwards and show that technological progress in manufacturing – the pull effect – 
was the main driver of the de-agriculturalization of today’s industrialized countries until 1920. 
However, productivity improvements in agriculture – the push effect – is the primary driver of 
structural change after the 1960s. The implication is that advances in industrial technology are essential 
for successful structural transformation at the early stages of development. However, industrial growth 
in Africa in the last five decades has been disappointing (Newfarmer et al., 2018). In contrast to the 
experience of earlier industrializers, recent evidence further suggests that the de-agriculturalization of 
Africa – depicted in Figure 5.2, panel A – is linked to improvements in agricultural productivity (Diao 
et al., 2018). Evidence on the subsistence constraint hypothesis indicates that this simple 
characterization alone explains as much as 90% of the decline in agricultural employment shares in 
some countries since the 1960s (see Üngör, 2013). The intuition and the empirical results of the 
subsistence constraint hypothesis further support the earlier indication that agricultural productivity 
has played a fundamental role in the structural transformation of the world in the last six decades.  
While improvements in agricultural technology free more workers globally, the sectors in which the 
workers are moving into explains regional differences in catching up with the productivity level of the 
frontier. For example, the aggregate productivity level of East Asia was 15% of the US level in 1963. 
East Asian productivity reached 70% of the US level by 2010. The productivity of Latin American 
was 35% of the US level in 1963 but shrank to 25% by 2010. One stylized fact associated with the 
divergence between these two regions is that whereas a significant proportion of workers initially 
relocated to manufacturing industries, and later, to dynamic services in East Asia, the fraction of the 
workforce in manufacturing has been declining while the fraction of the workforce in domestic trade 
and personal services has been rising in Latin America since the 1960s. The sectoral heterogeneity, 
particularly the differential rate of labor productivity growth in the sectors receiving most workers, 
explains the divergence of the two regions (Üngör, 2017).  The experience of Africa is no different 
from Latin America. The structural change of Africa has mostly been marked by informal tertiarization 
where workers are relocating from the traditional agricultural sector to informal trading activities with 
aggregate productivity of most countries below 15% of US productivity (see chapter 4).     
 






Figure 5.1, panels B and C, further show that the manufacturing and the industry share of employment 
has followed a hump-shaped trajectory throughout development. The increasing phase of the 
manufacturing/industry employment trajectory is known as industrialization, while the decreasing 
phase is known as deindustrialization. Despite the commonly observed patterns of structural change 
especially with respect to de-agriculturalization and tertiarization, it is clear from Figure 5.1, panels B 
& C, that countries and regions achieved different levels of industrial development at the same level 
of per capita income. While the predicted values of the agriculture and services shares of employment 
at each level of per capita income tend to fit the observed data quite well, the predicted values of the 
manufacturing share of employment at each level of per capita income do not fit the data so well. The 
highest manufacturing employment shares that countries reached before beginning to deindustrialize 
has fallen over time. 
At the national level, unbalanced productivity growth – labor productivity in manufacturing grows 
much faster than in non-manufacturing – has led to the fear that technology is taking away global 
manufacturing jobs. Evidence suggests that while manufacturing jobs are declining at the country level 
for former industrialized and some newly industrializing countries, the world as a whole has not 
deindustrialized (Felipe & Mehta, 2016). The near constancy of the global manufacturing share of 
employment and output since the 1970s is explained by the globalization of manufacturing supply 
chains. Thus, while technology is driving value added per worker to grow much faster than aggregate 
productivity within countries, global labor productivity in manufacturing is not growing faster than 
global aggregate labor productivity because rapid productivity growth within countries is offset by the 
negative geographic shift, namely the continual shift of manufacturing jobs from higher productivity 
countries and regions to lower productivity countries and regions (Felipe & Mehta, 2016).  





























































































































































Figure 5.1: Evolution of sectoral employment shares in the world 
Sectoral shares of employment and the level per capita income on a sample of 49 countries in the World. Based on data from the GGDC 10-sector database, the 




















































































































































Figure 5.2: Evolution of sectoral employment shares in the Sub-Saharan Africa 








Deindustrialization has been a key feature of advanced economies since the 1960s because of rapid 
technological progress, which induces differential patterns of productivity growth at the industry level. 
National experiences are marked by varying degrees of intensity of deindustrialization. For example, 
while the manufacturing share of employment in the US has steadily declined from about 25 percent 
in the 1950s to less than 10 percent in 2010, the manufacturing share of valued-added has remained 
roughly the same. In the United Kingdom, conversely, the manufacturing employment share 
decreased from about 30 percent in the 1970s to about 10 percent in 2010, with the manufacturing 
share in total value added also falling from about 25 percent to 15 percent (Timmer et al., 2015). On 
theoretical grounds, the structural shift of factors of production from manufacturing industries to 
services in developed countries is expected. At a high level of development (post-industrial phase), it 
is expected that the rate of technological progress and accompanying income level will induce a secular 
shift from the production of physical goods to the provision of services. What is unexpected and 
unwelcome is the ‘supposed’ deindustrialization of Africa.  
5.3.2.  Is Africa Deindustrializing?  
There is a widespread view that Africa is deindustrializing prematurely since the manufacturing share 
of employment and output peaks at income levels that are much lower than those at which former 
industrialized and newly industrializing economies reached before deindustrializing (Rodrik, 2016; 
Tregenna, 2015). However, recent evidence suggests that this view within the context of limited data 
needs to be reconsidered (Diao et al., 2017; Naudé, 2019; Nguimkeu & Zuefact, 2019). Figure 5.2, 
panel  B, shows that the manufacturing share of total employment is yet to peak in Africa. This section 
aims to examine whether Africa has truly deindustrialized using a new database that covers about 80% 
GDP in Africa. We explore the trends of deindustrialization since the 1960s. We begin our analysis 
by graphically summarizing the trends in the manufacturing share of employment and value added in 
Africa. 
Figure 5.3 depicts the patterns of manufacturing shares in employment in Africa and three sub-regions 
since the 1960s. For Africa as a whole, the manufacturing share of employment has marginally 
increased from less than 5% in 1960 to more than 7% by 2015. However, the results differ markedly 
by sub-region. In Southern Africa, there has been a relatively sharp decline in employment shares from 
11% in 1960 to 5.5% in 2015. In West Africa, the employment share increased from 4.2% in 1960 to 
about 6.5% in 2015 but this is lower than the 7.5% achieved in 1976, suggesting deindustrialization in 
the more recent period.  In East Africa, there is an incredible increase in the manufacturing share from 
around 1% to 9%. There is some evidence to indicate that the rapid expansion of employment in 
manufacturing is mainly driven by micro, small and medium size firms (MSMEs) that operate outside 
the formal sector in some East African countries (Diao, Kweka, et al., 2018; Diao, Magalhaes, & 
Mcmillan, 2018).  
Figure 5.4 shows the evolution of the manufacturing share of real value added in Africa and the three 
sub-regions.  In terms of value-added there is a rapid decline in the shares after 1982 (except for East 
Africa where the manufacturing share continues to increase till 1997 and does not decline much 






for Africa as a whole, and 16.5% for West Africa. The peaks are comparable to the manufacturing 
share of output in the UK and China in the 1980s.100   
The sample used in figures 3 and 4 is limited to the 18 countries for which data is available with no 
coverage of Central Africa. To extend our coverage of manufacturing output to as many countries in 
Africa as possible, we use the UN National Accounts: Analysis of Main Aggregates database. The 
database covers 46 countries in Africa, including nine countries in Central Africa from 1970 to 2016. 
Following the AU regional classification, we further sub-divided the sample by sub-region. Figure 5.5 
shows the evolution of the manufacturing share in value added by sub-region. In contrast to the 
wholesale conclusion that Africa is deindustrializing, Figure 5.5 reveals significant heterogeneity across 
the four sub-regions. While Southern Africa is experiencing a decreasing trend, the manufacturing 
value added shares of Eastern Africa and Central Africa are increasing over time. For example, the 
manufacturing share in value added in Southern Africa decreased from 20% in 1970 to about 10% in 
2016 whereas the share of Eastern Africa changes by about the same magnitude but in the opposite 
direction, increasing from about 11% in 1970 to 18% in 2016. Though the manufacturing share in 
value added of Central Africa is spiky, it shows an upward trend throughout the entire period, 
increasing from about 10% in 1970 to 16% in 2016. West Africa seems to be the only region that has 
witnessed a differing trend during the period of study. The manufacturing share of output decreased 
slowly from 1970 until the mid-1980s before picking up and increasing rapidly until the 1990s when 
it started falling drastically again. It, however, shows an upward trend since 2010.  
Figure 5.3: Manufacturing share of employment by sub-region over time 
 
Notes: Manufacturing share of employment trends in Africa, Western Africa, Eastern Africa, and Southern Africa based 
on the Expanded Africa Sector Database (Mensah and Szirmai, 2018). The regional employment shares are constructed 
 






as the ratio of total manufacturing employment of the region to the total employment of the region, which is equivalent 
to the weighted averages of manufacturing shares across countries. 
Figure 5.4: Manufacturing share of real value added by sub-region over time 
 
Notes: Manufacturing share of Real Value Added in Africa, Western Africa, Eastern Africa, and Southern Africa computed 
from the Expanded Africa Sector Database (Mensah and Szirmai, 2018). The regional real value added shares are 
constructed as the ratio of total manufacturing real value added (in PPP $) of the region to the total real value added (in 
PPP $) of the region, which is equivalent to the weighted averages of manufacturing shares across countries.  
 
5.4. Empirical Analysis of Deindustrialization  
The previous section provided an overview of the trends in the relative size of manufacturing 
indicators without considering simultaneously the income effect, population effect, and country-
specific idiosyncratic factors that may affect the degree of industrialization in the long run. As 
explained above, over the course of development – i.e., as income and population increases – 
manufacturing activities are expected to have an inverted U-shape relationship with income per capita. 
This section provides statistical evidence on deindustrialization after delineating the development 
effect using equation 5.1. 
Our baseline results are based on the EASD. For robustness and broader coverage, we supplement 
this data with the GGDC Africa sector database and the UN National Accounts database. Table 5.1 
reports estimated results based on the baseline data. The table further shows the results without 
Mauritius101 in the sample and results for the industry shares. Our focus is on real measures – the 
manufacturing share of employment and real value added – although in the context of the existing 
debate, we also report results for nominal value added. After controlling for income, demographic 
 
101 Mauritius is excluded following Rodrik (2016) to test the conjecture that countries with a high share of manufactured 






trends, and country fixed-effects, the estimated coefficients of the period dummies are insignificant 
and negligible in terms of the magnitude for all periods relative to the ISI period. The Lind & Mehlum 
test suggests that the true relationship between the manufacturing share of employment and per capita 
income is an increasing monotone. The relationship is increasing at lower and higher values of income 
per capita within the relevant data range with a constant slope. 
Figure 5.5: Trends of manufacturing share in value added by sub-region 
 
Notes:  Trends of manufacturing share of total value added in Western Africa, Eastern Africa, Central Africa, and Southern 
Africa computed from the UN National Accounts: Analysis of Main Aggregates Database. The construction of the shares 
follows a similar approach to that in Figure 5.4.  
For the nominal and real value added shares, the results show that the coefficients of the period 
dummies are postive and significant over time. In contrast to the trends in Figure 5.4, the trend of the 
manufacturing share of real value added show a positive and significant effect over time. Clearly, this 
does not mean that African countries have not experienced a reduction in the manufacturing share of 
output. Instead, it suggests that the general downward direction since 1982 (in Figure 5.3) is explained 
by income and demographic trends  with no deindustrialization left to be explained. This is confirmed 
by the Lind & Mehlum U test, which shows the presence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
real manufacturing value added and per capita income, with a turning point of around $7400 (2011 
US dollars). When Mauritius is excluded from the sample, the coefficients of the period dummies 
show a negative and significant effect in the case of the manufacturing share of employment, 
suggesting employment deindustrialization. Continuous deindustrialization would imply that the 
negative coefficient gets bigger (in absolute value) over time, however, the negative coefficient of the 






there has been much deindustrialization after the 1990s. Specifically, conditional on income, 
population, and country-specific idiosyncratic factors, the manufacturing share of employment is 0.7% 
lower in the lost decades, 1.1% lower in the period after SAPs, and 0.9% lower in the MDGs era 
compared with the ISI era. However, the manufacturing share of real output is 3.3% higher in the lost 
decades, 4.9% higer in the period after SAPs, and 5.2% higher in the MDGs era compared to the ISI 
era. The opposite trends of employment and real output shares suggest increasing manufacturing labor 
productivity in Africa (we return to this issue in Section 5.5).  
Table 5.2 reports the estimated results based on the same dataset Rodrik (2016) used. For the full 
sample, there is no evidence of deindustrialization in Africa. However, once we exclude Mauritius, we 
find similar trends deindustrialization reported by Rodrik (2016).102 The Lind and Mehlum test, 
however, rejects the presence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between the manufacturing share 
of employment or output and per capita income. Thus the relationship between manufacturing 
activities and per capita income is monotonic with confidence intervals suggesting a wide range of 
possible extremum points. The results in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 indicate that the evidence of 
deindustrialization in Africa is not as robust as Rodrik (2016) presented. Albeit, the result is still limited 
to a small fraction of countries in Africa – 18 countries in Table 5.1 and 11 countries in Table 5.2 – 
with no coverage of Central Africa.  
To cover as many countries as possible, we used the UN National Accounts: Analysis of Main 
Aggregates database. The UN dataset does not include most years of the ISI period; hence the period 
1970-79 is used as the benchmark period. As a consequence, we cannot define the lost decades as in 
the previous estimation, with the 1980s therefore used in place of the lost decades. However, the post-
SAPs (1990-99) and MDGs (2000-2015) periods are defined as previously. The results based on the 
UN database are reported in Table 5.3. The estimated coefficients of the period dummies are not 
statistically significant for the nominal manufacturing share of value added. For the real manufacturing 
share of value added, the estimated coefficient is 1.2% higher in the 1980s than the 1970s, 2.0% higher 
in the post-SAPs period than the 1970s, but there is no statistically significant difference between the 
estimated shares in the MDGs era and the 1970s. For the industry share of output, estimated 
coefficients of the period dummies are not statistically significant. The results suggest that Africa is 
not deindustrializing. However, there has not been any significant industrial development since the 
1970s.  
Rodrik (2016) argues that when Mauritius, a high exporter of manufacturing goods, is excluded from 
the sample, all three measures of industrialization103 show a declining trend in Africa. We, therefore, 
follow the approach of Nguimkeu & Zuefact (2019) to classify countries as intensive exporters of 
manufacturing in Africa if manufactured exports in the total volume of exports exceed 50%. The 
following countries were identified as intensive manufacturing exporters in Africa: Botswana, Lesotho, 
Eswatini, Cape Verde, and Mauritius. In our analysis, we excluded the intensive manufacturing 
exporters from the sample to test the conjecture that Africa is deindustrializing when intensive 
exporters of manufacturing are excluded from the sample. In contrast to Rodrik’s results, our analysis 
for the restricted sample rejects the conjecture that Africa is deindustrializing when exporters of 
 
102 The coefficients of income and population and their square values is however different from Rodrik’s. We use the latest 
version of the Maddison database while Rodrik uses the 2009 version updated with information from WDI 






manufacturing are excluded from the sample. In particular, the real manufacturing share of output is 
1.3% higher in the 1980s than the 1970s, 2.1% higher in the post-SAPs era than the 1970s, and 0.9% 
higher in the MDGs era than 1970s. The Lind and Mehlum test further shows that the true relationship 
between real manufacturing in value added and per capita income is not concave but monotonic, 
increasing in income.  
The results on the manufacturing share of output in tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 present evidence on the 
varying degree of industrialization in Africa. The different geographical coverage of the tables and the 
different corresponding estimated coefficients of the period dummies are suggestive of the 
significance of geographic differences in manufacturing performance. Figure 4 further suggests that 
estimating the model using data for all countries may conceal essential differences in the pattern of 
industrialization across sub-regions. We explore this further by dividing the sample and estimating the 
model according to the African Union (AU)sub-regional boundaries. The results for the sub-regional 
analysis are presented in Table 5.4. The results highlight noticeable regional differences. For both the 
nominal and real manufacturing share of value added, while East Africa is industrializing, Southern 
Africa is deindustrializing. The estimated coefficients of the period dummies for East Africa are 
positive and significantly different from the control period. The results show that the real 
manufacturing share of value added is 1.5% higher in the 1980s than the 1970s, 3.6% higher in the 
post-SAPs period than the 1970s, and 3.1% higher in the MDGs era than in the 1970s. Conversely, 
the estimated coefficients on the period dummies for Southern Africaare negative and statistically 
significant. The manufacturing share in Southern Africa is 1.7% lower in the 1980s than the 1970s, 
1.9% lower in the post-SAPs era than the 1970s, and 2.1% lower in the MDGs era than the 1970s. 
The appropriate U-curve test further confirms that the true relationship between the manufacturing 
share of output and per capita income is monotone in East Africa, but concave in South Africa with 
a turning point of $8394 (2011 US dollars). For West Africa, the real manufacturing share of value 
added is 2.5% lower in the MDGs era than in the 1970s. But for the other periods, there was no 
statistically significant difference between the shares and the control period. The Lind & Mehlum test 
suggests the presence of a strong inverted U-shaped relationship between manufacturing activities and 
per capita income. For Central Africa, we do not find evidence for changes in manufacturing shares 
over time.  
We do not find convincing and robust evidence in support of the general view that Africa is 
deindustrializing prematurely (by relative size). Manufacturing employment shares do not follow an 
inverse U-shape relationship. Conditional on income, population, and country-specific fixed effects, 
manufacturing output shares show positive and statistically significant trends over time. When we 
increase the coverage of countries to almost all countries in Africa, the results suggest that Africa is 
not deindustrializing, although there has not been any significant industrial development since the 
1970s. This result masks important regional differences. A sub-regional analysis shows that East Africa 










                                             Table 5.1: Evidence on Deindustrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa (EASD) 
 Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa excl. MUS104 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Panel A: Reg. Estimates EMP Nom VA Real VA EMP Nom VA Real VA EMP Nom VA Real VA 
 Manshare Manshare Manshare Manshare Manshare Manshare Indshare Indshare Indshare 
Per capita Income (ln) 0.021 0.181*** 0.206*** 0.034** 0.257*** 0.219*** 0.161*** 0.580*** 0.770*** 
 (0.031) (0.037) (0.035) (0.015) (0.048) (0.040) (0.043) (0.066) (0.062) 
Per capita Income-squared (ln) -0.000 -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.001 -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.030*** -0.043*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Population (ln) 0.010 0.135*** -0.039** 0.036*** 0.158*** -0.031* 0.013 -0.193*** -0.278*** 
 (0.009) (0.023) (0.016) (0.007) (0.023) (0.017) (0.015) (0.034) (0.038) 
Population-squared (ln) 0.000 -0.009*** 0.001 -0.001* -0.010*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Lost decades -0.001 0.038*** 0.032*** -0.007*** 0.034*** 0.033*** -0.011*** 0.045*** 0.038*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) 
Post SAPs -0.000 0.053*** 0.051*** -0.011*** 0.043*** 0.049*** -0.016*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.002) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) 
MDGs -0.003 0.044*** 0.051*** -0.009*** 0.036*** 0.052*** -0.028*** 0.043*** 0.054*** 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012) 
Intercept -0.225 -1.216*** -0.624*** -0.371*** -1.596*** -0.700*** -0.813*** -1.350*** -1.557*** 
 (0.150) (0.183) (0.168) (0.066) (0.229) (0.190) (0.198) (0.248) (0.313) 
Panel B: U Test          
Slope at LB of Income (ln) 0.020*** 0.056*** 0.069*** 0.018*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.225*** 0.260*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.015) 
Slope at UB of Income (ln) 0.020*** -0.026*** -0.021*** 0.008** -0.055*** -0.028*** 0.002  -0.009 -0.075*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) 
 U test statistic  3.022 2.661  4.368 2.803  0.572 3.948 
                    [0.001] [0.004]  [0.000] [0.003]  [0.284] [0.000] 
Extremum point  8.563 8.909 13.00 8.067 8.706 9.942 9.659 8.945 
        In 2011 US$  5236.11 7397.00    3251.45 6039.06  15657.01 7659.07 
95%CI, Fieller Method (-∞,9.93) (8.27,9.09) (8.63,9.45) (-4.69, ∞) (7.89,8.37) (8.42,9.28) (8.82,16.21) (9.25,10.30) (8.68, 9.29) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Countries 18 18 18 17 17 17 18 18 18 
Observations 918 970 930 872 914 884 918 970 930 
R-Squared 0.878 0.714 0.804 0.833 0.700 0.779 0.900 0.745 0.756 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses and p-values in square brackets. Estimations are based on the Expanded Africa Sector Database (Mensah & Szirmai, 
2018). U test is based on Lind & Mehlum (2010). LB, and UB denote lower boundary, and upper boundary, respectively. Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<.01. The Fieller Method follows an inverse test to construct confidence intervals for the ratio of normally distributed statistics. For the U-test this method is preferred 









                                      
                                  Table 5.2: Evidence on Deindustrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa (GGDC Africa Sector Database) 
U test is based on Lind & Mehlum (2010). LB, and UB denote lower boundary, and upper boundary, respectively. Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. 




 Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa excl. MUS Sub-Saharan Africa 
Panel A: Reg. Estimates EMP Nom VA Real VA EMP Nom VA Real VA EMP Nom VA Real VA 
 Manshare Manshare Manshare Manshare Manshare Manshare Indshare Indshare Indshare 
Per capita Income (ln) -0.120*** -0.081 0.003 -0.043** 0.094 0.077** 0.151** 0.515*** 0.498*** 
 (0.043) (0.050) (0.029) (0.021) (0.061) (0.032) (0.062) (0.123) (0.120) 
Per capita Income-sq. (ln) 0.009*** 0.005* 0.001 0.003*** -0.006 -0.004* -0.007* -0.024*** -0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Population (ln) 0.010 0.277*** -0.064*** 0.060*** 0.321*** -0.035* 0.072*** -0.124** -0.465*** 
 (0.015) (0.029) (0.021) (0.009) (0.032) (0.018) (0.021) (0.055) (0.070) 
Population-squared (ln) 0.000 -0.014*** 0.004*** -0.001*** -0.015*** 0.003*** -0.002* 0.009*** 0.026*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
Lost decades 0.002 0.011** 0.007** -0.009*** 0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.008 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) 
Post SAPs 0.002 -0.011 0.001 -0.019*** -0.028*** -0.006 -0.003 -0.008 -0.023 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.017) (0.019) 
MDGs -0.004 -0.034*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.052*** -0.026*** -0.020** -0.069*** -0.088*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.020) (0.024) 
Intercept 0.328 -0.903*** 0.184 -0.187* -1.778*** -0.230 -1.061*** -1.713*** -0.113 
 (0.214) (0.225) (0.160) (0.097) (0.285) (0.150) (0.287) (0.581) (0.609) 
Panel B: U Test          
Slope at LB of Income (ln) -0.005 -0.011 0.020*** -0.001 0.015 0.030*** 0.066*** 0.203*** 0.216*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.013) (0.006)  (0.011) (0.030) (0.027) 
Slope at UB of Income (ln) 0.078*** 0.040** 0.033*** 0.034*** -0.042* -0.004 0.004 -0.023 0.012 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.011) (0.008) (0.025) (0.013) (0.027) (0.041) (0.045) 
 U test statistic 0.746 0.879   1.205 0.297  0.571  
                   [0.228] [0.190]   [0.114] [0.383]  [0.284]  
Extremum point 6.695 7.361  6.198   7.639 10.520 11.353 10.557   11.298 
        In 2011 US$ 808.43 1572.95  491.61 2076.78 37036.62 85227.83 38463.27 80686.66 
95%CI, Fieller Method (5.15,7.11) (-∞,17.1) (-∞, 13.93) (1.58,7.02) (-∞,∞) (-30.6, ∞) (-10.9, ∞) (9.68, 13.63) (9.95,17.67) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Countries 11 11 11 10 10 10 11 11 11 
Observations 524 565 530 481 512 487 524 565 530 







                                Table 5.3: Evidence on Deindustrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa (UN Database) 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  Sub-Saharan Africa excl. HEC 
Panel A: Reg. Estimates Nom VA Real VA Nom VA Real VA Nom VA Real VA Nom VA Real VA 
 Manshare Manshare Indshare Indshare Manshare Manshare Indshare Indshare 
Per capita Income (ln) -0.050*** 0.136*** -0.041 0.067 -0.102*** 0.118*** -0.156*** -0.025 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.049) (0.049) (0.021) (0.027) (0.052) (0.051) 
Per capita Income-squared (ln) 0.004*** -0.006*** 0.009*** 0.003 0.007*** -0.005*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Population (ln) 0.086*** 0.132*** 0.046** 0.096*** 0.069*** 0.121*** 0.054*** 0.122*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.021) (0.023) (0.009) (0.010) (0.021) (0.022) 
Population-squared (ln) -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.000 -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
1980s 0.003 0.012*** -0.006 0.009 -0.001 0.013*** -0.010 0.010 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) 
Post SAPs 0.004 0.020*** -0.005 0.016 -0.004 0.021*** -0.005 0.023** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) 
MDGs -0.007 0.006 -0.027** -0.011 -0.016*** 0.009* -0.022 -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.013) (0.006) (0.005) (0.015) (0.014) 
Intercept -0.191** -1.154*** -0.122 -0.689*** 0.084 -1.022*** 0.277 -0.496** 
 (0.087) (0.131) (0.232) (0.251) (0.093) (0.130) (0.233) (0.252) 
Panel B: U Test         
Slope at LB of Income (ln) -0.009 0.079*** 0.046** 0.097*** -0.031*** 0.072*** 0.009 0.075*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.019) (0.019) 
Slope at UB of Income (ln) 0.041*** 0.010 0.149*** 0.132*** 0.053*** 0.018** 0.208*** 0.195*** 
 (0.006) (0.008)   (0.021) (0.020) (0.007) (0.008) (0.024) (0.023) 
U test statistic 1.136    3.634    
                   [0.128]    [0.000]    
Extremum point 5.939 11.588 2.325 -11.137 7.063 12.627 4.619 1.253 
    In 2011 US$ 379.76    1168.79        
95% CI, Fieller Method (3.38,6.82) (10.42, 15.22) (-10.62, 4.57) (-∞, 25.48) (6.36,7.45) (10.85,21.21) (2.66, 5.50) (-9.86,3.77) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Countries 46 46 46 46 41 41 41 41 
Observations 2157 2157 2157 2157 1922 1922 1922 1922 
R-Squared 0.703 0.783 0.736 0.827 0.680 0.785 0.755 0.850 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses and p-values in square brackets. Estimations are based on the UN National Accounts: Analysis of Main Aggregate 
Database. U test is based on Lind & Mehlum (2010). HEC, LB, and UB denote high exporting countries, lower boundary, and upper boundary, respectively. Significance 
levels: * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.0.   The Fieller Method follows an inverse test to construct confidence intervals for the ratio of normally distributed statistics. For the 
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Per capita Income (ln) 0.176*** 0.142*** -0.220*** 0.162** 0.194*** 0.081* 0.370*** 0.242*** 
 (0.047) (0.051) (0.036) (0.069) (0.047) (0.046) (0.055) (0.043) 
Per capita Income-squared (ln) -0.011*** -0.007** 0.014*** -0.009** -0.015*** -0.003 -0.019*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Population (ln) 0.010 0.053*** -0.089*** 0.562*** 0.098*** -0.015 0.377*** 0.336*** 
 (0.024) (0.011) (0.028) (0.053) (0.037) (0.011) (0.060) (0.049) 
Population-squared (ln) -0.000 -0.006*** 0.006*** -0.034*** -0.005** -0.001 -0.025*** -0.020*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) 
1980s -0.001 0.015*** 0.000 -0.016* 0.001 0.015*** 0.002 -0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) 
Post SAPs 0.017*** 0.030*** -0.003 -0.010*** -0.009 0.036*** -0.000 -0.019** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) 
MDGs 0.005 0.028*** -0.008 -0.020*** -0.025** 0.031*** -0.008 -0.021** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.019) (0.010) 
Intercept -0.621*** -0.713*** 1.288*** -2.921*** -0.963*** -0.284* -2.908*** -2.459*** 
 (0.231) (0.198) (0.222) (0.404) (0.273) (0.162) (0.357) (0.324) 
Panel B: U Test         
Slope at LB of Income (ln) 0.065*** 0.069*** -0.078*** 0.073*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.186*** 0.111*** 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.027) (0.015) (0.017) (0.025) (0.017) 
Slope at UB of Income (ln) -0.068*** -0.019 0.091*** -0.033* -0.118*** 0.017 -0.034** -0.046*** 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.011) (0.023) (0.025) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) 
U test statistic 2.980 1.060 4.980 1.450 3.35  2.28 2.74 
                   [0.001] [0.145] [0.000] [0.074] [0.000]  [0.012] [0.003] 
Extremum point 7.752 9.500 7.612 8.921 6.680      13.64 9.834 9.035 
    In 2011 US$ 2327.12 13346.21 2021.95 7485.80 796.274 842457.07 18648.95 8394.29 
95% CI, Fieller Method (7.32, 8.60) (8.71,16.73) (7.14, 7.93) (8.24, 17.29) (6.10, 7.05) (1.67, ∞) (9.38, 10.57) (8.56,9.97) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Countries 16 10 9 11 16 10 9 11 
Observations 752 470 423 512 752 474 423 512 
R-Squared 0.747 0.849 0.643 0.724 0.741 0.827 0.879 0.818 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses and p-values in square brackets. Estimations are based on the UN National Accounts: Analysis of Main Aggregate 
Database. U test is based on Lind & Mehlum (2010). LB and UB denote lower boundary, and upper boundary, respectively. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01. The Fieller Method follows an inverse test to construct confidence intervals for the ratio of normally distributed statistics. For the U-test this method is preferred 









5.5. The deep drivers of manufacturing performance in Africa     
Our baseline data (EASD) show that conditional on income, population, and country-specific 
idiosyncratic factors, the manufacturing share of employment is declining while the manufacturing 
share of output is increasing. These opposing trends point to a potential productivity effect. To 
understand this trend and other underlying drivers of manufacturing outcomes in Africa, we 
estimate model 5.2, examining the marginal effect of the key as well as other independent variables 
on the manufacturing share of employment in Africa. Table 5.5 presents the regression results. 
Column 1 shows the estimated coefficients of the key independent variables, Column 2 shows the 
estimated coefficients of all independent variables except trade, and Column 3 shows the result 
for all regressors. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent across the three models. 
Our preferred model is model 3. As expected, the coefficients on internal factors except for 
income – i.e., population, and relative labor productivity growth – are statistically significant and 
exhibit the expected signs. The results show a U-shaped relationship between manufacturing share 
of employment and per capita income, suggesting that in Africa, conditional all other variables in 
the model, as income increases, it induces the reallocation of labor from the manufacturing sector 
of Africa. However, beyond a certain level of income, the growing affluence of consumers induces 
reallocation of labor into manufacturing. This is inconsistent with Bell’s Law and the extended 
Engel’s law where changes in the marginal rate of substitution (budget share) between the 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sector initially induces the reallocation of activity in favor 
of the manufacturing sector. However, our results are consistent with existing studies on Africa 
which control for some of the key variables used in our model. For example, our results 
corroborate the results of Mijiyawa (2017), who finds a U-shape relationship between the 
manufacturing share of GDP and per capita income in Africa. The U-shape relationship between 
manufacturing activities and per capita income characterizes less competitive countries in a highly 
competitive and globalized world (ibid). 
Population shows an inverted U-shape relationship with the manufacturing share of employment. 
There is no doubt that population, a proxy for the size of domestic market, is important for the 
industrialization of Africa.  However, in African countries that are populated by poor consumers, 
beyond a certain level of population, the negative ‘size’ effect seems to dominate the positive scale 
economies.  
The results further show that there is a negative relationship between technological progress in 
manufacturing relative to services and manufacturing employment in Africa. Thus, relatively faster 
productivity growth in the manufacturing sector shrinks manufacturing employment in Africa, 
confirming the Baumol’s cost disease hypothesis. Two reinforcing reasons may explain this result. 
First, manufacturing goods are traded through global value chains (GVCs) which also acts as a 
channel for the diffusion of skilled-biased technologies in developing countries (Rodrik, 2018b). 
However, the diffusion of these technologies adversely affects manufacturing employment in 
developing countries by replacing less skilled workers. As explained above, manufacturing goods 
exported to international markets embodies higher knowledge intensity and standards, which 
requires less manual work leading to the use of labor-saving technologies such as automation or 
mechanization. In the context of Africa, our result is consistent with the recent study of Pahl et al. 
(2019), who show that technological change through the GVC participation has a negative effect 
on manufacturing jobs in emerging African countries. 
 
 





Table 5.5: Deep Drivers of Manufacturing Employment Shares in Africa, 1970-2015 
 
Notes: Panel-corrected Standard errors in parentheses. Estimations are based EASD. Significance level: * p<.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<.01 
 
Second, as price takers on the world market, African countries may have imported the negative 
effect of technological progress from abroad. After the SAPs, most African countries liberalized 
their trade regimes resulting in a significant surge in trade inflows. At the same time, technological 
progress reduced the relative prices of manufacturing goods on the world market. Examination of 
the underlying data shows that there was a marginal increase in the relative labor productivity of 
manufacturing, but this was not sufficient to counteract the magnitude of the reduction in the 
 (1) (2) (3)  
 Manshare_EMP Manshare_EMP Manshare_EMP  
Per capita Income (ln) -0.236*** -0.237*** -0.255***  
 (0.046) (0.036) (0.039)  
Per capita Income-squared (ln) 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020***  
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)  
Population (ln) 0.298*** 0.213*** 0.253***  
 (0.034) (0.028) (0.030)  
Population-squared (ln) -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.005***  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Unbalanced Productivity growth -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.024***  
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)  
Man. imports from Africa (%MVA) -0.026  0.014  
 (0.017)  (0.015)  
Man. imports from North (% MVA) -0.015***  -0.010***  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  
Man. imports from South (% MVA) -0.018***  -0.014***  
 (0.003)  (0.003)  
Man. exports to Africa (%MVA) 0.024***  0.007  
 (0.008)  (0.007)  
Man. exports to North (% MVA) 0.046***  0.029***  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  
Man. exports to South (% MVA) 0.004**  0.003*  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  
Index of Undervaluation  0.009*** 0.007**  
  (0.003) (0.003)  
Fixed capital (% GDP)  0.054*** 0.057***  
  (0.008) (0.008)  
Human capital  0.212*** 0.152***  
  (0.024) (0.027)  
Foreign Direct Investment (ln)  0.016*** 0.011***  
  (0.002) (0.002)  
Interaction: FDI and Human capital  -0.011*** -0.008***  
  (0.001) (0.001)  
Intercept -1.685*** -1.274*** -1.440***  
 (0.308) (0.239) (0.244)  
Country FE Yes Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 620 576 576  
R-squared 0.933 0.939 0.945  
 





relative price of manufacturing from elsewhere.105 The net effect is a shrinkage in manufacturing 
employment.              
The variables intended to capture the contribution of international trade on relative manufacturing 
employment in Africa – manufactured exports and imports – exhibit the expected sign in model 1 
and model 3. The only difference is that once we control for the other variables in model 3 the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients reduces. Manufactured exports from other African 
countries, the global South and global North as a percentage of manufacturing output correlate 
positively with the manufacturing employment share. The role of manufactured exports to Africa 
is not statistically significant once we control for other factors (model 3), however, indicating the 
limited role that intra-African trade has played in building the productive capacity of the continent. 
The share of intra-African exports as a percentage of total African exports was 17 percent in 2017 
compared to 59 percent in Asia, 69 percent in Europe, and 31 percent in North America (Songwe, 
2019). It is projected that the successful implementation of the African Continental Free Trade 
Area (AfCFTA) will double the size of the manufacturing sector and create 14 million jobs in 
Africa by 2025 (Signé, 2018). The AfCFTA is promising for industrialization since recent evidence 
suggests that manufactured goods, which are more knowledge-intensive compared to primary 
products, make up 42 percent of intra-African exports compared to 15% of extra-regional exports 
(Songwe, 2019). This means AfCFTA will not only boost the size of industry but may also facilitate 
knowledge transfer and catch-up within Africa, as shown by the catch-up analysis in Chapter 4.  
Manufactured imports from the North and the South correlate negatively with relative 
manufacturing employment, with the coefficient of imports from the South being bigger than the 
coefficient on imports from the North in absolute value. This suggests that the competition effect 
is stronger than the spillover effect. After the SAPs, most African countries opened their borders 
to trade. After hiding behind protective walls for decades, the domestic industry was not able to 
compete on cost with the South and on quality with the North after trade liberalization. As a result, 
they imported employment deindustrialization. The statistically significant coefficient of imports 
is, however, lower than exports, indicating that economic globalization increases relative 
manufacturing employment in Africa than it decreases.  
The coefficient of the index of undervaluation is positive and statistically significant. This means 
that competitive exchange rates will make the tradable sector more profitable, increasing the 
relative size of manufacturing by acting as a subsidy to remove distortions created by weak 
contracting institutions and market failures. Our result is consistent with the empirical findings of 
McMillan, Rodrik, & Verduzco-Gallo (2014) where overvaluation of currencies through 
disinflationary monetary policy and foreign aid inflows inhibits structural change. It is also 
consistent with the theoretical predictions of Diao & McMillan (2018), where assumptions about 
a country’s dependence on foreign aid inflows for infrastructure development could cause real 
exchange rate appreciation making the open modern sector less competitive. The stock of human 
capital is positively correlated with the share of manufacturing employment. Improving the quality 
of education and training in Africa is essential for producing knowledge-intensive goods. Domestic 
investment has a significant effect on relative manufacturing employment. FDI is also an important 
conduit for industrialization through knowledge transfer. In our model, FDI has a statistically 
strong effect on manufacturing employment. However, manufacturing FDI tends to flow into 
 
105 Using data from EASD to calculate the change in relative manufacturing labor productivity of Africa and the 
GDDC 10-sector database to calculate the change in the relative price of manufacturing in China and the North (the 
major trading partners of African countries).  
 





low-income countries where the human capital stock and wages tend to be low, creating a negative 
interaction effect. In our model, we measure this indirect effect by interacting FDI with the stock 
of human capital. The results show that FDI indirectly displaces manufacturing jobs in Africa. 
This is consistent with the observation that manufacturing FDI tends to flow into low-income 
countries with low-skilled labor and wages.  
 
5.6. Conclusion 
Deindustrialization is a key feature of structural change around the world. While there is no debate 
about evidence on deindustrialization in Latin America and developed countries, the evidence on 
the pattern of deindustrialization in Africa is inconclusive. The representativeness and the coverage 
of the samples used in previous analyses often form the crux of the debate. This chapter provides 
extensive evidence on deindustrialization in Africa, using carefully constructed data and other 
reliable sources. We find that the evidence on deindustrialization is sensitive to sample size. If we 
replicate the results of Rodrik (2016) with data for the 11 African countries in the 10-sector 
database of GGDC, we find similar patterns. However, if we increase the sample size from 11 to 
18 and 45, different patterns and trends emerge. For the sample of 18 countries in the EASD, 
conditional on income, population, and country fixed effects, we observe employment 
deindustrialization and output industrialization in Africa. When we increase the sample to cover 
all countries in (Sub-Saharan) Africa, we do not find evidence of (output) deindustrialization 
neither do we find evidence of industrialization, however. Therefore, the appropriate 
characterization of the evidence for a typical African country is industrial stagnation, not premature 
deindustrialization. We, however, document significant sub-regional heterogeneity with East 
Africa industrializing and Southern Africa deindustrializing. Based on the results of the drivers of 
the deindustrialization, we argue that the deindustrialization of Southern Africa is preference-
induced whereas the significant industrialization of Eastern Africa is trade-induced. Higher levels 
of income in Southern Africa and higher levels of manufacturing exports observed in Eastern 
Africa explain the sub-regional heterogeneity.   
In addition to investigating the patterns of deindustrialization, we examine the underlying drivers 
of the declining manufacturing employment trend (in Table 5.5). We found that income (squared) 
and population are significant positive correlates of manufacturing employment, indicating that 
purchasing power and the size of the domestic market are essential for the industrial development 
of Africa. Our analysis further shows that technical progress, through the price-taker mechanism, 
has had a negative effect on relative manufacturing employment, suggesting that African countries 
may have imported negative technology effects on employment from abroad. While international 
trade, in general, creates more manufacturing jobs than it displaces in Africa, intra-regional trade 
has played a limited role in the industrial development of the continent. Our results underscore a 
number of important policy options for African economies to overcome the pervasive industrial 
stagnation. First, the results show that FDI and domestic investment are essential for the industrial 
development of the continent. Strategies to attract manufacturing FDI should be a key policy 
priority for many African countries, taking into consideration the different contexts. For example, 
relatively high-income countries like Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa, where wages are high 
and the industrial structure is capital-intensive, are less attractive for greenfield manufacturing 
investments looking for low-wage countries. For such countries, relying on FDI for industrial 
 





development is a less viable strategy, therefore targeted domestic investment would be more 
important. Most African countries are low-cost countries with young populations, therefore 
attracting greenfield investment into the manufacturing sector is critical.  However, some of the 
low-cost countries are endowed with natural resources and are vulnerable to Dutch disease. Other 
countries artificially overvalue their currencies through disinflationary monetary policy, making 
them less competitive in international markets. For these countries, in addition to attracting 
manufacturing FDI, implementing competitiveness polices such as undervaluation of domestic 
currencies could boost industrialization.  
Second, imports from both the North and South have negative effect on relative manufacturing 
employment suggesting that the competition effect is stronger than the spillover effect in the 
context of Africa. African countries can offset the negative effect through competition policies 
such as subsidies and local content laws that have minimum requirements for the procurement of 
locals and services, local employment opportunities, technology, and skill transfer, etc.   
Finally, as the results of the drivers show, promoting manufacturing exports is important for the 
industrial development of the continent. In that sense, reducing trade frictions within Africa and 





















5.7. Appendix to Chapter 5 
Baseline results with decadal dummies instead of the period dummies used throughout the thesis.  
Table A5.1: Evidence on Deindustrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa (EASD)  
 Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa excl. MUS Sub-Saharan Africa 
Panel A: Reg. Estimates EMP Nom VA Real VA EMP Nom VA Real VA EMP Nom VA Real VA 
 Manshare Manshare Manshare Manshare Manshare Manshare Indshare Indshare Indshare 
Per capita Income (ln) 0.015 0.196*** 0.208*** 0.033** 0.249*** 0.214*** 0.147*** 0.593*** 0.769*** 
 (0.031) (0.036) (0.034) (0.014) (0.046) (0.039) (0.042) (0.065) (0.062) 
Per capita Income-squared (ln) 0.000 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.001 -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.007** -0.031*** -0.043*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Population (ln) 0.017* 0.104*** -0.055*** 0.045*** 0.128*** -0.045*** 0.030** -0.219*** -0.287*** 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.016) (0.007) (0.023) (0.016) (0.015) (0.033) (0.038) 
Population-squared (ln) 0.000 -0.009*** 0.001 -0.001** -0.010*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
1970s -0.005** 0.034*** 0.022*** -0.003 0.032*** 0.023*** -0.018*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) 
1980s -0.009** 0.067*** 0.052*** -0.013*** 0.061*** 0.052*** -0.031*** 0.068*** 0.057*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) 
1990s -0.009* 0.083*** 0.070*** -0.017*** 0.073*** 0.068*** -0.039*** 0.094*** 0.091*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.013) (0.011) 
2000s -0.013** 0.082*** 0.075*** -0.016*** 0.073*** 0.076*** -0.056*** 0.068*** 0.076*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016) (0.014) 
Intercept -0.245 -1.095*** -0.537*** -0.416*** -1.394*** -0.594*** -0.864*** -1.252*** -1.492*** 
 (0.152) (0.180) (0.163) (0.065) (0.222) (0.182) (0.200) (0.245) (0.312) 
Panel B: U Test          
Slope at LB of Income (log) 0.019*** 0.059*** 0.069*** 0.018*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.062*** 0.228*** 0.260*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.016) 
Slope at UB of Income (log) 0.021*** -0.031*** -0.021*** 0.008* -0.052*** -0.026*** 0.006  -0.012 -0.075*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) 
 U test statistic  3.630 2.736  4.293 2.727  0.740 3.905 
                    [0.000] [0.003]  [0.000] [0.003]  [0.229] [0.000] 
Extremum point -24.288 8.454 8.894 12.721 8.106 8.732 10.204 9.614 8.940 
        In 2011 US$  4694.44 7295.15    3315.79 6195.68  14967.58 7628.01 
95%CI, Fieller Method (-∞,10.15) (8.19,8.87) (8.62,9.42) (-5.36, ∞) (7.90,8.41) (8.43,9.33) (8.89,20.70) (9.21,10.23) (8.68, 9.29) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Countries 18 18 18 17 17 17 18 18 18 
Observations 918 970 930 872 914 884 918 970 930 
R-Squared 0.878 0.731 0.812 0.835 0.714 0.786 0.902 0.747 0.756 
Panel-corrected standard errors are in parentheses and p-values in square brackets. Estimations are based on the Expanded Africa Sector Database (Mensah & Szirmai, 2018). U test 
is based on Lind & Mehlum (2010). LB, and UB denote lower boundary, and upper boundary, respectively. Significance levels: * p<.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01. The Fieller Method 















 Chapter 6.  Reforms and productivity growth in 




























A long-standing observation in economics is that large differences in productivity is the dominant 
source of the differences in living standards across countries (Restuccia & Rogerson, 2017). A 
recent study suggests that labor productivity is the most important source of GDP per capita in 
some developing countries (Foster-McGregor & Verspagen, 2016). The rate at which labor 
productivity grows at the aggregate level depends on two components: the intra-sectoral 
component (within effect) and the inter-sectoral component (between effect), also known as 
structural change. The former indicates the average growth rate of labor productivity within the 
sectors of an economy, and the latter measures the growth rate of labor productivity due to the 
movement of labor across the sectors of an economy. Differences in patterns of structural change 
explain much of the variation in total labor productivity growth among developing regions. For 
instance, many Asian countries have successfully undergone deep structural change that boosted 
labor productivity while most African and Latin American countries have recorded relatively low 
labor productivity growth, mostly driven by within-sector productivity growth (McMillan et al., 
2014). This raises the question of why some countries have higher labor productivity growth and 
a more dynamic shift of labor across sectors than others.  
A growing literature has identified misallocation as an important source of aggregate productivity 
differences across countries ( e.g., Bartelsman et al., 2013; Hsieh & Klenow, 2009; Restuccia & 
Rogerson, 2008). Misallocation arises from frictions or structural rigidities that prevent the efficient 
allocation of resources. The frictions that drive cross-country differences in productivity and 
allocative efficiency include among others entry barriers (Ciccone & Papaioannou, 2008), labor 
market distortions (Haltiwanger et al., 2014), trade restrictions (Revenga, 1997; Wacziarg & 
Wallack, 2004), credit frictions (Bai, Carvalho, & Phillips, 2018), financial market distortions 
(McKinnon & Pill, 1998; Shaw, 1973), market power (De Loecker et al., 2020)and monopoly 
power (Cheremukhin et al., 2017). A related literature has also identified structural reforms as 
important determinants of economic performance and labor productivity growth by engendering 
an efficient reallocation of resources such as labor by reducing rigidities that exist in markets 
(Adamopoulos & Restuccia, 2019; Bourlè et al., 2013; Casu et al., 2013; Prati et al., 2013). In 
developing countries where a series of structural reforms have been implemented over the last 
decades, there is little evidence on the impacts of these reforms on labor productivity growth 
(Dabla-Norris et al., 2016; Kouamé & Tapsoba, 2019). Most importantly, these few studies do not 
assess how these effects are distributed between the intra and inter-sectoral components, masking 
the allocative efficiency channels through which reforms affect labor productivity growth.  
This chapter fills the gap in the literature by analyzing the impact of financial sector, product 
markets, and trade reforms on labor productivity growth and exploring whether these reforms 
affect labor productivity growth by inducing a more efficient reallocation of resources either within 
sectors or across sectors or both. In doing so, this chapter is the first attempt to quantify how 
labor productivity growth effects of financial sector, product markets, and trade reforms are 
distributed between the within and the between components in developing countries. It is often 
argued that the persistent inter-sectoral productivity gaps across countries (Duarte & Restuccia, 
2010; Gollin et al., 2014)  and within countries (McMillan et al., 2014) are caused by structural 







differences in sectoral productivity relate to market failures or government failures, such as 
observable policy distortions introduced in many developing countries during the import-
substitution era. Therefore, structural reforms are expected to improve inter and intra-sectoral 
allocative efficiency, and hence productivity growth, more rapidly in developing countries (see, for 
example, the Berg's report, World Bank, 1981). Theoretically, trade reforms induce a more efficient 
allocation of resources within sectors ala Melitz (2003) and between sectors in response to changes 
in relative prices ala Ricardo and Heckscher–Ohlin models. Product market reforms increases 
competition in product markets, reduces mark-ups and generate allocative, dynamic and 
productive efficiencies (Nicodeme & Sauner-Leroy, 2007). Financial sector reforms affect 
productivity through the efficient allocation of financial resources (Schumpeter, 1912) (see Section 
2).  
For our analysis, we merge the structural reform dataset from Prati et al. (2013) with labor 
productivity data computed from sectoral data from the GGDC 10-Sector Database and the 
Expanded Africa Sector Database.107 The data cover the period 1975-2005 and includes all the 
developing countries for which data on reforms, value-added, and employment are available. We 
employ the shift-share method used in McMillan & Rodrik (2011) to decompose labor productivity 
growth into the intra-sectoral and the inter-sectoral components. To minimize possible causality 
bias between reforms and labor productivity growth, we measure reforms at the beginning of each 
period. We control for country and time fixed-effects and cluster standard errors within countries. 
We run a number of robustness checks adding various control variables, estimating a dynamic 
panel data model to correct for possible endogeneity bias, estimating a five years labor productivity 
growth model and testing for heterogeneity effects using distance to the technological frontier. 
We find that product markets and trade reforms—in a particular trade, the current account, and 
electricity and telecommunications (henceforth network) reforms—are positively associated with 
the growth rates of labor productivity. Similarly, financial sector reforms—such as domestic 
finance, banking, and securities reforms—have positive and statistically significant effects on the 
growth rate of labor productivity. However, the magnitude of the coefficients decreases as the 
country reduces the productivity gap with the technology leader. Thus, countries that are further 
away from the technology leader tend to benefit more from structural reforms than countries 
closer to the technology frontier. This evidence corroborates the empirical findings of Dabla-
Norris et al. (2016), who found that the positive impact of reforms on productivity growth 
increases with productivity distance from the technology frontier. 
Looking at the different components of the growth rate of labour productivity, structural reforms 
affect the within and the structural change components differently. In fact, most of the financial 
sector, product markets, and trade reforms have positive effects on the within component but 
have no significant effects on the structural change component of labor productivity growth. In 
terms of the distribution of the contribution of the effects of reforms on the growth rate of labor 
productivity, we find that the contribution of the effects of structural reforms arising from the 
within component accounts for between 76 percent and 96 percent of the overall productivity 
 







effect108 depending on the measure of reforms we consider. The contribution that comes from the 
structural change component thus varies between 4 percent and 24 percent, with a negative 
contribution observed in most cases. This implies that structural reforms work mostly through the 
intra-allocative efficiency channel but not through the inter-allocative efficiency channel. That is, 
structural reforms induce an efficient reallocation of resources within sectors but not across 
sectors. Our results are consistent with the argument that many developing countries had structural 
adjustment programs  without structural change (Page, 2012).  
The chapter adds to the limited literature on the impact of reforms on productivity in developing 
countries. To the best of our knowledge, Dabla-Norris et al. (2016) is a unique chapter examining 
the impact of reforms on productivity in 108 emerging markets and developing countries at the 
macroeconomic level. The authors find that the positive impact of reforms on productivity growth 
depends on the distance to the productivity technology frontier. However, they did not explore 
the distributional effects of reforms between the within and the between components. ElFayoumi 
et al. (2018) focus on structural reforms and sectoral labor reallocation, neglecting the effect of 
reforms on intra-sectoral allocative efficiency. At the microeconomic level, the recent chapter by 
Kouamé & Tapsoba (2019) is among the few studies to assess the impact of structural reforms on 
firm-level productivity in developing countries. Alternative microeconomic evidence includes 
Amiti & Konings (2007), Arnold et al. (2016), Eslava et al. (2004), and Topalova & Khandelwal 
(2011). These studies adopt a country case study approach by focusing mainly on China, Colombia, 
India, and Indonesia and find a positive impact of structural reforms on productivity. Our chapter 
differs from those chapters mentioned above by focusing on the impact of reforms on productivity 
growth in developing countries at the macroeconomic level, where existing evidence is needed, 
but limited. Second, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine how structural 
reforms affect both within and structural change components of productivity growth and evaluates 
the relative importance of reforms on both components.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 discusses the theoretical 
mechanisms through which reforms may affect the between and within effects differently; Section 
6.3 describes the datasets; Section 6.4 discusses descriptive statistics and the empirical strategy; 
Section 6.5 reports and discusses the estimation results; and Section 6.6 presents concluding 
remarks.  
6.2. Theoretical mechanisms 
In most of the theoretical literature, the link between reforms and productivity are indirect and 
often act through specific channels. In this section, we discuss some of these channels, particularly, 
how trade reforms, product market reforms, and financial market reforms may affect productivity 
growth either through the between effect or within effect.  
6.2.1. Trade reforms  
Trade reforms are reforms that reduce or eliminate frictions and costs that affect the free 
movement of goods and services across countries. From classical models of trade such as Ricardo’s 
 
108 The only exception is agriculture reform, for which the contribution is equally distributed between the within and 







theory of comparative advantage to ‘new’ new trade theory (NNTT), such as the seminal work of 
Melitz (2003), increasing the degree of openness to trade has implication on the allocation of 
resources within and across sectors. In classical models, a country gains from trade by moving 
resources to the sector that the country has a comparative advantage in. Countries specialize in 
different economic activities based on their relative differences in technology – in Ricardo’s model 
– and factor endowments – in the Heckscher–Ohlin model. In both models, trade liberalization 
induces a reallocation of resources across sectors in response to changes in relative prices. In new 
trade theories (NTT) with increasing returns to scale, trade liberalization leads to the agglomeration 
of production in certain geographic locations, which can act as growth poles because of the 
existence of agglomeration economies in these locations leading to observable sectoral change at 
the country level (Wacziarg & Wallack, 2004). This is especially the case when there are existing 
complementary spatial industrial policies that influence the location choice of firms (Newman & 
Page, 2017). In the endogenous growth models with increasing returns to scale where trade 
openness facilitates the transmission of technology and impacts upon long-run growth (Grossman 
& Helpman, 1991b), reductions in trade frictions may affect the intersectoral shifts of resources  
if the transfer of technology affects the modern and traditional sectors differently. By inducing the 
reallocation of resources across sectors, trade reforms can affect labor productivity growth through 
the structural change component.   
Another set of models demonstrates how trade liberalization affects intra-industry productivity 
growth without necessarily changing the specialization patterns of countries and hence structural 
change. In NNTT and NTT models with heterogeneous firms, differentiated products, and 
increasing returns to scale, trade occurs within narrowly defined sectors, inducing a reallocation of 
resources towards more productive firms within the same industry. For example, Melitz (2003) 
specifies a model with imperfect competition and heterogeneous firms in which trade liberalization 
leads to a shift of resources towards more productive firms within industries. In this model, more 
competitive and productive firms expand in the domestic market, and some enter the international 
market. Trade compels less productive firms to exit the market, reallocating market shares to the 
internationally competitive firms. The process leads to an increase in intra-industry productivity, 
even when productivity does not grow within firms. To be clear, if the traded goods are labor-
intensive, then increased intra-industry trade may induce structural change or even changes in the 
international organization of production (see Antras, 2003, for example). However, the immediate 
implication of the model is increased intra-industry productivity growth. Consistent with these 
theoretical predictions, Pavcnik  (2002), in a study of Chilean manufacturing plants, found that 
trade liberalization improves within-plant productivity for the plants in the import-competing 
sector. From the study, aggregate productivity improvement is mostly due to the reallocation of 
resources from less to more efficient plants.   
Furthermore, pro-competitive models have shown that trade liberalization can be beneficial to a 
country without necessarily involving the pattern of specialization. This is known in the literature 
as the pro-competitive effects of trade liberalization. For example, Melitz & Ottaviano (2008), 
integrating the different modeling structures under NTT, demonstrated that trade liberalization 
reduces mark-ups, at least in the short run, highlighting the potential pro-competitive effects 
associated with trade liberalization. For a particular sector where high-mark-up firms are many, 







of resources within that sector and hence the within component of aggregate productivity growth.  
In similar models based on imperfect competition within a dynamic Cournot-Nash framework, 
trade liberalization can have a pro-competitive effect on output without necessarily relying on 
changes in the pattern of comparative advantage (Wacziarg ,1997; Wacziarg & Wallack, 2004). The 
key implication of the pro-competitive models of trade is that gains from trade are possible without 
necessarily inducing structural change.    
6.2.2. Product markets reforms 
Product market reforms remove impediments to the proper functioning of products markets by 
increasing competition among producers of goods and services. Nicodeme & Sauner-Leroy (2007) 
argue that product market reforms affect productivity through three indirect mechanisms: 
allocative efficiency, productive efficiency, and dynamic efficiency. First, product market reforms 
such as deregulation of agricultural markets and liberalization of the telecommunication sector, 
eliminate unnecessary government interventions, barriers to entry, and open up markets. This will 
increase competition in the market and reduce economic rents such as mark-ups. For example, it 
is expected that agricultural reforms improve price incentives, affecting farm profitability, inducing 
a supply response, and hence productivity growth and sometimes agricultural commercialization 
if land tenure system permits. While the immediate supply response generates productivity growth 
within the agricultural sector, the commercialization of production, which often involves 
mechanization and adoption of new farming technologies, rapidly increases agricultural 
productivity.  Since agricultural productivity is inversely related with the share of the labor force 
in agriculture, agricultural commercialization may reduce the number of people employed in the 
agricultural sector, inducing an intersectoral movement of labor. We expect agricultural reforms 
to have  a stronger effect on the within component, rather than the structural change component, 
especially in developing countries where the supply response to changes in price incentives is 
immediate but agricultural commercialization happens in the medium to long term and often 
depends on land and labor markets institutions.    
Second, product market liberalization increases competition, forcing firms to allocate available 
resources efficiently by reducing or eliminating underutilization of factors of production such as 
labor and capital. By removing entry barriers and costs, product market competition supports the 
creation of new enterprises and business growth and increases the speed of diffusion of new 
technologies and production techniques. By increasing the intensity of competition, product 
market reforms actively encourage the spread of ideas, the adoption of better production 
techniques, technology spillovers, increasing technical and productive efficiency, and hence 
productivity growth.  Another channel through which product market reforms increase productive 
efficiency relates to agency costs. Competitive pressures incentivize managers and workers to 
reduce slack and increase worker efforts, increasing production efficiency. Finally, product market 
reforms affect productivity through dynamic efficiency or the Schumpeterian engine of growth. 
Schumpeterian models emphasize that competition reduces economic rents. It is natural for 
individual firms to accrue rents and market power. Due to the fear of losing economic rents, firms 
have great incentives to innovate. Conversely, new endogenous growth models find that 
competition increases the incentives to innovate to escape competition. There is evidence that at 







empirical relationship between competition and innovation is an inverted U-shape. In addition, 
the absorptive capacity and the type of industry will influence the incentives for innovation 
(Nicodeme & Sauner-Leroy, 2007). 
In summary, agricultural reforms such as the dismantling of agricultural marketing boards, 
privatization of state-owned companies that monopolized agricultural trade, the removal of price 
controls, and the removal of exchange rate restrictions to promote exports may create price 
incentives and induce productivity growth within the agricultural sector. However, this may also 
lead to agricultural commercialization and mechanization if land tenure system permits. With the 
inverse relationship between mechanization and the share labor force in agriculture, agricultural 
reforms can generate a between effect conditional on land and labor institutions. Similarly, we 
expect network reforms to increase efficiency and reduce mark-ups in electricity and 
telecommunications markets. Depending on the heterogeneity of mark-ups across sectors and 
interconnectedness of the deregulated sector to other sectors of the economy, the allocative 
efficiency effect of product market reforms will increase aggregate productivity growth either 
through the reallocation of resources across or within sectors. Especially with the rise of mobile 
money services in many developing countries, a competitive telecommunication sector will have 
effects beyond its boundaries. However, we expect a stronger within effect from product market 
reforms. This is because product market reforms may generate allocative and productive efficiency 
in the short term and dynamic efficiency in the long term. We expect dynamic efficiency to induce 
structural change. On balance, product market reforms will generate stronger within effects than 
structural change, at least in the short run.  
6.2.2.1. Financial markets reforms 
The main role of financial institutions is to facilitate the efficient allocation of resources in an 
economy. Schumpeter (1912) argued that financial institutions have the ability to identify 
entrepreneurs with prospects and can, therefore, help channel resources to their most productive 
uses. A well-functioning financial system can identify and fund firms with the highest probability 
of initiating new products and processes, boosting the rate of technological innovation in an 
economy. Therefore, it has been recognized that a well-functioning financial sector is a 
precondition for the efficient allocation of resources and potential long-run economic growth 
(Levine, 1997, 1999). Allocative efficiency is often associated with a more unfettered – liberalized 
and deregulated – financial system. However, financial sectors of developing countries are often 
described as repressive, with excess control and interference from the state. Financial sector 
reforms – mostly through structural adjustment loans – aim to remove the systemic repressions 
and restrictions on the price and quantity of credit, boost productivity growth by generating higher 
levels of domestic investment and encourage a more efficient allocation of capital within and 
across sectors (Dabla-Norris et al., 2016; Graham, 1996). Notably, there is an indication that 
financial liberalization improves allocative efficiency by allowing investment funds to go to firms 
with a higher marginal return to capital (Galindo, Schiantarelli, & Weiss, 2007). For within-sector 
productivity growth, financial reforms lower the cost of credit, allowing financially constrained 
firms to access capital and produce at a more efficient level. Furthermore, it enables the financing 
of new machinery, the adoption of new production techniques, and innovation within industries. 







countries increased aggregate productivity through a more efficient allocation of capital within-
industry by 10% to 16% (Larrain & Stumpner, 2017).  
Conversely, financial reforms affect structural change by inducing the reallocation of capital and 
investment to more productive industries. For instance, there is an indication that well-developed 
financial systems increase investment more in growing industries and decrease investment more 
in declining industries compared to less-developed financial systems (Wurgler, 2000). The 
efficiency with which capital is allocated across industries is also inversely related to the extent of 
state ownership in the economy (ibid). Furthermore, there is evidence that countries with well-
developed financial markets have relatively high correlated intersectoral growth rates (structural 
change) and respond better to global opportunities (Fisman & Love, 2004). This evidence implies 
that by removing restrictions and state interference, financial reforms may also boost productivity 
growth through structural change. 
 
6.3. Data 
6.3.1. The structural reforms data 
To measure structural reforms, we employ the dataset on real sector reforms and financial sector 
reforms from Prati et al. (2013).109 Compared to existing structural reforms datasets in the 
literature, this database has the advantage of covering more than 90 countries across the world 
with a long-time series dimension. The chapter makes use of different indexes of real and financial 
sector reforms. For the real sector reforms, we employ indicators related to the openness to 
international trade and product market liberalization. Openness to international trade is measured 
over two dimensions: (i) the average tariff rate and (ii) the restrictions on current account 
transactions that include payments and receipts on exports and imports of goods and services. 
Restrictions on current account transactions measure restrictions on the proceeds from trade 
transactions, rather than on the underlying transactions as several countries use in practice 
restrictions on trade proceeds as a type of trade restriction. In the context of theoretical 
discussions, we expect trade reforms to affect productivity growth positively, but whether this will 
work either through the between effect or within effect or both cannot be determined, a priori. 
We use each dimension of the openness to international trade individually in the regressions.  
Product market reforms are agricultural sector reforms and the degree of liberalization in the 
telecommunication and electricity markets (network sector reforms). Agricultural sector reforms 
measure the extent of public intervention in the market of the country's main agricultural export 
commodity, the presence of export marketing boards, and the incidence of administrated prices. 
The degree of liberalization in the telecommunication and electricity markets accounts for the 
existence of an independent regulator, and the extent of competition in the provision of the 
services. The regressions will include the indexes of agricultural sector reforms and liberalization 
in the network sector separately.    
The indicators of financial reforms derived from Abiad et al. (2008) include two main indexes. The 
first index measures the degree of domestic financial liberalization which is an average of six sub-
 
109 See the online supplemental materials of Prati et al (2013) for the list of countries covered by this database and the 







indices: (i) credit controls accounting for subsidized lending and directed credit, (ii) interest rate 
controls such as floors and ceilings, (iii) competition restrictions related to entry barriers and limits 
on number of bank branches, (iv) the importance of state ownership, (v) the quality of banking 
supervision and regulation, and (vi) the degree of legal restrictions on the development of domestic 
bonds and equity markets and the existence of independent regulators. Of the six sub-indices, the 
first five sub-indices document reforms in the banking system while the sixth captures securities 
sector reforms. Our strategy will consist of introducing the aggregate domestic financial 
liberalization index and two separate indexes of reforms in the banking system and securities 
sector. The second index of financial sector reform captures the degree of external capital account 
liberalization. This is an average of two sub-indicators measuring the intensity of restrictions on 
residents and nonresidents in moving capital in and out of a country. The external capital account 
liberalization index captures a broad set of restrictions on financial transactions for residents and 
non-residents and the use of multiple exchange rates. In the regressions, we include the aggregate 
index of external capital account liberalization and two separate indices of capital account 
liberalization for residents and non-residents. As in the original database, all (normalized) reform 
indicators range between 0 and 1, with a higher value corresponding to a higher degree of 
liberalization in the associated sector. Consistent with the theoretical discussion, we expect the 
domestic financial liberalization variable to affect both between and within effects through the 
efficient allocation of capital and investments. Financial openness may also affect productivity by 
improving domestic allocative efficiency, by allowing countries to effectively share risks and invest 
in riskier but high-return firms/sectors (e.g., see the model of Obstfeld, 1994). We expect external 
financial liberalization to affect productivity through both the between and within channels.    
6.3.2. Sectoral Indicators data 
To analyze the effect of reforms on productivity growth, and the within and structural change 
components, we use the Groningen Growth and Development Center (GGDC) 10-sector 
database (M. Timmer et al., 2015) and the Expanded Africa Sector Database (EASD) (Mensah and 
Szirmai, 2018). These datasets have been widely used to analyze productivity across time and space 
because of their coverage and reliability. The GGDC 10-sector database provides long-run 
harmonized sectoral data on nominal value added, real value added, and employment for ten broad 
sectors of the economy in 42 countries mostly from the 1960s to 2010. Of the 42 countries, 11 
countries are in Africa, 11 countries are in Asia, 2 countries in MENA, 9 countries are in Latin 
America, and 8 countries are in Europe and the USA. We complemented this dataset with the 
EASD, which updates value added and employment data for the 11 existing African countries. 
EASD also extends the coverage of the data to 7 new countries in Africa, increasing our sample 
to 49 countries. Of the 49 countries, 8 countries in Europe, along with Hong Kong-China, Japan, 
Singapore, South Korea, and the USA are classified as developed countries. Our analysis is based 
on the remaining 36 developing countries.  
Using this dataset, we apply the shift-share methodology to decompose labor productivity growth 
in developing countries. As mentioned above, labor productivity in a country can grow in two 
ways; either within sectors due to innovation, capital accumulation, and a more efficient allocation 
of resources across plants or through the movement of workers from low-productivity sectors to 







Aggregate labor productivity growth is defined as the weighted sum of sectoral productivity, with 
the weights being the employment shares, that is:  
6.1                   𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 = ∑𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                                                       
where 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is labor productivity of sector 𝑖𝑖 in time 𝑡𝑡 given by 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =  
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� , 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 being sector 𝑖𝑖’s real 
value added and 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 being the number of persons employed in sector 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡.  Real value added 
(volume) is used to measure the growth of output per worker because the nominal value added 
conflates movement in quantities and prices. 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the sectoral employment share defined as the 
ratio of each sector’s employment to the total employment of the economy at time 𝑡𝑡. Given the 
above, many researchers have decomposed labor productivity growth between time (𝑡𝑡) and (0) 
using variant forms of the shift-share method.110 In this chapter, we take inspiration from Rodrik 
and McMillan (2011) to decompose aggregate labor productivity growth. The approach is given as: 
6. 2                     ?̇?𝑞 =  ∆𝑞𝑞
𝑞𝑞0
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The first term on the right-hand side is the within effect, and the second term is the reallocation 
effect (structural change). The within effect measures average productivity growth within the 
sectors of an economy due to the adoption of new production techniques, innovation, and 
improvements in intra-sectoral allocative efficiency and productive efficiency. The reallocation 
effect measures productivity growth mainly due to the improvement in intersectoral allocative 
efficiency i.e. the movement of labor from lower productivity sectors to higher productivity 
sectors.  
6.3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
This section discusses the variation in reform indices, the patterns of labor productivity growth, 
and structural change in developing countries over time. Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 show the 
evolution of the (five-year average) indices of product markets reforms and financial markets 
reforms, respectively, since 1975. For the real sector, reforms related to trade has been more 
pronounced than reforms related to agriculture and electricity and telecommunications. This is 
consistent with the observation that structural adjustment programs in products markets were 
mostly preoccupied with trade openness. In addition, we observe that the distribution of the trade 
liberalization index narrows over time, indicating that most countries further liberalized their trade 
regimes. Countries in the sample also underwent deep financial liberalization. We observe a strong 
variation over time in the domestic financial sector reforms and its two components – banking 
and securities markets as well as the financial openness index (capital accounts index). The strong 
financial liberalization observed in developing countries may be explained by the fact that the SAPs 
or most IMF programs are highly contingent on recipient’s commitment to financial and fiscal 
reforms.      
 
 







  Figure 6.1: Real sector reforms 
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on Prati et al. (2013). Higher values indicate higher degree of liberalization. 
Figure 6.2. Financial markets Reforms 
 
      Notes: Authors’ calculation based on Prati et al. (2013). Higher values indicate higher degree of liberalization 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the results of the decomposition exercise by region and country, 
respectively. Table 6.1 confirms regional differences in labor productivity growth, highlighting the 
potential differences in allocative and productive efficiency. For example, the highest labor 




































































































































































average. In contrast, productivity growth decreased by about 0.2% per annum on average in Latin 
America due to weak productivity growth within sectors. Productivity grew by 1.4% in Africa with 
structural change contributing as much as the within effect. There is also heterogeneity in 
productivity growth of the countries within each region. The highest degree of heterogeneity is 
observed in Africa with a standard deviation (SD) of 6.5%.  For example, productivity growth is 
as high as 4.6% in Botswana but as low as -0.1% in Ethiopia over the same period (see Table 2). 
The observed productivity gaps between Asian and non-Asian developing countries are well-
documented in the literature. For example, Timmer et al. (2014) find similar productivity patterns 
and show that while structural change in Asia is characterized by a reallocation of labor towards 
sectors that experience both above-average productivity level and above-average productivity 
growth, in Africa and Latin America resources move toward sectors with above-average 
productivity but below-average productivity growth, resulting in dynamic productivity losses. 
McMillan et al. (2014) find a similar productivity difference and argue that the difference in 
aggregate labor productivity growth between Asian economies and non-Asian economies is due 
to different patterns of structural change. Relating these findings to the speed of transition from 
one income level to another, Foster-McGregor and Verspagen (2016) show that the high level of 
labor productivity growth helped Asian countries to transition faster from one income level to 
another, when compared with non-Asian countries.    









SS Africa 0.7 0.7 1.4 6.5 
Asia 2.9 0.6 3.5 1.8 
Latin America -0.8 0.7 -0.2 4.8 
MENA 1.5 0.7 2.2 5.2 
  Source: Authors’ calculation based on the GGDC 10-sector database and Expanded Africa Sector Database. Figures 
are unweighted averages across countries within each region. Due to approximation (rounding up), the components 
may not be exactly equal to total productivity growth in this table.  
 
6.4. Estimation model  
Our estimation strategy follows closely the empirical strategy of Prati et al (2013). The main 
difference between this chapter and the paper of Prati et al. (2013) is that our dependent variables 
are the growth rate of labor productivity and its two components (the within effect and structural 
change) whereas their dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita.  Our main baseline 
model is an OLS model where we control for country and time fixed-effects and cluster standard 
errors at the level of the country. In some of the estimations, we control for a number of variables 
that have been previously identified in the literature as being determinants of labor productivity 
growth. We also estimate a GMM model to correct for possible endogeneity that may exist in the 
data. Our three main dependent variables are the growth rate of labor productivity, and both the 
within and structural change components of labor productivity growth. We first estimate the 







t-1 and t. As explained above, the reform indices range from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating a 
higher degree of liberalization.  The estimating equation is given as follows: 
6.3       𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) − 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) +
                                                                                  𝛽𝛽2𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡    
 
             Table 6.2: Average Annual Labor Productivity Growth by Country (%), 1975-2005 
 
  Region Country Within Effect Structural Change LP Growth 
1. SSA Botswana 4.2 0.3 4.6 
 Burkina Faso 2.6 1.0 3.6 
 Cameroon 0.6 1.6 2.2 
 Ethiopia -0.8 0.7 -0.1 
 Ghana 0.3 0.1 0.5 
 Kenya -1.5 0.9 -0.6 
 Lesotho 1.1 0.9 2.0 
 Malawi -0.7 0.8 0.2 
 Mauritius 2.4 0.7 3.1 
 Mozambique 2.6 0.1 2.7 
 Namibia 1.4 0.2 1.6 
 Nigeria 1.6 -0.1 1.5 
 Rwanda 0.5 1.4 1.9 
 Senegal -1.8 1.1 -0.7 
 South Africa 0.1 0.6 0.7 
 Tanzania 0.4 1.1 1.6 
 Uganda -0.7 1.8 1.1 
 Zambia -0.2 -0.9 -1.0 
2. Asia  China 5.5 1.1 6.6 
  India 1.4 1.1 2.5 
  Indonesia 1.3 1.1 2.4 
  Malaysia 4.6 -1.1 3.5 
  Philippines 0.6 0.3 1.0 
  Taiwan 4.7 -0.3 4.4 
  Thailand 2.2 1.7 3.8 
3. Latin America    Argentina 0.4 -0.5 -0.1 
  Bolivia -1.4 1.3 -0.1 
  Brazil -1.2 1.1 0.0 
  Chile 1.7 0.4 2.0 
  Colombia -0.6 0.6 0.0 
  Costa Rica -1.0 1.0 0.0 
  Mexico -1.5 1.0 -0.5 
  Peru -1.7 0.8 -0.9 
  Venezuela -2.3 0.4 -1.9 
4. MENA  Egypt 2.6 0.7 3.3 








Source: Authors’ calculation based on the GGDC 10-sector database and Expanded Africa Sector Database. Due 
to approximation (rounding up), the components may not be exactly equal to total productivity growth in this 
table. 
 
The dependent variable, 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) − 𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1), is the annual growth 
rate of labor productivity for country 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡. The key parameter of interest is 𝛽𝛽2 which 
measures the effect of a given reform on the growth rate of labor productivity. Because different 
types of reforms may yield different outcomes, it is important to use the disaggregated indicators. 
Following the work of Prati et al. (2013), we enter the different real and financial sector reforms 
individually in the model because of the high correlation between the reform variables. In some 
of our specifications, we include additional control variables, 𝐸𝐸, that include the growth rate of the 
population, endowments of human capital, as well as an indicator of the quality of institutions. 
Country and time fixed effects are captured by 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 and  τt, respectively.  
The novelty in this chapter is to analyze the effect of reforms on the within and the structural 
change components of the growth rate of labor productivity. The linear OLS model allows us to 
effectively regress reforms on the within component and the structural change component as a 
means of decomposing the effect of reforms into an intra-sectoral allocative efficiency channel 
and an inter-sectoral allocative efficiency channel, respectively. The estimating equations are given 
as follows:  
6.4     𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛼𝛼2𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡           
6. 5   𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝛾𝛾𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙_𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝛿2𝐺𝐺𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 +
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡     
That is, because the estimation models are linear and the dependent variable in equation (6.3) is 
the sum of the dependent variables in equations (6.4) and (6.5), hence we can write: 
 6.6                                                                 𝛽𝛽2 = 𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛿𝛿2                                                   
With this expression, we can determine the fraction of the effect of reforms on labor productivity 
growth that comes through the within component and the fraction that comes from the structural 
change component. The advantage of this approach is that it provides comparable cross-country 
evidence on the effect of reforms on within-sector productivity growth and structural change, 
contrary to the anecdotal argument about the potential effect of adjustment programs on the 
structural transformation of developing countries. In addition, this approach avoids the pitfall of 
a lack of comparability of cross-country firm level data that characterizes some micro-level 
evidence ( Landesmann & Foster-McGregor, 2021). 
For robustness, we employ the dynamic panel method proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991) to 
correct for possible endogeneity in the estimation of the effects of reforms on labor productivity 
growth. Particularly, the use of the lagged dependent variable as regressor in the above equations 
violates the strict exogeneity assumption because the lagged dependent variable and the general 
error term are likely to be correlated, as a result, the fixed-effect OLS estimator is likely to produce 
inconsistent results.  The Arellano-Bond (AB) GMM estimator deals with the endogeneity by 
taking the first difference of equation 6.3 to remove country-specific unobserved heterogeneity 







does not allow us to quantify the distributional effect of structural reforms between the within 
effect and the structural change effect because, with the GMM,  the  dependent  variable  in  
equation  (6.3)  is  labor  productivity  in  level,  which  cannot  be decomposed  into  within  and  
between  components.   
6.5. Results and Discussion 
6.5.1. Reforms and Aggregate Labor productivity growth 
We start our discussion of the results with Table 6.3, where we regress the real and financial sector 
reforms on the growth rate of labor productivity controlling for the lagged level of labor 
productivity and country and time fixed effects. We also cluster the standard errors at the country 
level to correct for correlation that may occur among observations within countries. Similar to the 
paper of Prati et al. (2013), our baseline model does not include additional controls because of the 
high correlation between variables but as robustness checks we include some control variables in 
a separate model.  
The results show that trade reforms, and electricity and telecommunications liberalization have 
positive and statistically significant effects on the growth rate of labor productivity. The result of 
trade reforms is consistent with expectations of classical trade theory or ‘new’ new trade theory 
where trade liberalization could increase labor productivity growth either through specialization 
according to comparative advantage or  provides new opportunities for profits only to the most 
productive firms, allowing them to pay the entry costs of exporting. As the productive firms 
expand due to new market opportunities from trade, they increase demand for labor, increasing 
real wages and forcing the least productive firms to exit, inducing a more efficient allocation of 
resources within sectors. Similarly, electricity and telecommunications liberalization could increase 
productivity by increasing competition that leads to a reduction in marks-ups and market power, 
hence a more efficient allocation of resources within or across sectors. The statistically insignificant 
effect of agricultural reforms is consistent with existing findings that showed that the effect of 
agricultural reforms on key outcomes such as agricultural production and modern input usage had 
not met expectations in some developing countries. For example, Kherallah et al. (2000) find that 
following reforms in the agricultural sector, the average growth rate of agricultural production per 
capita and modern input use was negative in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s.   
For financial sector reforms, we find that reforms in domestic finance, banking, and securities have 
positive and statistically significant effects on the growth rate of labor productivity, confirming the 
intermediary role that the financial sector plays in the efficient allocation of productive investments 
(Schumpeter, 1912). Contrary to domestic financial reforms, external capital account liberalization 
does not have significant effects on labor productivity growth in the linear model. Our results are 
similar to Rodrik (1998), who found no growth effect of general capital account liberalization. 
While it is possible that capital account openness could lead to an inflow of investible funds, a 
lower cost of capital, and increases in productive investments, there is also the risk of the Dutch 
disease effect which could render the tradable sector uncompetitive.  The findings in Table 6.3 
highlight that in general real and financial sector reforms have increased the growth rate of labor 
productivity in developing countries. This confirms previous research that shows a positive 







labor productivity growth (Dabla-Norris et al., 2016), and firm productivity growth (Kouamé & 
Tapsoba, 2019). 
Table 6.4 reports results from the AB GMM estimation. The results further emphasize that real 
and financial sector reforms have positive and statistically significant effects on the growth rate of 
labor productivity. In addition, the estimated coefficients of the AB GMM model are higher than 
the ones obtained with our baseline model. In Table 6.5, we include additional control variables to 
our baseline model. These variables are the growth rate of population, a measure of human capital 
and the stock of physical capital as a share of GDP. All these variables are in natural logarithm. 
We also include the measure of constraints on the executive from Polity IV to capture the quality 
of institutions. The estimation results show that most of the reform variables that were significant 
in the baseline model are still significant in this model. However, the level of significance of the 
real sector reforms has decreased. It is worth noting that many of the additional controls are highly 
correlated. We add them to test the robustness of the results. However, for the rest of the analysis, 
we will follow Prati et al (2013) to use our baseline model that only controls for initial productivity 
level and country and time fixed effects.  
6.5.2. Intra-sectoral or Intersectoral Reallocation?  
The key question we are interested in this chapter is whether structural reforms affect labor 
productivity growth by inducing a more efficient reallocation of resources within sectors, across 
sectors or both. We investigate the effects of reforms on these two channels of labor productivity 
growth using our baseline specification, which controls for country and time fixed-effects, and the 
initial level of labor productivity. The estimation results using the within component as dependent 
variable are reported in Table 6.6. Trade reforms have a sizable and significant effect on within-
sector productivity growth, confirming some of the predictions of “new’ new trade theory and 
pro-competitive models of trade, particularly, the idea that countries can still gain from trade 
without necessarily changing their specialization patterns.  Electricity and telecommunications 
liberalization have positive and statistically significant effects on within-sector productivity growth. 
By increasing the intensity of competition, product market reforms may have encouraged the 
spread of ideas, the adoption of better production techniques, technology spillovers, increasing 
technical and productive efficiency and hence productivity growth within sectors. Again, 
agricultural reforms have no effect on the within effect, in contrast to the expectation that 
agricultural reforms will create price incentives, induce a supply response, and increase agricultural 
productivity growth. The lack of productivity growth within the sector may affect essential input 
supply to other industries, and as demonstrated by Gollin (2009), agricultural productivity growth 
is necessary for aggregate productivity growth, hence the insignificant effect on the aggregate 
within effect. Another way to think about the result is that agricultural reforms may not be relevant 
beyond the agricultural sector itself, hence the limited aggregate within-sector productivity. For 
example, Table 6.14 reports the effect of all reform indices on sectoral labor productivity growth. 
The Table shows that while all other reform indices are relevant beyond agriculture, agricultural 
reforms have no significant effect on the labor productivity of industry and services. This result 
may reflect how agricultural reforms are measured in the Prati et al. (2013:948) database. In the 
database, agricultural reform is narrowly defined as “the extent of public intervention in the market 
of each country’s main agricultural export commodity. It includes the presence of export marketing 
boards and the incidence of administered prices.” For example, the main agricultural export 







other sectors such as the textile industry and telecommunications. A broader measure that includes 
input and output markets of agricultural products as well as agricultural land reforms may capture 
the agricultural effect on aggregate within effect more precisely.  
All the domestic financial sector reforms are significant and have the expected sign on the within 
effect. There are many ways through which financial sector reforms may have positively affected 
within-sector productivity growth. Financial liberalization improves allocative efficiency by 
allowing investment funds to go to firms with a higher marginal return to capital (Galindo et al., 
2007). For within-sector productivity growth, financial reforms lower the cost of credit, allowing 
financially constrained firms to access capital and produce at a more efficient level. Furthermore, 
it enables the financing of new machinery, the adoption of new production techniques and 
innovation within industries. Our results are consistent with the empirical findings and theoretical 
predictions of Larrain & Stumpner (2017). However, easing restrictions on external capital has 
little effect (non-residents) or no effect (resident) on within-sector productivity growth. The weak 
effect of financial openness relates to the benefits and costs of internal capital flows. Easing capital 
account restrictions could generate inflows such as FDI that can facilitate the transfer of foreign 
technological knowledge, encourage competition and financial sector development. It also helps 
firms to insulate themselves against risk by diversification, potentially generating growth within 
sectors. Conversely, there are increasing risks associated with the fluctuations of internal capital 
flows such as sudden reversals associated with investor sentiments and the Dutch disease effect.  
Table 6.7 shows the results of the effects of reforms on the structural change component. The 
estimated coefficients on both real and financial sector reforms are all insignificant. While these 
insignificant effects on structural change are expected from reforms such as agricultural reforms, 
at least in the short run, for some reforms such as trade reforms, the zero effect on structural 
change is surprising. Traditional trade theory predicts that countries gain from trade liberalization 
through specialization in areas of comparative advantage, and through changes in relative prices, 
which induce structural change. However, our results should be interpreted with caution since 
some structural change effect of reforms are conditional on land and labor market institutions and 
may also be realized in the long term. For example, if trade liberalization allows firms to import 
cheaper capital and intermediates inputs but firing and hiring costs are still high, firms will adopt 
more capital intensive methods of production and favor a process of creative destruction (Pariboni 
& Tridico, 2019), where the Schumpeterian engine of innovation generates productivity growth 
within sectors but not structural change due to lack of labor flexibilization. However, we do not 
have data on land and labor market reforms to test some of these mechanisms. As a second-best 
solution, we examine long-run effects of reforms on labor productivity growth and its two 
components. Presumably, in countries where land reforms and labor market reforms are 
complementary to the reforms we have considered, the structural change effects of the various 
institutional reforms should be realized after five years. Tables 6.12 and 6.13 show that the effect 
of reforms on productivity growth after five years is positive and statistically significant and works 
mainly through the within-sector effect but not through structural change.  
Overall, the results of the analysis have shown that structural reforms have increased the growth 
rate of labor productivity, mainly through the within component. Structural reforms work by 







competition, and allocative efficiency (i.e. inducing a more efficient reallocation of resources within 
sectors). However, reforms do not induce structural change in developing countries.  
In Table 6.8 we decompose the contribution of the effect of reforms on the growth rate of labor 
productivity that comes through the within component and through the structural change 
component. Among the real sector reforms, current account reform is the one that has the highest 
effect on labor productivity growth arising through the within component. In fact, more than 96% 
of the effect of current account reforms on the growth rate of labor productivity comes through 
the within component, with just 3.6% coming from the structural change/between component. 
These values are around 88% and 12% for trade and electricity and telecommunications reforms. 
Agriculture is the only real sector reform for which there is an equal contribution through the 
within and structural change components, but the previous table has shown that agriculture 
reforms did not have any significant effects on any of the dependent variables. 
Turning now to the financial sector reforms, we find that domestic finance, banking, and securities 
reforms have roughly 89% of their effects on the growth rate of labor productivity coming from 
the within component and only around 11% from the structural change/between component. 
Looking at reforms on capital and resident and non-resident capital reforms, we find that they also 
record higher contributions through the within component than the structural change. 
6.5.3. Distance to the frontier 
One of the key findings of the nascent literature on the effects of reforms on economic 
performance is that the effect may depend on the distance to the technological frontier. For 
instance, Prati et al (2013) and Dabla-Norris et al (2016) have shown that countries that are far 
from the technological frontier benefit more from some structural reforms than other reforms, 
for example. The obvious reason is that the closer a country is to the frontier, the closer is its 
allocative efficiency, dynamic efficiency, and productive efficiency to that of the frontier. As a 
result, reforms that aim to improve these productivity mechanisms, may not positively affect 
countries closer to the frontier as much as countries which are far away from the frontier. Using 
an interaction terms, we test if closeness to the technological frontier increases or decreases the 
effect of reforms on the growth rate of labor productivity and its sub-components. Following, the 
literature we consider the US as the country with the highest technology. For each country and 
year, we compute the technological distance as the ratio of the labor productivity of the country 
to the labor productivity of the US. A ratio lower than one indicates that the country is below the 
technological frontier and a ratio equal one means that the country has reached the technological 
frontier.  
In the estimations, we remove the initial level of productivity and include the variable distance to 
the technological frontier along with its interaction with each reform variable. Table 6.9 presents 
the results using the growth rate of labor productivity as the dependent variable. For real sector 
reforms, we find positive signs on the estimated coefficients of the variable reforms and negative 
signs on the interaction terms, but they are statistically significant only for the current account 
reform variable. This indicates that current account reforms have a positive effect on the growth 
rate of labor productivity, but this effect reduces as countries approach the technological frontier. 







therefore easing restrictions on the current account may not generate significant trade grains 
compared to countries far away from the productivity level of US.  For financial sector reforms – 
domestic finance, banking, and securities reforms – the results show positive and statistically 
significant effects on labor productivity but negative and statistically significant coefficients on the 
interaction with the distance to the frontier. Results for current account reforms are found to be 
similar. Generally, financial sector reforms have positive effects on labor productivity growth but 
that diminishes with proximity to the technology leader. From this table we can conclude that 
countries that are far from the technological frontier benefit more from structural reforms than 
countries closer to the technology leader.  
Finally, we investigate if distance to the technological frontier also matters for the effects of 
reforms on the within and structural change components. The results for both components are 
reported in tables 6.10 and 6.11, respectively. As for the previous estimations, we find that current 
account, domestic finance, banking, and securities reforms all have positive effects on the within 
component, but these effects decline as the productivity gap with the technological frontier 
reduces. Table 6.11 repeats the same exercise using the structural change component as the 
dependent variable. Most of the estimated coefficients are not significant but we find in a few cases 
a positive sign on the coefficient of reforms and a negative sign on the interaction term between 
real sector reforms and technological distance to the US, although the level of significance is 10%.    
6.6. Concluding remarks 
It is widely recognized that productivity is an important determinant of countries’ economic 
performance in the long run. Understanding which policies raise productivity growth in developing 
countries is essential given the low level of productivity in these countries. This chapter adds to 
the limited literature on the impacts of structural reforms on productivity growth in low and low-
middle income countries and pays particular attention to how reforms affect  both within-sector 
effect and the movement of labor across sectors of the economy i.e., structural change. The 
empirical analysis combines the dataset on structural reforms from Prati et al (2013) with a sectoral 
database from GGDC 10-sector database and EASD to compute productivity growth and 
structural change. Our findings show that financial sector reforms have greater effects on the 
growth rate of labor productivity than real sector reforms. However, reforms affect the within and 
the structural change contributions differently. Financial sector reforms have positive effects on 
the within component of the productivity growth rate. In contrast, the different reforms have 
either a negative effect or no effect on structural change. The results show that reforms affect 
growth in developing countries mostly by inducing within-sector productivity growth but not 
structural change, further providing empirical support for the argument that many developing 
countries had structural adjustments programs without structural change (Page, 2012). Our analysis 
demonstrates that market-oriented reforms alone will not be able to deliver structural change in 
developing countries; therefore, there is prima facie rational for complementary industrial policies.   
The analysis in this chapter suggests a number of future research avenues. Most of the reform 
indicators are narrowly defined. For example, agricultural reform covers the markets of each 
country’s main agricultural commodity exports. This sector may have no or limited linkages with 
other sectors of the economy, therefore the agricultural reform indicator in this research may not 







non-tariff barriers. Given that different indicators of trade openness are uncorrelated (Pritchett, 
1996), moving beyond tariffs may have some implications for the results reported. Broadening the 
reform measures and examining how they may affect labor productivity growth, but also its 
components, is an important area for future research.  
Furthermore, while this chapter considers the linear effect of reform on structural change, there is 
the possibility that the effect of reforms on structural change is nonlinear. As explained above, 
some reforms may induce sectoral reallocation of resources if they are complemented with 
appropriate land institutions and less rigid labor markets. Interacting land and labor market 
institutions may capture some of these mechanisms. However, we do not have data on land and 









                                                                          Table 6.3: Reforms and labor productivity growth 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
LnProd(t)-LnProd(t-1)           
Real sector reforms  
Trade(t-1) 0.024**          
 (0.011)          
Current_account(t-1)  0.028**         
  (0.013)         
Agriculture(t-1)   0.005        
   (0.009)        
Network(t-1)    0.019**       
    (0.008)       
Financial sector reforms 
Domestic_finance(t-1)     0.022**      
     (0.009)      
Banking(t-1)      0.020**     
      (0.009)     
Securities(t-1)       0.022***    
       (0.008)    
Capital(t-1)        0.014   
        (0.010)   
Capital_resident(t-1)         0.007  
         (0.009)  
Capital_nonresident(t-1)          0.013 
          (0.008) 
LnProd(t-1) -0.066*** -0.040** -0.032 -0.024 -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.037** -0.036** -0.036** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Constant 0.661*** 0.393** 0.326 0.242 0.400*** 0.395*** 0.401*** 0.373** 0.367** 0.367** 
 (0.146) (0.178) (0.199) (0.164) (0.122) (0.121) (0.136) (0.166) (0.172) (0.167) 
Observations 1,025 1,075 1,034 1,051 913 913 913 1,075 1,075 1,075 
Number of countries 34 32 31 31 28 28 28 32 32 32 
R-squared 0.193 0.161 0.163 0.128 0.152 0.152 0.154 0.154 0.152 0.154 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 










                                                                       Table 6.4: Reforms and labor productivity growth, GMM 
Dependent variable                     
LnProd(t)-LnProd(t-1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Real sector reforms 
Trade(t-1) 0.051**          
 (0.025)          
Current_account(t-1)  0.082***         
  (0.022)         
Agriculture(t-1)   0.041**        
   (0.019)        
Network(t-1)    0.059**       
    (0.026)       
Financial sector reforms 
Domestic_finance(t-1)     0.100**      
     (0.041)      
Banking(t-1)      0.097**     
      (0.039)     
Securities(t-1)       0.070***    
       (0.027)    
Capital(t-1)        0.079***   
        (0.022)   
Capital_resident(t-1)         0.062***  
         (0.017)  
Capital_nonresident(t-1)          0.074*** 
          (0.023) 
LNProd(t-1) 0.932*** 0.921*** 0.936*** 0.924*** 0.750*** 0.756*** 0.830*** 0.941*** 0.957*** 0.948*** 
 (0.048) (0.029) (0.031) (0.047) (0.070) (0.066) (0.063) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
Observations 991 1,043 1,003 1,020 885 885 885 1,043 1,043 1,043 
Number of countries 34 32 31 31 28 28 28 32 32 32 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
AR (1) Test P-value                0.013 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
AR (2) Test P-value 0.700 0.341 0.166 0.218 0.276 0.281 0.151 0.394 0.385 0.404 
Hansen Test P-value 0.644 0.727 0.806 0.776 0.815 0.821 0.789 0.680 0.736 0.657 








                  
                             Table 6.5: Reforms and labor productivity growth with additional control variables 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
LnProd(t)-LnProd(t-1)           
Real sector reforms 
Trade(t-1) 0.022*          
 (0.012)          
Current_account(t-1)  0.030*         
  (0.017)         
Agriculture(t-1)   -0.004        
   (0.011)        
Network(t-1)    0.022       
    (0.014)       
Financial sector reforms 
Domestic_finance(t-1)     0.049**      
     (0.018)      
Banking(t-1)      0.041**     
      (0.017)     
Securities(t-1)       0.046***    
       (0.013)    
Capital(t-1)        0.011   
        (0.014)   
Capital_resident(t-1)         0.004  
         (0.011)  
Capital_nonresident(t-1)          0.008 
          (0.012) 
LnProd(t-1) -0.070*** -0.038** -0.037 -0.017 -0.030** -0.030** -0.031** -0.039** -0.039** -0.039** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
lnpop_growth(t-1) 0.030 0.004 -0.672 -0.517 -0.490 -0.537 -0.292 0.015 0.009 0.017 
 (0.199) (0.233) (0.556) (0.473) (0.693) (0.687) (0.640) (0.235) (0.239) (0.236) 
ln_humanCapital(t-1) 0.014 -0.005 0.032 -0.020 -0.081 -0.069 -0.071 0.016 0.022 0.018 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.040) (0.061) (0.060) (0.052) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) 
ln_capital/GDP(t-1) -0.011 0.001 -0.035* -0.028 -0.030 -0.030 -0.031 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.032) (0.027) (0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Xconst(t-1) 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.735*** 0.375 0.550** 0.346 0.535** 0.526** 0.535** 0.403* 0.407* 0.402 
 (0.203) (0.235) (0.263) (0.236) (0.206) (0.208) (0.218) (0.237) (0.239) (0.240) 
Observations 985 1,038 980 995 874 874 874 1,038 1,038 1,038 
No. of countries 34 32 31 31 28 28 28 32 32 32 
R-squared 0.195 0.159 0.179 0.139 0.166 0.163 0.166 0.153 0.152 0.153 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
















                         Table 6.6: Reforms and within component 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Within                     
Real sector reforms 
Trade(t-1) 0.028***          
 (0.010)          
Current_account(t-1)  0.027**         
  (0.011)         
Agriculture(t-1)   0.003        
   (0.007)        
Network(t-1)    0.022***       
    (0.008)       
Financial sector reforms 
Domestic_finance(t-1)     0.025***      
     (0.008)      
Banking(t-1)      0.023***     
      (0.008)     
Securities(t-1)       0.025***    
       (0.008)    
Capital(t-1)        0.020*   
        (0.010)   
Capital_resident(t-1)         0.010  
         (0.008)  
Capital_nonresident(t-1)          0.019** 
          (0.009) 
LNProd(t-1) -0.069*** -0.040** -0.033 -0.025 -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.038** -0.036* -0.037** 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Constant 0.690*** 0.397** 0.340 0.259 0.445*** 0.440*** 0.446*** 0.381** 0.374** 0.374** 
 (0.147) (0.187) (0.212) (0.171) (0.125) (0.123) (0.136) (0.173) (0.181) (0.173) 
Observations 1,025 1,075 1,034 1,051 913 913 913 1,075 1,075 1,075 
Number of countries 34 32 31 31 28 28 28 32 32 32 
R-squared 0.196 0.162 0.164 0.131 0.165 0.164 0.166 0.157 0.155 0.157 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




















                                                                     Table 6.7: Reforms and structural change 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Between component                     
Real sector reforms 
Trade(t-1) -0.004          
 (0.006)          
Current_account(t-1)  0.001         
  (0.006)         
Agriculture(t-1)   0.003        
   (0.005)        
Network(t-1)    -0.003       
    (0.006)       
Financial sector reforms 
Domestic_finance(t-1)     -0.003      
     (0.006)      
Banking(t-1)      -0.003     
      (0.006)     
Securities(t-1)       -0.003    
       (0.006)    
Capital(t-1)        -0.006   
        (0.008)   
Capital_resident(t-1)         -0.003  
         (0.006)  
Capital_nonresident(t-1)          -0.006 
          (0.007) 
LNProd(t-1) -0.029 -0.004 -0.014 -0.017 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.056) (0.049) (0.053) (0.051) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) 
Constant -0.029 -0.004 -0.014 -0.017 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.056) (0.049) (0.053) (0.051) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) 
Observations 1,025 1,075 1,034 1,051 913 913 913 1,075 1,075 1,075 
Number of countries 34 32 31 31 28 28 28 32 32 32 
R-squared 0.081 0.079 0.079 0.078 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.081 0.080 0.082 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 




                                               Table 6.8: Decomposition 
  Within component (structural change) Total 
Real sector reforms    
Trade +87.5*** |-12.5| 100 
Current_account +96.4** +3.6 100 
Agriculture +50.0 +50.0 100 
Network +88.0*** |-12.0| 100 
Financial sector reforms    
Domestic_finance +89.3*** |-10.7| 100 
Banking +88.5*** |-11.5| 100 
Securities +89.3*** |-10.7| 100 
Capital +76.9* |-23.1| 100 
Capital_resident +76.9 |-23.1| 100 









                                         Table 6.9: Reforms and labor productivity growth with distance to the technological frontier 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Dist_front(t-1) -0.797*** -0.381* -0.469 -0.357 -0.529*** -0.527*** -0.515*** -0.383 -0.420* -0.376 
 (0.180) (0.206) (0.279) (0.217) (0.139) (0.140) (0.135) (0.226) (0.228) (0.239) 
Real sector reforms 
Trade(t-1) 0.138          
 (0.091)          
Dist_front(t-1)*Trade(t-1) -0.154          
 (0.111)          
Current_account(t-1)  0.313***         
  (0.110)         
Dist_front(t-1)*Current_account(t-1)  -0.361***         
  (0.128)         
Agriculture(t-1)   0.124        
   (0.086)        
Dist_front(t-1)*Agriculture(t-1)   -0.152        
   (0.097)        
Network(t-1)    0.152       
    (0.243)       
Dist_front(t-1)*Network(t-1)    -0.165       
    (0.280)       
Financial sector reforms 
Domestic_finance(t-1)     0.279***      
     (0.087)      
Dist_front(t-1)*Domestic_finance(t-1)     -0.322***      
     (0.103)      
Banking(t-1)      0.255***     
      (0.083)     
Dist_front(t-1)*Banking(t-1)      -0.297***     
      (0.098)     
Securities(t-1)       0.338***    
       (0.097)    
Dist_front(t-1)*Securities(t-1)       -0.380***    
       (0.113)    
Capital(t-1)        0.282   
        (0.209)   
Dist_front(t-1)*Capital(t-1)        -0.332   
        (0.241)   
Capital_resident(t-1)         0.196  
         (0.148)  
Dist_front(t-1)*Capital_resident(t-1)         -0.233  
         (0.172)  
Capital_nonresident(t-1)          0.252 
          (0.195) 
Dist_front(t-1)*Capital_nonresident(t-1)          -0.297 
          (0.225) 
Constant 0.721*** 0.354* 0.436* 0.324 0.484*** 0.483*** 0.468*** 0.356* 0.388* 0.350 
 (0.162) (0.185) (0.255) (0.197) (0.127) (0.128) (0.121) (0.202) (0.204) (0.214) 
Observations 983 1,032 991 1,008 871 871 871 1,032 1,032 1,032 
No. of countries 33 31 29 29 27 27 27 31 31 31 
R-squared 0.202 0.177 0.174 0.130 0.169 0.168 0.173 0.165 0.162 0.163 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 










                                          Table 6.10: Reforms and within effect with distance to the technological frontier 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Within           
Dist_front -0.853*** -0.409* -0.485 -0.363 -0.564*** -0.562*** -0.556*** -0.382 -0.426* -0.362 
 (0.190) (0.224) (0.294) (0.224) (0.131) (0.133) (0.124) (0.229) (0.234) (0.238) 
Real sector reforms 
Trade(t-1) 0.055          
 (0.095)          
Dist_front(t-1)*Trade(t-1) -0.047          
 (0.112)          
Current_account(t-1)  0.243**         
  (0.099)         
Dist_front(t-1)*Current_account(t-1)  -0.276**         
  (0.117)         
Agriculture(t-1)   0.034        
   (0.066)        
Dist_front(t-1)*Agriculture(t-1)   -0.046        
   (0.075)        
Network(t-1)    0.162       
    (0.172)       
Dist_front(t-1)*Network(t-1)    -0.173       
    (0.201)       
Financial sector reforms 
Domestic_finance(t-1)     0.212***      
     (0.076)      
Dist_front(t-1)*Domestic_finance(t-1)     -0.238**      
     (0.088)      
Banking(t-1)      0.192**     
      (0.073)     
Dist_front(t-1)*Banking(t-1)      -0.217**     
      (0.085)     
Securities(t-1)       0.273***    
       (0.092)    
Dist_front(t-1)*Securities(t-1)       -0.300***    
       (0.106)    
Capital(t-1)        0.284   
        (0.187)   
Dist_front(t-1)*Capital(t-1)        -0.328   
        (0.216)   
Capital_resident(t-1)         0.179  
         (0.118)  
Dist_front(t-1)*Capital_resident(t-1)         -0.210  
         (0.139)  
Capital_nonresident(t-1)          0.276 
          (0.188) 
Dist_front(t-1)*Capital_nonresident(t-1)          -0.319 
          (0.217) 
Constant 0.766*** 0.380* 0.449 0.333 0.517*** 0.515*** 0.506*** 0.357* 0.395* 0.340 
 (0.172) (0.200) (0.268) (0.204) (0.119) (0.121) (0.112) (0.204) (0.210) (0.213) 
Observations 983 1,032 991 1,008 871 871 871 1,032 1,032 1,032 
Nb countries 33 31 29 29 27 27 27 31 31 31 
R-squared 0.203 0.174 0.173 0.134 0.177 0.175 0.181 0.169 0.164 0.169 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 









            Table 6.11: Reforms and structural change with distance to the technological frontier 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Structural change           
Dist_front 0.055 0.028 0.015 0.006 0.035 0.035 0.041 -0.001 0.006 -0.014 
 (0.065) (0.053) (0.064) (0.064) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.049) (0.053) (0.045) 
Real sector reforms 
Trade(t-1) 0.083*          
 (0.045)          
Dist_front(t-1)*Trade(t-1) -0.107*          
 (0.054)          
Current_account(t-1)  0.070         
  (0.041)         
Dist_front(t-1)*Current_account(t-1)  -0.086*         
  (0.048)         
Agriculture(t-1)   0.089*        
   (0.046)        
Dist_front(t-1)*Agriculture(t-1)   -0.105*        
   (0.053)        
Network(t-1)    -0.010       
    (0.125)       
Dist_front(t-1)*Network(t-1)    0.008       
    (0.145)       
Financial sector reforms 
Domestic_finance(t-1)     0.066      
     (0.041)      
Dist_front(t-1)*Domestic_finance(t-1)     -0.084      
     (0.050)      
Banking(t-1)      0.063     
      (0.037)     
Dist_front(t-1)*Banking(t-1)      -0.080*     
      (0.045)     
Securities(t-1)       0.066    
       (0.050)    
Dist_front(t-1)*Securities(t-1)       -0.080    
       (0.059)    
Capital(t-1)        -0.002   
        (0.065)   
Dist_front(t-1)*Capital(t-1)        -0.003   
        (0.073)   
Capital_resident(t-1)         0.017  
         (0.058)  
Dist_front(t-1)*Capital_resident(t-1)         -0.023  
         (0.066)  
Capital_nonresident(t-1)          -0.024 
          (0.057) 
Dist_front(t-1)*Capital_nonresident(t-1)          0.022 
          (0.065) 
Constant -0.045 -0.025 -0.014 -0.008 -0.032 -0.032 -0.039 -0.001 -0.008 0.011 
 (0.059) (0.048) (0.058) (0.058) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.044) (0.048) (0.041) 
Observations 983 1,032 991 1,008 871 871 871 1,032 1,032 1,032 
Nb countries 33 31 29 29 27 27 27 31 31 31 
R-squared 0.091 0.088 0.092 0.080 0.085 0.085 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.085 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 









Table 6.12: Reforms and 5-years growth of labor productivity 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
LnProd(t)-LnProd(t-5) 
Real sector reforms 
Trade(t-5) 0.226***          
 (0.0674)          
Current Account(t-5)  0.236***         
  (0.0587)         
Agriculture(t-5)   0.0685        
   (0.0551)        
Network(t-5)    0.156***       
    (0.0463)       
Financial sector reforms 
Domestic Finance(t-5)     0.191***      
     (0.0517)      
Banking(t-5)      0.179***     
      (0.0514)     
Securities(t-5)       0.189***    
       (0.0438)    
Capital(t-5)        0.183***   
        (0.0456)   
Capital Resident(t-5)         0.169***  
         (0.0501)  
Capital nonresident(t-5)          0.117** 
          (0.0429) 
LNProd(t-5) -0.254*** -0.176* -0.103 -0.0897 -0.194** -0.189** -0.193** -0.148 -0.139 -0.136 
 (0.0759) (0.101) (0.106) (0.0955) (0.0873) (0.0871) (0.0916) (0.0910) (0.0935) (0.100) 
Constant 2.466*** 1.658 1.027 0.899 1.918** 1.876** 1.903* 1.437 1.342 1.362 
 (0.776) (1.021) (1.088) (0.971) (0.889) (0.887) (0.930) (0.934) (0.962) (1.017) 
Observations 213 214 206 209 186 186 186 214 214 214 
R-squared 0.475 0.467 0.393 0.329 0.389 0.384 0.394 0.434 0.429 0.417 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered within countries in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country fixed-effects are included in all the estimations. 
 
Table 6.13: Decomposition for the 5-year growth of labor productivity 
  Within component Structural change Total 
Real sector reforms   
Trade |+81|*** 19 100 
Current_account |+97|*** 3 100 
Agriculture 98 |-2| 100 
Network |+86|*** |14| 100 
Financial sector reforms   
Domestic_Finance |+95|*** |5| 100 
Banking |+94| |6| 100 
Securities |99.5|*** 0.5 100 
Capital |+97|*** |-3| 100 
Capital_resident |+90|*** 10 100 










Figure 6.3: Agricultural reforms and productivity 
 
 
Table 6.14: Reforms and sectoral productivity growth 
  Agriculture Industry Services 
Real Sector Reforms    
Trade 0.00451 0.00962* 0.0101* 
 (0.00387) (0.00550) (0.00538) 
Current Account 0.00680 0.00857 0.0131** 
 (0.00467) (0.00515) (0.00555) 
Agriculture 0.000685 0.00140 0.00329 
 (0.00286) (0.00458) (0.00354) 
Network -0.000378 0.00748** 0.0118*** 
 (0.00258) (0.00328) (0.00397) 
Financial Sector Reforms   
Domestic Finance 0.00490 0.00673* 0.0104*** 
 (0.00311) (0.00369) (0.00371) 
Banking 0.00478 0.00566 0.00985** 
 (0.00315) (0.00382) (0.00367) 
Securities 0.00370 0.00939*** 0.00932*** 
 (0.00274) (0.00322) (0.00335) 
Capital 0.00246 0.00442 0.00744 
 (0.00390) (0.00419) (0.00461) 
Capital Resident 0.000737 0.00290 0.00375 
 (0.00306) (0.00401) (0.00441) 
Capital Non-Residents 0.00268 0.00236 0.00766* 
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7.1. Empirical Findings 
7.1.1. Data 
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the patterns, causes and (labor market) consequences 
of structural change in developing countries especially those in Africa. The thesis begins with the 
premise that the study of structural transformation in Africa is limited by a great statistical problem. 
These statistical problems produce a considerable amount of uncertainty in our continuous attempt 
to estimate the effect of structural change on productivity growth and other outcomes in Africa. 
Building on the existing work of McMillan and Rodrik (2011) and de Vries et al. (2015), we conduct a 
meticulous study of the statistical sources, methods, statistical reforms, and macroeconomic reforms, 
such as currency redenomination, to produce a new sectoral database that is used to analyze structural 
developments in Africa in the rest of the thesis. One clear lesson from the construction of the sectoral 
database is that while African statistical institutes are improving the production of information on 
sectoral output, production of data on inputs such as employment, hours worked and sectoral 
information on capital and Research and Development (R&D) remains a challenge. The lack of key 
input data such as sectoral capital and R&D impair empirical research on structural change (see 
limitations below).  
In general, basic employment information such as the number of people engaged, hours worked, and 
occupation is severely limited in Africa. While this is the case for most African countries, there are 
also good practices on the continent. For example, South Africa conducts quarterly labor force surveys 
with detailed information on sectoral employment, occupation, and hours worked. In most parts of 
Africa, data on hours worked is mostly missing, an outcome largely due to the high level of informality 
on the continent. Although the informal sector is significant in Africa, reliable and consistent time 
series data on informal sector output and employment by sector is still missing from African statistics. 
Notwithstanding these data limitations, the thesis constructs sectoral indicators on value added and 
employment that covers both the formal and informal sector and accounts for 80% of GDP in Africa.  
7.1.2. Patterns of structural change 
Using this database, the thesis further establishes many empirical regularities about the patterns of 
structural change in Africa.  First and foremost, there is a process of de-agriculturalization in Africa, 
with the employment share of agriculture declining over time. Unlike, the experience of early 
industrializers in the 19th century where technological progress in manufacturing was the main driver 
of the de-agriculturalization (i.e. a pull effect), the de-agriculturalization of Africa is linked to marginal 
improvements in agricultural productivity (i.e. a push effect). The experience of Africa contrasts with 
the well-established trajectory of economic growth where advances in industrial technology are 
essential for successful structural transformation at early stages of development.  
The employment and value-added shares of agriculture have declined signaling the changing structure 
of production. However, the service sector is the main recipient of the workers exiting the agricultural 
sector. While some sub-sectors of services such as business and telecommunication are as dynamic as 
manufacturing, other sub-sectors such as trade, government and personal services are only marginally 
more productive than agriculture. Unfortunately, the majority of the reserve army exiting the 






phenomenon we describe as the informal tertiarization of African economies. The premature 
(informal) tertiarization in Africa means that structural transformation has been weaker than it would 
have been if resources had shifted to manufacturing or high-tech services. 
In contrast to previous studies, our data suggest that the productivity of the service sector is higher 
than previously estimated (Table 3.2). This is due to the structural undercounting of some high-
productivity services sub-sectors, such as telecommunications, business services, and important 
sectors such as entertainment and the informal sector.   
Structural change is also more important than previously estimated (Table 3.3) due again to the 
undercounting of services in previous data. We have seen a massive exodus of agricultural workers to 
trade services and a moderate movement to ICT services particularly in tech start-ups. The systematic 
undercounting resulted in an underestimation of productivity levels, and hence an underestimation of 
productivity growth due to the reallocation of labor to these services. Aggregate productivity growth 
due to innovation within sectors comes mainly from manufacturing and agriculture. However, 
aggregate productivity due to the reallocation of workers arises mainly from trade and business 
services (see Table A3.5). This suggests that apart from manufacturing, dynamic services such as 
business services can play a key role in the transformation of African economies. This is beginning to 
show in the case of East African economies.  
Being aware of the importance of regional technological interdependence (spatial externalities) in the 
process of structural transformation, the thesis makes a departure from the existing literature and 
studies technological change and technological catch-up within African by considering catch-up with 
respect to an African technology leader. We do this by using nonparametric methods (Data 
Envelopment Analysis) and structural methods (shift-share catch-up decomposition) to estimate an 
African production frontier. We further measure productivity change in Africa and disentangle the 
change due to general technological progress and catch-up. As shown in Chapter 4, catch-up within 
Africa is a sector-specific phenomenon. Our analysis shows that Botswana and Mauritius are the only 
two countries in Africa which have converged to the productivity level as well as the efficiency level 
of the frontier, with mining and manufacturing being the technological engines of catch-up in these 
two countries respectively. We explore the special role of technological catch-up by decomposing it 
into within-sector convergence, between-sector convergence, and initial specialization. The results 
highlight the special role of structural change in catch-up. The chapter contributes to recent evidence 
suggesting that countries can climb up the income ladder at a faster rate through a two-pronged 
transformation – i.e. structural change and technological catch-up. 
The thesis further examines the question of premature deindustrialization in Africa. Chapter 5 show 
that deindustrialization is not the typical experience of most countries in the region. Rather, we 
observe a process of industrial stagnation where the manufacturing output share for a typical African 
country has not changed since 1970.  We document, however, important regional differences with 
East Africa industrializing and Southern Africa deindustrializing. Based on this extensive evidence, we 
argue that the appropriate characterization of the evidence is industrial stagnation not premature 
deindustrialization.  
 
7.1.3. Potential causes of structural change 






deindustrialization, a specific phenomenon of structural change. We found that changes in income, 
technological change and international trade are essential for the industrial development and structural 
transformation of Africa. In particular, technical progress, through the price-taker mechanism, has 
had a negative effect on relative manufacturing employment, suggesting that African countries may 
have imported negative technology effects on employment from abroad. While international trade in 
general creates more manufacturing jobs than it displaces in Africa, intra-regional trade has played a 
limited role in the industrial development of the continent. Exchange rate competitiveness and 
domestic investment also play a significant role in the structural transformation of the Africa.  
Several studies have shown that market and institutional frictions lead to a suboptimal allocation of 
scarce resources across sectors penalizing overall productivity growth (e.g., Bartelsman et al., 2013; 
Hsieh & Klenow, 2009; Restuccia & Rogerson, 2008). Structural reforms are often used to reduce 
rigidities that exist in markets in developing countries. Chapter 6 of this thesis examines how trade 
reforms, product market reforms, and financial reforms affect labor productivity growth and its two 
components – between effect and within effect – in developing countries. The results overwhelmingly 
show that reforms affect growth in developing countries mostly by inducing within-sector productivity 
growth but not structural change, further providing empirical support for the argument that many 
developing countries had structural adjustments programs without structural change (Page, 2012). 
7.1.4. Labor Market Consequences 
The process of informal tertiarization of African economies has not only slowed down productivity 
growth but has also affected job stability across sectors with attendant consequences on 
unemployment and income inequality in Africa. Jobs in the services sector are highly volatile compared 
to manufacturing, increasing uncertainties for a majority of workers.  There is a strong shift towards 
services, with the highest annual job creation in the sector being in wholesale and retail trade services 
(largely informal) and personal and government services, and only  a weak to moderate shift towards 
dynamic business services due to potentially restrictive opportunities that limit labor absorption into 
dynamic modern market services. The expansion of these non-tradable services has increased 
transitory employment since jobs in these sectors are often temporary or part-time in nature, less paid 
and protected, and have fewer fringe benefits and opportunities for career development. This has 
increased earnings inequality and stalled the expected poverty reduction associated with structural 
change because business services which is a high-wage services sector is creating fewer opportunities 
compared with lower-wage non-tradable services. 
The labor market institutional arrangements in many countries in Africa have played a significant role 
in these outcomes. We find that rigid labor market institutional arrangements in the region discourage 
job reallocation, making it difficult to reallocate surplus labor into sectors where they could be more 
productive, penalizing productivity growth as a result.  
 
7.2. Policy Implications 
The patterns of de-agriculturalization, industrial stagnation, premature tertiarization, and technological 
trajectories observed are a result of persistent structural disequilibrium in African economies. 
Therefore, appropriate policies can alter these negative growth paths and mitigate associated costs. 






with a strong manufacturing sector (the case of Mauritius in the 1970s/80s). Countries that have 
enjoyed sustained growth and structural transformation did not leave industrial development to the 
whims and caprices of the market. They engaged in active industrial policies. In the past, it was argued 
that Africa’s failed industrialization is due to government failure. Particularly, bad complementary 
macroeconomic management and inappropriate policy adoption. Therefore, structural adjustment 
programs were instituted to allow the private sector to drive growth with a resulting marginalization 
of industrial policy. The outcome of this approach to development is disastrous growth with no 
significant structural change. With the incoming youth bulge, it is now clear that industrialization is a 
possible pathway to the structural transformation of Africa. However, this thesis has shown that 
complementary policies may be key to avoiding the past industrial mistakes. Particularly, job 
reallocation towards dynamic sectors is restricted by rigid labor market institutions. Encouraging more 
flexible markets regulations with stricter enforcement and protection for workers could be a potential 
way of allocating resources efficiently across sectors.  
The thesis has further shown that a multi-sector approach to development could also transform 
African economies. Business services such as ICT, banking, transportation, and healthcare are large 
scale, capital intensive and technologically dynamic and are an important source of productivity gains 
in Africa. Much of the productivity gains in East Africa, for example, comes from these services. While 
manufacturing should be the bedrock of development, evidence in this thesis suggests that modern 
services could offer significant opportunities for the transformation of African economies.  
Results in the thesis imply that domestic income has not been sufficient to generate a manufacturing 
expansion. The majority of African economies are populated by poor consumers, with the expansion 
of the market through international trade potentially encouraging manufacturing growth and 
technological upgrading in African countries. With the low levels of intra-African trade, the Africa 
Continental Free Trade Agreements (AfCFTA) presents a unique opportunity for industrialization 
through the promotion of manufacturing exports and a reduction in trade frictions within Africa to 
expand intra-regional trade.  
Another unique implication of the thesis has to do with the diffusion of productive knowledge within 
Africa to achieve productivity convergence. The spread of African-induced innovations such as Mpesa 
and Mpedigree has removed impediments to productivity growth within African countries. Since the 
diffusion of technological knowledge decreases with distance, encouraging the adoption of best 
practice within Africa can be an important means to encourage productivity convergence within Africa 
as shown in Chapter 4  
Chapter 6 showed that market-oriented reforms work only through a short-term within productivity 
effect. Reforms have not been successful in inducing long term effects such as a structural change 
bonus. Therefore, there is a prima facie rationale for active industrial policy and complementary labor 
market and land reform policies that may help in the efficient allocation of resources across sectors.  
 
7.3. Limitations and Future research direction 
Though this thesis has contributed significantly to the literature on structural change in developing 






effect may be sensitive to formal and informal transitions. The work of de Vries et al (2015) on the 
BRICs show that the total reallocation effect comprises a reallocation effect due to the transition 
between formal and informal sectors (i.e. 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖) and the reallocation between main sectors (i.e. 𝐺𝐺).  
Unlike the standard shift-share methodology used in Chapter 3 to study structural change in Africa this 
model shows that broad sectoral decompositions might hide considerable variation at a lower level of 
aggregation. A particular sector, say manufacturing, might encourage productivity growth by 
outsourcing labor-intensive activities to small informal firms. This detailed reallocation may not be 
picked up by aggregate shift-share analysis but a detailed decomposition that takes into account formal 
and informal sector transitions may pick this up as −𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 , indicating a negative reallocation effect 
between subsectors (de Vries et al, 2015). This requires that we move from a broad sector level to a 
detailed subsector level analysis based on a distinction between informal and formal activities 
especially in the context of Africa where the informal sector is sizeable. However, detailed sectoral 
data on the informal sector is not available. Recent studies have shed light on this detail transitions 
combining national representative surveys with national accounts data  ( e.g., Diao, Kweka, et al., 2018; 
Diao, Magalhaes, et al., 2018). Combining sectoral data by formality with nationally representative 
surveys to shed light on the details and nuances of structural change in Africa is an important future 
research agenda. 
 Second, mainstream growth theory has emphasized the role of capital deepening in the structural 
transitions of low-income countries. In Chapter 4 we emphasize the role of capital in improving 
productive efficiency of some African countries. However, tracing these patterns to the sectoral level 
proved difficult due to the non-existence of data on sectoral capital.  
Third, the manufacturing share of GDP depends not only on manufacturing productivity and prices, 
but also on productivity and prices in other sectors, since these other sectors provide competing uses 
for the factors of production employed in manufacturing (Nickell et al, 2008: 1154). Therefore, 
understanding the causes of industrial development and the reasons why its pace varies among 
countries requires modelling all markets and the global economy in a consistent framework. In an 
empirical model, this requires modelling relative prices, technology, and trade. However, prices and 
technology are endogenous. A potential estimation strategy is to instrument for prices and technology 
using price-shifters and technology-shifters, respectively. In the literature, sectoral data on government 
consumption expenditure is used as an instrument for relative prices, but it is not available for the 
sample of African countries. One possible exogenous shock from the supply-side that we can use as 
a technology-shifter (instrument) is government R&D expenditure in basic science – which is less 
responsive to market incentives – but this is missing from African statistical databases. As a result, the 
conclusions derived from Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are based on correlation analyses, and therefore 
we cannot make any causal claims. That is why Section 7.1.3 lists the findings as potential causes. 
A possible way to overcoming this problem is theory. However, modelling demand, supply and trade 
is theoretically intractable and often entails considerable sacrifice of realism. A theoretical model that 
is able to abstract and still predict the patterns of structural change observed in Africa in a consistent 
manner may be a plausible solution to this challenge. As Friedman (1953) rightly said, “a theory is to 
be judged by its predictive power for the class of phenomena for which it is intended to explain”, in 
that sense,  a theoretical model that has a strong predictive power on structural change in Africa is the 






 Impact statement 
Structural change is the most prominent feature of modern economic growth (Kuznet, 1973), and 
remains the most important aspiration for developing countries in Africa and beyond. The importance 
of structural transformation has been emphasized in a number of Sustainable Developments Goals 
(SDGs), SDG 8 ‘Decent work and economic growth’ and SDG 9 ‘Industry, innovation and 
infrastructure’. At the regional level, the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063 emphasizes 
industrialization as a means and end to productivity growth in Africa. The Africa Development Bank 
has also stressed industrialization as one of its pillars (high fives) for transforming Africa. With the 
incoming youth bulge, the importance of structural change and the creation of decent jobs cannot be 
overemphasized. However, lack of reliable sectoral data and evidence have generated uncertainty 
surrounding the measurement of structural change in Africa, resulting in knowledge and policy 
deficits.  
This thesis provides a new sectoral database on Africa that covers 80% of GDP in Africa. The thesis 
then uses the database to examine the sectoral trends and patterns, causes and consequences of 
structural change and its implications for sustainable development in Africa. The content of the thesis 
has so far received key media and academic coverage and stimulated passionate debate on structural 
transformation in Africa. 
On the recent expansion of manufacturing in Africa and the different strategies that African countries 
can adopt to create a pathway of sustainable development, the June 11th 2020 edition of The 
Economist magazine cites Chapter 3 of the thesis.111 Chapter 2 of the thesis was cited in the 2019 
African Economic Outlook (AEO) prepared by the African Development Bank (AfDB), which 
suggests  that  macroeconomic  stabilization  and  employment outcomes in Africa are better when 
industry drives growth,  showing  that  industrialization  is  a  robust  path  to  rapid  job  creation. 
This conclusion is based on analysis of sector-driven growth episodes and job dynamics using the 
Extended Africa Sector Database (EASD) discussed in Chapter 2.  The AEO is the one of key policy 
briefs that provides scientific inputs and key recommendations to African governments. The 2019 
AEO was translated into Amharic, Arabic, Hausa, Kiswahili, Pidgin English, Portuguese, Yoruba and 
Zulu that reached millions of Africans.  
Chapter 2 and 3 are cited in the World Bank global productivity study/report and the World Bank 
global productivity database.112 The reports analyzes the evolution and patterns of productivity and 
assesses the effect of structural change, technological change and COVID-19 pandemic in 164 
countries, and discusses many policy options to rekindle productivity growth. Again, Chapter 2 and 3 
have been cited in the World Bank’s report on the future of work in Africa. The report assesses how 
the adoption and diffusion of digital technologies may affect the nature of work in Africa by creating 
new opportunities and challenges.113 Chapter 3 is also cited in the World Bank’s industrializing for 
jobs in Africa report.114 The study seeks to assess the prospects of countries in the region participating 
 
111 See graphs (The Economist,2020 June 11th Edition). “How manufacturing might take off in Africa” 
112 See (Editor: Alistair Dieppe, 2020). “Global Productivity: Trends, drivers and policy.” The World Bank Group.   
113 See ( Editors: Jieun Choi, Mark A. Dutz, Zainab Usman, 2020).  “The Future of work in Africa: Harnessing digital 
technologies for all.” Office of the Chief Economist, African Region, The World Bank Group. 
114 Industrializing for jobs in Africa through global value chains. Forthcoming, Office of the Chief Economist, African 






in specific manufacturing global value chains (GVCs) for significant and sustained gains in terms of 
jobs and productivity. Finally, Chapter 3 is cited in the Brookings Institution’s assessment of 
employment intensities of industries without smokestacks.115 
The thesis has also generated numerous academic interests. The chapters in the thesis have been cited 
in academic journals and working papers.116 It has also stimulated a passionate debate on the 
deindustrialization of Africa. Citing Chapter 2, which considers the recent statistical revision in Africa, 
a number of studies have begun to question the dominant view that Africa is deindustrializing 
prematurely. For example, a recent article in The Conversation117 questions the premature 
deindustrialization narrative and provides a more optimistic narrative about manufacturing patterns 
in Africa in recent years. The underlying academic paper for this article is based on the Extended 
Africa Sector Database presented in Chapter 2.  
The findings and evidence in the thesis have been presented at conferences and workshops to 
stimulate further discussions on structural change in Africa.  For example, chapter 5 was presented at 
UNIDO-UNU-MERIT Conference on the Future of Industrial Work (September 2019, UNIDO 
HQ, Vienna). Chapters 3 and 6 were presented at the CSAE Conference on Economic Development 
in Africa (2019, St. Catherine’s College, Oxford University, UK). Chapter 4 was presented at 
GLOBELICS International Conference on Innovation, Economic Growth and Sustainable 
Development (2018, Accra Ghana) and the MIT Media Lab and YSI Workshop on Innovation, 
Economic Complexity and Economic Geography (2018, Cambridge, USA). Chapter 3 was presented 
at the PEGNet/African School Economics Conference on Improving the quality of education and 
learning outcomes in developing countries (2018, Cotonou, Benin); YSI Africa Convening (2018, 
Harare, Zimbabwe) and the Development Studies Association Conference on Global Inequalities: 
Parallel Session on Structural Change Tensions and Tradeoffs (2018, University of Manchester, UK). 
Chapter 2 of thesis was presented at the UNU-MERIT structural change research theme meetings 
and the internal conference in 2017.  
The discussions, debates and the significant attention received from academia, media, and policy 
circles indicate the societal relevance of the thesis. Two analytical chapters are under review in 
academic journals. The other two chapters are currently being prepared for submission.  
 
 
115 See (B. Coulibaly et al, 2020). “Job creation for the youth in Africa: assessing the potential of industries without 
smokestacks”. AGI, Brookings Institution.  
116 See Naudé, W. (2019). Brilliant technologies and brave entrepreneurs: A new narrative for african manufacturing. 
Journal of International Affairs, 17(No.1), 143–158.   
Estmann et al. (2020). Merchandise export diversification strategy for Tanzania-promoting inclusive growth, economic 
complexity and structural change. DERG Working paper series 02-2020, University of Copenhagen 
Baymul, C. & Sen, K. (2020).  Was Kuznets Right? New Evidence on the Relationship between Structural Transformation 
and Inequality. The Journal of Development Studies, 56:9, 1643-1662, DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2019.1702161 
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